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Introduction
Welcome to the third volume of the Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education
(JPSE), a peer-reviewed journal put out by the Society for the Philosophical Study of
Education (SPSE). We would like to thank Fordham University for giving us access to
its digital research platform, and Professor Babette Babich of Fordham University, editor
of New Nietzsche Studies and author of several books on Nietzsche and other topics, for
her generosity, support, and participation in this project.
JSPE aims to publish papers that approach the field of education from a philosophical
perspective, in the broadest sense of the term. Some of the papers considered for
publication may be selected from works presented at the annual meeting of the Society
for the Philosophical Study of Education by members of that organization, after these
papers undergo blind peer review and revision if necessary. However, this journal does
not limit its content to works pertaining to the annual conference; it strongly invites
outside submissions from any interested party, provided that such submissions fit the
guidelines of the journal. JPSE will consider papers, book reviews, interviews, and other
documents with emphases in history, psychology, literature, politics, religion, pedagogy,
and other areas if they portend to the general ideal of philosophical speculation on the
meaning, purpose, and/or nature of education, both in the literal and in the broadest sense
of the word. To encourage diffusion, we are posting abstracts of the contributions.
With regard to paper selection, JPSE has established the following guidelines for paper
review, consideration, and publication: each paper is blind reviewed by two outside
readers as well as reviewed by the chief editors. If deemed necessary by the editors, the
paper may be sent to a third reader. Reviews are “value free” insofar as JPSE is not
consciously pushing an educational agenda. If the argument makes logical sense, seems
valid, and does not violate facts, it is treated with a certain amount of flexibility. Our
desire is to ensure that all papers go through a “screening” process of blind review,
whether or not the paper has undergone previous commentary during conference
presentation. Unless other arrangements are made, we claim one-time publication rights
for any submission that is accepted.
A paper that receives two positive reviews from outside readers and support from the
journal editors will be accepted, with suggested revisions if necessary. Whenever
possible, readers and/or editors will suggest appropriate revisions, stylistic or otherwise,
or raise questions regarding the content, context, and argument of the essay submitted.
These should help the author make revisions, if any are requested. Our goal is not to turn
papers away, but rather to help authors develop their ideas. If the paper is returned and
the suggested revisions have not been made to the satisfaction of the editors, the paper
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will not be accepted. The decision of the editors is final.
Often in academia, peer editing is highly select, and frequently it follows strict
ideological guidelines, thus discouraging innovative approaches to areas of study. Our
intention is to provide a platform for scholarship and speculation that can permit the
exploration of ideas that may not represent mainstream concerns of the academic
community. For this reason a section of this journal may be dedicated to works in
progress, including those on topics that are not currently fashionable in critical circles.
The journal thus will consider finished works, reviews, and other forms of inquiry when
these enrich the content of the review. Our approach aims to enable writers to receive
constructive feedback, though without compromising the integrity of the writing as well
as the contribution of accurate information and knowledge, which must remain the
purpose of scholarship. Thus the journal will encourage original endeavors and
perspectives in order to broaden fields of research and speculation, concentrating on the
eclectic and Socratic purposes of pursuing inquiry and increasing thought about and
reflection upon the educational landscape in the broad sense of the term. This format
should allow for a safe exchange of feedback and foster the growth of scholarship, thus
creating a supportive intellectual community.
***
“We don’t need no education,” Pink Floyd famously sings in the rock opera The Wall;
“We don’t need no thought control.” The themes implied in these lines — issues
concerning the role of the professor or teacher, the value of freedom in education, the
importance of the concept of the individual, the treatment of education as a commodity
— recur in the essays and articles collected in this volume. Thus we read of the
representation of the authoritative voice in the fictional education of Harry Potter, the
attempt to establish a language that allows inclusion of the non-human world in human
communication, the evolution of the concept of the autonomous individual in
representative democracies, and the search for the mythic, the magical, and the
transcendent in educational systems. Discussions of the role of freedom and
entertainment in education also come to the fore. Representations and misrepresentations
and the political positions that underlie them are featured. These articles, then, explore a
range of subjects, moving from the Age of Reason to concepts and beliefs of the New
Age. If the mix seems eclectic, it is; yet throughout these essays the power of education
to “educe,” in the sense both of bringing out the latent and of inferring, recurs.
As a guide, the educator does not provide information, but assists the student in finding
his or her own knowledge and insight. Communication is key, no matter what the
discipline. The educator, our writers continually stress, must lead students to discovery,
to finding their own meanings, be it through the authority of the voice (as, Babich
contends, is the case for the character Severus Snape of the Harry Potter movies, played
by Alan Rickman), or through attention to the boundaries of freedom in the classroom, as
vii

the papers by Wenneborg and by Miller and Bourgeois suggest. Or perhaps discovery
occurs in the structural formation of the child in ways that encourages integration or
integrality through the inclusion of the mythic and the magical as valid realms of
experience, areas that are explored in the studies by Mitchell, Falk, and A. Johnston.
Approaches that surpass direct focus on the anthropocentric are central to the critique of
Humanism in the paper by Börebäck and Schwieler, while the papers by Bulle and G.
Johnston look to the Enlightenment either to trace the evolution of the concept of the
individual (Bulle) or to explore how the writings of one of the key figures of the Age of
Reason, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, are understood, and too often misunderstood, in the
context of a cultural matrix that tries to assert its dominant, politicized worldview. Thus
in the movement from New Age or magical to hegemonic cultural forces, questions arise
such as, ‘What role does the character of the teacher play in the child’s education?’
‘What degree of educational freedom should be granted to the pupil?’ ‘How can we
interact with the world in ways that do not automatically implicate us in
anthropomorphism or focus exclusively on rationalism, excluding both nature and the
underlying processes that define the realms of myth and magic?’ ‘Should these realms be
re-examined?’ Such questions circulate in these works, and give us a “handle” on ways
to approach education.
We hope that considering today’s extraverted, goal-oriented world, the essays presented
here will lead you to reflect even more on the purpose, fate, and future of education, and
on its need to foster in both the student and the educator a universal recognition of the
basic skills that encourage communication and accuracy in learning and understanding,
not solely as a means to or a goal of production, but as a way of encouraging constant
discovery and recognition of the state of being of the individual and of the collective self
as both work to enhance and inform each other. The variety of topics addressed in the
essays included in this issue of JPSE reflects the quality and diversity of the approaches
we would like to consider in future volumes. Should you have any questions or be
interested in submitting material, please do not hesitate to contact the editors via email at
ajohnst2@depaul.edu, ajohnston@colum.edu, or gjohnsto@depaul.edu.
Guillemette Johnston and Allan Johnston
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CALL FOR PAPERS
JPSE is now actively seeking submissions of papers by members of SPSE and others.
Priority will be given to papers delivered at the November meetings of SPSE in Chicago.
However, other works, such as interviews, reviews, works in progress, and articles, will
also be considered. See the introduction for an idea of the editorial strategy and scope of
JPSE. Please submit materials as attachments to the editors, Allan Johnston and
Guillemette Johnston, at the following email addresses:
ajohnst2@depaul.edu
ajohnston@colum.edu
gjohnsto@depaul.edu
Please indicate “JPSE submission” in the subject line of the email. Documents should be
submitted in Microsoft Word doc or docx formats. Please include an abstract of about
100 words and a list of key search terms with your submission, along with a short bio.
A NOTE FOR READERS
If you are interested in reviewing papers submitted to JPSE, please let us know.
Interested parties should submit a CV and a writing sample for consideration.
When reviewing a paper, readers are expected to exercise academic tolerance and provide
constructive support with helpful suggestions, questions, and comments. Disparaging,
egoistic, and dismissive feedback on behalf of the reader will not be accepted and will not
be sent to the writer unless it is revised. This type of review, we feel, does not serve the
purpose of helping to create a safe, respectful, and supportive academic community. We
aim at opening minds, not closing them, and being helpful and productive.
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ABSTRACTS
Spirit and Grace, Letters and Voice
Babette Babich
The role of the professor as actor is explored here through Alan Rickman’s portrayal of
the character Severus Snape in the Harry Potter movie franchise. Rickman’s
performance is linked to Ivan Illich’s discussion of monastic ambience and community to
show how the quality of grace is related to the concept of gratuity, or the freely giving
away of something for no reason and with no expectation of return (German
Umsonstigkeit), and how this quality of giving relates to the performative qualities that
underlie teaching. Additional themes include the significance of alchemical signature —
particularly the daffodil (‘powdered root of asphodel’) — as well as rhythm and prayer in
Milton, Goethe, and Nietzsche.
Key words:
Ivan Illich, Harry Potter, Alan Rickman, alchemy, rhythm
Two Concepts of Educational Freedom
Emily Wenneborg
Many contemporary educational debates that do not appear to be about freedom do in
fact depend on an underlying concept of educational freedom. Accordingly, it is
important to consider what conception of educational freedom brings greatest clarity to
such discussions. In this article I challenge one widely held view of freedom, that
freedom is the absence of constraints, and I advocate a contrasting view of freedom as the
scope of action afforded by one’s social setting. I suggest that we judge the freedom
offered by different educational structures not in terms of how many constraints are
placed on students, but in terms of how much agency students possess within those
structures.
Key words:
Ivan Illich, A. S. Neill, Summerhill, freedom, agency, structure
Teaching as Entertainment: An Examination of Effects
Ross M. Miller and Steven J. Bourgeois
In this article, we seek to identify the problems in common educational practice and the
ideas that serve as their basis. We treat two contrasting approaches in the classroom:
teaching as entertainment and the hard school. Through our analysis, we explore the
purpose of education and discuss the long-term effects of viewing schooling through the
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prism of entertainment. Though applicable throughout the curriculum, our discussion
focuses on ideas and experiences relating to our classroom experience in the liberal arts,
specifically within historical studies at the secondary level. While taking a critical
approach, we also provide a possible solution in line with our argument.
Key words:
Educational philosophy, entertainment in education, technology in education
Enantiodromia and Integrality: The Rhythm of the Cultural Continuum
Robert Mitchell
We have arrived at a critical point in the cultural continuum and in the evolution of
consciousness. This fact invites a re-visioning of the K-12 education curriculum to
emphasize the continuum of culture and incorporate the concept of the evolution of
consciousness via the processes of enantiodromia and integrality. Enantiodromia depicts
a wave-like pattern that challenges the description of the cultural continuum as linear,
historical and progressive, describing instead a dynamic, rhythmic process where things
transform into their opposites. Integrality depicts a structure of consciousness defined by
the cultural historian Jean Gebser as representing the next step in the evolution of
consciousness. Each of Gebser’s unfolding structures of consciousness is significant in
terms of ontological development. Integrality, the next phase in this development,
describes an evolution in consciousness as well as a transformation in the cultural
continuum. It can be equated to what Carl Jung described psychologically as the process
of individuation. Together, individuation and integrality give form to the next phase in
the evolution of consciousness.
Key words:
Jung, Neumann, Gebser, enantiodromia, integrality, individuation, transcendent function,
collective consciousness, collective unconscious, mass psyche
Humanity in the Womb of History
Thomas M. Falk
From climate change to mass species extinction and the threat of nuclear war, history as
we know it appears to be approaching a precipice. Using a phenomenological lens, the
author describes ways in which our political economy, neurochemistry, and habits of
digital communications technology usage contribute to these existential threats. Taking
cues from ancient Athens to contemporary brain science, the essay next suggests
directions for developing a curriculum of consciousness through which we might literally
change our minds and thus envision a future, very different from the present, lying just
beyond the horizon.
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Key words:
Phenomenology, political economy, digital media, curriculum
Elaborating Environmental Communication within “Posthuman” Theory
Maria Kristina Börebäck and Elias Schwieler
In this article, using a posthumanist and Deleuzian vocabulary, we problematize the
anthropocentric approach within communication theory that at present is setting the
theoretical ground for environmental communication. We argue that ‘anthropocentrism’
has caused humans to situate humanity at the top of an assumed environmental hierarchy.
Consequently, humanity has given itself the right to interpret the world according to its
own standard. This, in turn, has consequences for what is called the environment,
including its marginalization and exploitation.
To address this issue, we maintain that environmental communication is in need of a
posthuman theoretical elaboration that allows for a post-anthropocentric turn and enables
an alternative radical approach to environmental communication theory. Our main
argument is that the idea of processuality allows us to work with relationality as a
concept within environmental communication theory. Relationality gives rise to the
communicative actions that are put in motion by environmental communication theory.
In traditional environmental communication research, environmental issues are
understood as expressions of discourses or systems. We suggest, in response, that
environmental issues, as posthuman communicational processes, are crucial for
understanding sustainable development as a set of practices. Posthuman or posthumanist
theory, we argue, makes possible a turn from an androcentric ideal to a postanthropocentric stance within environmental communication. This lets us develop the
concept of “sustainable development” and its practices as relating to both material and
ethical matters. Environmental communication thus becomes a function in which
knowledge provides the necessary abstraction for engaging in posthuman and postanthropocentric communicative actions.
Key words:
Post-humanism, environmental communication, processuality, relationality, sustainable
development, Deleuze
Epistemologies and the Formation of Modern Democratic Individuality
Nathalie Bulle
In this paper we analyze the philosophical theories underlying models of democratic
individuality that historically developed in western culture. We begin by defending the

xii

idea that recognition of the human faculty for independent thinking lies at the foundation
of democratic modernity. On this basis, using analyses made by the epistemologist
Filmer Northrop for support, we study the impact of philosophical theories of knowledge
on models of democratic individuality. We observe that the epistemic duality of sources
of human knowledge lies at the heart of some of the major advances in modern
epistemology. We then argue that this epistemic duality opens a path that is distinct from
both the ontological dualism of classical rationalism and the radical empiricisms that are
derived from classical empiricism, but that includes their main teachings. This path
invites us to rethink the sources of free thinking in the knowing subject. It gives real
meaning to the idea of a participatory democracy to which schools contribute through
their cognitive role.
Key words:
Filmer Northrup, epistemology, individuality, democracy, empiricism
Politics, Education, and Understanding: Anglo-American Readings and
Misreadings of Rousseau in the 19th to 21st Centuries
Guillemette Johnston
Anglo-American readings of the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau from the late 19th
century to the present have been mixed, to say the least. If one looks at explorations of
Rousseau’s political and educational texts, one notices that while scholars such as Roger
D. Masters, Judith Shklar, and Patrick Riley have given valid and insightful readings of
Rousseau’s works, many conservative Anglo-American critics and scholars project
ideological perspectives onto Rousseau’s writings, seeing The Social Contract, Emile,
and other texts as harbingers of totalitarianism or exemplifications of hypocritical
manipulation. In this paper these latter readings (or misreadings) are criticized for their
misunderstanding or misappropriation of Rousseau’s philosophical achievement under
the form of a detailed commentary revisiting some of the more complex concepts in
Rousseau’s writings. Rousseau can be seen as a constellating figure who has become an
intellectual scapegoat for conservatives such as Irving Babbitt, J. L. Talmon, and Lester
G. Crocker, and more recently for Jonathan Israel and Michael Coffman. This lack of
ability to understand the nuances underlying Rousseau’s philosophy raises concerns
about ideological tendencies within educational systems in which such
misunderstandings are fostered by overemphasis on specific and limited perspectives
linked to empiricism, pragmatism, political and historical slants, and other philosophical
trends.
Key words:
Rousseau, Lester G. Crocker, J. L. Talmon, Irving Babbitt, Roger D. Masters, Patrick
Riley, Leo Strauss, Judith Shklar, Jonathan Israel, Michael Coffman, politics, education,
misreading
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Teaching Magical Thinking: Notes towards a Burroughsian Pedagogy
Allan Johnston
This paper looks at the pedagogical practices of William S. Burroughs and their
relationship to Burroughs’ concepts regarding the word virus, addictions to power, and
magical thinking. It argues that Burroughs’ writing engages in a constant attack upon
systems of social control, including those embodied in language and the processes of
rational thinking language supports. Burroughs describes his own belief system as
“magical thinking,” and pedagogical practices that he has suggested link to this system of
belief, which situates the individual at the center of his or her own perceptual universe
and therefore suggests causal links between perception and experience. Burroughs’
theories concerning “magical thinking” are compared to ideas presented in Scientology
and in eastern belief systems such as yoga and Buddhism.
Key words:
William S. Burroughs, magical thinking, pedagogy, Scientology, word virus
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Spirit and Grace, Letters and Voice
Babette Babich
1. Ivan Illich, C. S. Lewis, J. K. Rowling, and Gratuitous Grace1
Ivan Illich was born in 1926,2 the same year as the priest, physicist, and philosopher
Patrick Aidan Heelan, S. J. (1926-2015).3 I took a course in the philosophy of science
with Heelan, who was also the first to introduce me to C. S. Lewis, and, almost in the
same breath, to Ivan Illich’s personality (Heelan and Illich were friends) and to Illich’s
work. It is perhaps no accident that Heelan (in what he intended as a spiritual context)
would also tell me about Harry Potter by comparing me to Harry Potter. I had not yet
read the novels, but given the comparison, I promptly read the first book, Harry Potter
and the Sorcerer’s Stone as it is called in the American edition,4 and after that, of course,
I never stopped reading them. Between the books and the films, I came to realize that if
Heelan’s comparison was ultimately not particularly accurate, the enduring beauty of
Harry Potter, given the workings of the culture industry as Adorno details this, together
with Illich’s analysis of school as a schooling-in bourgeois society, is that everyone can
be compared to (or take themselves to be) Harry Potter.
Now Ivan Illich was the Slavoj Žižek of the 60s and 70s, as a proponent of distinctly
Catholic liberation theology, very radically, very broadly, conceived.5 And just as it is
not a ‘good thing’, generally speaking, to be compared with Slavoj Žižek, it is similarly
not a good thing to be part of liberation theology. An advocate of and for health contra
what he named ‘medicalization’, a scholar of the word and the book against school, and a
thinker about, and therefore a critic of, technology in our modern age, Illich would die, as
he lived, among friends, in Bremen in 2002. In the intervals between writing lectures and
books, Illich did the things that made him famous as one of our best candidates, apart
from Dorothy Day, for sainthood (one does not always admire such exemplars: I met
Dorothy Day when I was a kid, and found, as kids will, rather a lot to be desired in her
style of austerity). Saints are meant to be ascetics and Illich surely shared that style, to
such an extent that both his admirers and his detractors agree that his asceticism
ultimately fell short, lamenting his appreciation for good food and wine, as if wine were
not part of the heritage of the sacrament itself, and, indeed, of that other god, Dionysus.
2. ‘Umsonstigkeit’ – Gratuitous Grace
I read Ivan Illich’s Deschooling Society (1971) together with his reflections on Medical
Nemesis (1974) but also in connection with a work that appeared some two decades later:
In the Vineyard of the Text (1993). By and large, Illich criticized institutions as such, not
because he disagreed with them in the ideal — no more than did John Cardinal Newman
or Illich’s fellow Viennese compatriot, Ludwig Wittgenstein, or the British political
theorist and philosopher of education, Michael Oakeshott — but precisely because he
disagreed with them in practice.
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Reflecting on institutions in one of his last texts, “The Cultivation of Conspiracy,”6 Illich
reminded his listeners of the “kiss of peace”7 as legitimating intimacy and recognition,
which Illich, using a tactic not unrelated to Heidegger’s more esoteric philosophical
method, traced through a reflection on the meaning of words — tacking through
atmosphere and its layers, the aura — to speak of smell and of suffering what one was
forced to smell, the breath and breathing with, literally: con-spiracy, not as something to
challenge, much less avoid, but and much rather to “cultivate” for the sake of an elusive
“peace,” 8 the peace a priest commemorates to, for, and with his conspirators, his
concelebrants, his congregation. For Illich, who always remained a priest, his
conspirators were his friends, and he meant this not in a loosening or casual sense but as a
kind of informal but patent monasticism: “I have never doubted” he wrote — “and it’s
even more true today — that a ‘monastic’ ambience is the prerequisite to the
independence needed for a historically based indictment of society” (Illich, “Cultivation”
241). For Illich, “Community in our European tradition is … the consequence of a
conspiracy, a deliberate, mutual, somatic, and gratuitous gift to one another”
(“Cultivation” 235). In this way, a few years before his death, at a moment of
celebration, Illich offered this comparative reflection, recalling a certain corporeal shock
to the sensibilities imposed first by the sense of smell and the body and what this means
for spirit, as well as the very language of the “kiss of peace,” where we, just in order not
to have to pay attention to the kiss, focus on peace, pax; Illich called this focus a
distraction, and thus we shake hands during mass today, politely, resisting conspiracy as
we do.
Illich writes:
The Latin osculum is neither very old nor frequent. It is one of three
words that can be translated by the English “kiss.” In comparison with the
affectionate basium and the lascivious suavium, osculum was a latecomer
into classical Latin, and was used in only one circumstance as a ritual
gesture: In the second century, it became the sign given by a departing
soldier to a woman, thereby recognizing her expected child as his
offspring. (“Cultivation” 239-240)
Illich’s point would be that congregants had to be close enough to inhale one another’s
breath, and the community involved would have to presuppose the same:
Eucharist. Conspiratio, the mouth-to-mouth kiss, became the solemn
liturgical gesture by which participants in the cult-action shared their
breath or spirit with one another. (“Cultivation” 240)
At stake for Illich was the intractability of the same spirit that blows where it will, that is
not up to us, that is precisely not as we will.
From this reflection on spirit, Illich drew a striking set of observations that we ignore in
thinking about the philosophy of education and school at our peril: institutions and
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centers, even those founded by persons with the charisma, the grace and gifts, of an Ivan
Illich, could not, so he argued, be maintained, sustained, or preserved.
Illich argued that it was of the essence of spirit — and its clear paradox — that
atmosphere invites the institutionalization that will corrupt it. You never
know what will nurture the spirit of philia, while you can be certain what
will smother it. Spirit emerges by surprise, and it’s a miracle when it
abides; it is stifled by every attempt to secure it; it’s debauched when you
try to use it. (“Cultivation” 236)
Thus reflecting on the challenges of institutions as such, Illich’s reflections on education,
medicine, and technology explore the art of living in terms of mortality, but also as open
to — and this is where it gets hard — as generous to others in their mortality, their
vulnerability. Here we note that Illich’s Umsonstigkeit is virtually untranslatable into
English or, indeed, into German.
The standard English rendering in David Cayley’s impressions of his conversations with
Illich, The Rivers North of the Future, opted for simple “gratuity.”9 I think it essential to
hear the German: Umsonstigkeit, that is: something given for no good reason, no reason
at all, for nothing at all, supererogatory beyond exchange and market price, apart from
any expectation of any reciprocity, any quid pro quo, any aspiration to gain or advantage,
utterly gratuitous. Umsonstigkeit is thus the unexpected, corresponding to no obligation,
excess, beyond rule.
This kind of excess is akin to Nietzsche’s affirmation or “yes saying,” and, in this
measure, Illich’s Umsonstigkeit has a Goethean aspect, as we may recall that Pierre
Hadot celebrated Goethe’s view that “Only the present is our happiness” (Hadot, “Only”
217).10 Illich’s celebration is golden, or in Goethe’s words, „Herrlich wie am ersten tag“
(„Faust,“ ed. Beutler 149). But the allusion to gold already warns us to take care: as
Nietzsche emphasizes at the beginning of The Gay Science, the challenge for most of us
is to see the good of goodness just where there is no advantage, no purpose, no point.
Seeing what might, in such a fashion, be what is ‘good’, i.e., that it is good, isn’t a matter
of ‘value’ as Illich tries — not altogether successfully — to convey to Cayley, nor is it a
matter of rule or calculation and also, ultimately, a matter of reasoning; it is hence
inexplicable, irreducible to the good of the ideal of moral law, the categorical imperative.
3. On the Professor as ‘Acteur’ and the Culture Industry: Reflections on Alan
Rickman
Popular books and movies are always manufactured in accordance with what Theodor
Adorno named the ‘culture industry’; witness the recent flair and fade of Pokemon Go,
Doctor Who and Doctor Strange, Wonder Woman too, the X-Men, Star Wars and Star
Trek, and not least the Harry Potter formula, and its franchise and offshoots and prequels
too, its Disney World-style theme park surely included. In what follows, I read the
performance practice of the late Alan Rickman (1946-2016) as Severus Snape as an
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indispensable guide, if only because Rickman was an actor who played evil brilliantly,
rife with ambiguity, edged with surprise, contra our more automatic prejudices.11 As
Rickman plays Snape’s aspect, ressentiment-laden, this aspect includes unrequited and
therefore pure and unsullied love: it is just this lack of consummation, this virginity, that
matches Snape with Harry’s mother, such that he can say “always,” and it is why we
believe him, just as we believe his unwanted attentions to Lilly not as so much mooning
harassment but transfigured or redeemed in the undying dedication of romantic love12 —
and Rickman rather majored in this sort of romantic ideal. Indeed, if we were to count
his roles, Rickman specialized in playing lovers, including a lover who is also a bad guy
in Love Actually, or, more frequently, playing lovers of the risqué variety on stage in Les
Liasons Dangereuses or in Noel Coward’s Private Lives, or, a bit more esoterically, if
one will count the love of the world, speaking on behalf of God as Megatron in Dogma;
or dramatizing a father’s love, from incidental harassment become accidental perversion
(An Awfully Big Adventure) to bereavement (Snow Cake), or as the ‘wounded lover’, in
the already mentioned case of Snape or, else, classically romantically, in the case of
Colonel Brandon in Sense and Sensibility; or, beyond death itself, as the lover who cares
enough to return from the beyond for the sake of his bereaved partner in Truly Madly
Deeply.
I am concerned to write about Rickman’s ‘acteurly’ characterization of Severus Snape
not as lover, that is as having been in love with Harry Potter’s mother (think of the
Oedipal fantasies that constellation can evoke, and has, in fact, evoked among a certain
Harry Potter fan base) — a love utterly fantastic in every Lacanian sense,
unconditionally loyal beyond the grave — but rather, and this is my focus in what
follows, as a teacher at his most severe. True to the letter, Severus Snape’s name, like
everything in J. K. Rowling’s books, tells us everything. And as the incarnation of the
virtues of elocution, Rickman as actor justifies every syllable with every word he speaks,
every pause, every eyebrow raised — only Leonard Nimoy’s Mr. Spock was better when
it came to the eyebrows.13
Note that I am mixing cultural references, combining high and low, as we do today
without any particular trepidation. More critically it is worth asking what Illich, who has
seen his time come and go, decades ago now, has to offer us today — especially with
respect to philosophy of education, especially where Illich himself insisted on telling us
to ban school, and who, as I have taken some care to illustrate, would further contend that
the idea of the institution as such was bootless, as he argued spiritually, evocatively, at
the end of his life. What can he say to us?
4. Latin and Letters
It is the letter, the alphabet, the text as such, that matters in Illich’s beautifully titled,
beautifully articulated In the Vineyard of the Text.14 And it is Latin that holds the key to
the Harry Potter films and books, with their portentous names and elaborate incantations.
Illich, talking about Hugh of St. Victor, is talking about Latin inasmuch as this ‘dead’
language dominates our relation to language, that is, to reading, as it does with grammar
and syntax to this day.
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Though he was a trained historian, Illich’s point is not the tired notion of historical debt;
much rather, he raises a hermeneutic question in a complex section entitled “The Latin
Monopoly over Letters” (Vineyard 70-73), noting that history is nothing apart from the
writing of empire: imperial expression, including imperial conflict and contest. To
understand this, we need to reflect as Illich takes us back to the invention of phonetic
writing, recalling that “[s]cholars increasingly recognize that truly phonetic writing was a
one-time invention, made in Greece around 770 B.C.” (Vineyard 102-103). Illich reflects
on this point at some length, here and elsewhere, but his concern is not the Greek as such,
important as this is for the distinction between oral and written cultures, specifically as a
tool for the recording of sound. Instead, Illich here focuses on the political use of Latin,
not qua record of a spoken common language, but as a legacy of rule and the prescribed
use of letters. We still follow this rule, as Nietzsche once winced regarding this utter
submission, as we continue to submit to the rule of grammar. As Nietzsche teases us on
just this rule in Twilight of the Idols, “‘Reason’ in language: oh what a deceitful old
woman! I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar”
(“’Reason’” §5, 48). Illich’s point is a more exoteric one: historically, to use the Roman
alphabet was to commit oneself to writing in Latin; for a very long time, the Roman
alphabet was not an alphabet that was used for writing other languages.15 And this
dedicated commitment to Latin endured for centuries:
When we think of the alphabet, we see in it a tool for recording speech
sounds. For one and a half thousand years this simply was not so. The
letters, which without any change in form and number have proven their
capacity to encode hundreds of different languages, were for this long time
used for one exclusive purpose: writing Latin. But not Latin as it was
spoken; rather, as it was alphabetized during the last centuries B. C.
During the 650 years when Rome governed the Mediterranean world, not
one of the tongues of the conquered and governed peoples was ever
recorded in Roman letters. (Vineyard 70-71. Emphasis added)
As Illich continues his observation of Latin letters, he notes:
The monopoly of Latin over the Roman alphabet was so absolute that it
has never been viewed as the result of a ‘taboo’, and has never been
considered as a surprising historical anomaly. This neglect of an available
technology seems as impressive as the neglect of the wheel in preColumbian cultures, where only gods and playthings were ever put on a
carriage. (Vineyard 71)
Only a speaker like Illich himself, born in Vienna, displaced for historical reasons by war
(and crimes against humanity) to Italy, and thus a native speaker of German who at a
very young age learned Italian and French, and undertook to learn Croatian at the age of
seven (in order, he tells us, to be able to speak with his Dalmatian grandfather), might
have made such observations concerning the symbolic forms of the alphabet and of
sound:
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The monopoly of Latin over the Roman letters, and equally of Greek over
the Greek alphabet, was anchored in deep assumptions about the relation
of shape and sound. When Cyril and Methodius, around 850, created
“galagolic” as the appropriate language into which they could translate the
Greek Bible for the Bulgarians, they also devised a new alphabet. They
never thought of enlarging the Greek alphabet with a few signs needed to
record Slavonic sounds. (Vineyard 71)
Illich makes things more esoteric by alluding to his compatriot, the theoretical linguist
Uwe Pörksen, when talking about the efflorescence of interest in Provençal and German
song and the role of Latin itself as a hinge between them.16 We could draw a similar set
of distinctions in English (think of Mark Twain’s use of dialect in Huckleberry Finn).17
The discussion is inevitably subtle, and to follow it one will need to read Illich’s footnote
reference to Peabody, after which one can add Parry and Lord and not less, so I have
been arguing for some time, Nietzsche’s reflections on the “spirit of music.”
5. Alchemical Coding: Severus Snape on Compounding Asphodel with Wormwood
I have argued for a number of reasons, including its reflection on Nietzsche’s pathos of
distance, that Rickman’s interpretation on screen proved indispensable to the character of
Snape.18 And if it is said that Rickman was privy to Rowling’s secret concerning Snape,
his background, his double agency, etc. and so on, what does not depend on author
privilege is the (still-to-be-asked) question of Rickman’s influence on Rowling: this is the
question of whether or not Rickman’s portrayal of that same secret as he articulated it
throughout would have any influence on the figuring of that denouement at the time still
and yet to be articulated by the author herself, who watched the very same films we
watched.
In the context of Illich’s characterization of our own scopic era as “the age of the show”
(“Guarding”),19 I have elsewhere argued that the Harry Potter phenomenon is less about
reading than about film and video. Indeed, let us call this the Game of Thrones effect:
today’s novelist — consider the Canadian fantasy writer R. Scott Bakker — does not
consider himself or herself a success unless HBO comes calling.
But film or not, the connection with the text remains. Everything depends on the
linguistic terms: the Latin of the spells, the names of the characters Potter, Dumbledore,
Snape, including the almost Lacanian codification of Voldemort: “He-who-must-not-benamed,” as in the sibilance of the snake itself, the name of the house Slytherin, all along
with the tones of Alan Rickman.
Alan Rickman, who played villains manifestly for the fun of staging villainy, also liked to
insist on little things, from the first film to the last: the same costume, buttons buttoned
down all over, points de capiton, as Lacan would say. The reason I speak of Rickman as
acteur is here to emphasize the deliberate performance of improvisation. To this extent,
adding elements of interest, sameness, precision, repression, Rickman played his
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professor just a little differently than J. K. Rowling had initially written him into being
(hence my wondering above if Rickman’s performative contribution made a difference in
the end).20
In the Harry Potter films, we meet an actor with all the gifts of the stage in a film of
costumes and magic, including “foolish” wand waving, including — we have already
mentioned the importance of the Latin spells — what Snape himself denounces, no better
way to call attention to it, as so many “silly incantations.”21
Costume and special effects are to be sure an everyday affair at Hogwarts — it is a
magical school. But what is not par for the course is Snape’s language, as this surprises
the viewer at the same time that it impresses his students; thus he dismisses the likelihood
of their interest, a strategy that works to compound interest, especially as Snape
simultaneously alludes to the promise of astonishing powers. The class in question, like
chemistry (or alchemy), concerns magic potions, as he makes clear:
“There will be no foolish wand waving or silly incantations in this class.
As such, I don’t expect many of you to appreciate the subtle science and
exact art that is potion making. However, for those select few … who
possess … the predisposition … I can teach you how to bewitch the mind
and ensnare the senses. I can tell you how to bottle fame, brew glory and
even put a stopper in death.…”
Nevertheless: the whole point of Hogwarts turns on the use of wands. And what else are
witchcraft and wizardry to be about, if not about those same incantations, however
denigrated?
The fragmentary collimation here exemplifies what Derrida calls aposiopesis. Given
standard movie coding, i.e., given that Snape is wearing black, it is not hard for us, even
if everyone else is wearing black as well, to suppose ourselves to know which side he is
on. And he doesn’t smile. And if that be insufficient, we can remember the sorting hat
scenario at the outset of the film: Maggie Smith’s Professor McGonigal’s separating
students into different houses, including Gryffindor, the good guys, and Slytherin, the
bad.22 Rickman’s Snape might surprise us, although we hardly pay this any mind, by
failing in this first teacherly scene to focus on Malfoy or the other Slytherins, as might be
expected of the director of their house. Nor does Snape, in setting a series of difficult
questions on potions and being seemingly keen on answers, pay any attention to the
eagerly clever Hermione Grainger, although her hand shoots up immediately in response
to his questions, volunteering to answer the questions Snape sets to Harry.23
The questions Rickman’s Snape puts to Harry are, it should be remembered, not wholly
all about putting him on the spot, although that is our first impression. Rather, what is at
stake is preparation, in two senses. To this end, Snape poses a question about the subject
matter of the class, which is precisely magic potions: “Tell me,” he asks from a distance
that highlights the impact of his question, “what would I get if I added powdered root of
asphodel to an infusion of wormwood?” Here, in this context, ‘asphodel’ is a highly
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poetic allusion, dating back to the very beginnings of poetry with Homer’s reference in
the Odyssey to the fields of asphodel where the souls of the dead dwell in the underworld,
with echoes of Elysium. Asphodel appears in this context in works by Milton, Tennyson,
Longfellow, and even Oscar Wilde.24 More typically, it is pointed out that Snape’s
question seems to recall a love poem written by William Carlos Williams, “Asphodel,
That Greeny Flower.” 25 At the very least, the simple range of poetic recollection
suggests that this was for Rowling an anagram of ‘signatures’, and thus the reference to
alchemy befits a course on magic potions and a professor who, as we are told, Rowling
modeled on a severe (obviously) professor of chemistry.
But in the film version, things move quickly, and Harry, dismally unequal to every
question Snape poses to him, inspires only his teacher’s sarcasm: “Pity. Clearly fame
isn’t everything, is it, Mr. Potter?” which strikes us today as not a supportive thing to say,
seemingly confirming all our suspicions about Snape’s sadism; and yet even there
teacherly bullying doesn’t seem to be the whole of it, as Snape whirls to turn his
annoyance against the entire class: “Well, why aren’t you all copying this down?”
I am spending this amount of time on a film series made for children, a film exporting a
very English idea of school to other countries, including the US, France and Germany, to
underline the force of language, which works because one can hear this in the Latin of the
spells, as Rowling drew the magic of her book as a book about nothing so much as
school, from nothing other than, or less academically linguistically significant than, Latin
as such, and as a signifier.
Note the power of a word to conjure up the sense of important knowledge. This is the
adept’s beginning — alchemy once again — in Goethe’s Faust, corresponding to both
our aspiration to powers beyond our capacities and the limitations of our knowledge of
those same limits. We recall Faust’s first incantation and its intimation: “Thou, Spirit of
the Earth, art nearer / … / I glow, as drunk with new made wine” (Goethe, Faust 20).26
The very same Spirit invoked, implored — Faust cries “I feel thee draw my heart, absorb,
exhaust me: / Thou must! thou must! And though my life it cost me!” (21)27 — does
indeed respond, pointlessly as it turns out, simply to the extent that precisely as mortal
beings we cannot hope to comprehend the metaphysical as such (this is one of the reasons
theology needs philosophy, for the same reasons of analogy and proportionate
knowledge), as the spirit rebukes Faust:
To view me is thine aspiration,
My voice to hear, my countenance to see;
Thy powerful yearning moveth me,
Here am I! — what mean perturbation
Thee, superhuman, shakes? Thy soul’s high calling, where?
Where is the breast, which from itself a world did bear,
And shaped and cherished — which with joy expanded,
To be our peer, with us, the Spirits, banded?
Where art thou Faust, whose voice has pierced to me,
Who towards me pressed with all thine energy?
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He art thou, who, my presence breathing, seeing,
Trembles through all the depths of being,
A wrinkling worm, a terror-stricken form? (21-22)28
Here, as in the case of the beginning invocation of the spirit of the earth, inspired, as the
literary scholar Burdach tells us that Goethe was inspired by Herder’s poem „Das Kind
der Sorge“ [“The Child of Care”],29 while Herder himself was inspired by Hyginus —
this also matters for Heidegger’s reflections, ethical, I argue,30 on care in his Being and
Time — what matters for the conjurer (or sorcerer in the case of Harry Potter) is the sense
of the right word perfectly chosen, precisely articulated, in the right way, for the right
reason, and above all perhaps at the right time.
As in the case of a religious rite, here we may think of the Greeks of antiquity as
Nietzsche reminds us in his own reflections on poetic rhythm, or we may think of Tibetan
monks today, or the formula for a prayer, or, perhaps especially in the case of casting a
magic spell, the formula word Abracadabra: it is the right gesture, the right placement
and poise, as well as the correct enunciation that makes all the difference.
As a phenomenological philologist, Nietzsche argued that the role of rhythm concerned
not its capacity to entrain our own souls but its objective force beyond ourselves, to move
the cosmos itself. When we get to science we may think we can dispense with rhythm,
rhyme, and every element of style or rhetoric. Thus Harry Potter is valuable, as Goethe’s
Faust is valuable, if only we can be led to pay attention to the importance of style and the
signifiers of distinction, the way and the how of our speech, the role of subtleties.
6. Rhythm and Prayer: Towards a Phenomenological Philology
The focus has been on Ivan Illich, J. K. Rowling as author of children’s literature, and to
play and thus to unlock this coding on screen, Alan Rickman as actor. I have also
referred to Homer and Milton, and to William Carlos Williams’ “Asphodel, That Greeny
Flower,” in addition to Goethe and Herder and Nietzsche. As a classical philologist,
Nietzsche was an expert in Diogenes Laertius, and his particular research interest was
Greek lyric, specifically quantitizing, quantitational [quantitierenden] metric. Here we
may recall that reflections on the lyric poet, including the lyric subject, were at the heart
of Nietzsche’s book on tragedy — not reflections on the person himself, but on the poem
as such. I have argued this point in several different variations, but it is an elusive one.31
We separate, as Nietzsche tells us that we ought not separate, music and word. To this
extent, when scholars tell us what ancient music ‘sounded’ like, as mainstream scholars
are wont to do, their claims and discoveries are founded upon what is taken to be
expressly, exclusively, musical notation supervenient upon the words themselves, and
this assumption is operative even where we have no such notation from historical eras
relevant to ancient Greek musical drama.32 The assumption is that ancient Greek music
had its own script and that we simply need to find it, or otherwise reconstruct what we
today would call the score.33
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As Nietzsche puts it in his lecture on Greek music drama, “One knows that tragedy was
originally nothing other than a choral song.”34 At issue is only the literality of this claim:
“True Greek music is purely vocal: the natural link between the language of words is that
of sound which had not yet been sundered.” (Nietzsche, “On Music and Word” 107).
The problem is the origin of language,35 expressed as the origin of music and lyric poetry,
qua oral poetry, and thereby the original function of writing as a means for recording
musical pitch.36
In his Basel lecture courses on Greek Lyric, Nietzsche lists several steps beginning with
1. the introduction of orchestric-chorestic music from popular life into the
contest … 2. Adding to this pure instrumental music… 3. the system of
tonal kinds develops out of Phyrgian music.… 4. Herewith begins the
notation of music, the note system of the alphabet…. („Griechische
Lyriker,“ Werke 403)37
Emphasizing the musicality of the Greek word (contra the modern or emphatic stressaccent), 38 Nietzsche argued that for the ancients the “rhythmical [stress] ictus is
unattested, shows no effect, was, rather, completely excluded” („Zur Theorie“ 277).39
Per contra, Nietzsche differentiates a „ton-Iktus,“ reflecting that this cannot but be
elusive for us, given our own modern linguistic sensibilities.40
Phenomenological philology here illuminates Nietzsche’s point; it is the method that
proves his case: “Why,” as he asks with reference to his own new innovation, “don’t we
set the music near the word rather than in the word?” („Griechische Lyriker,“ Frühe 372.
Emphasis added.),41 invoking the cult relevance of lyric poetry (hence the reflection
above on Vergegenwärtigung), claiming that “the lyric is the oldest form of poesie”
(„Griechische Lyriker,“ Werke 379).42
Thus when Nietzsche, as noted, cites a “4fold” („Griechische Lyriker,“ Werke 379)43
rhythmic efficacy in this text as inherent to the use of the rhythmic word, this means that
the Greek deployed rhythm as means for influencing, or even “compelling,” their deities
— and this fact survives in magical formulae, once again: in the abracadabra, and, in the
Harry Potter novels, the linguistic and filmic use of (often enough literarily licensed)
Latin.
But as in the case of the beginning invocation of ‘the spirit of the earth’ at the start of
Goethe’s Faust, what is at issue for the magician is the sense of the mot juste of which I
have been speaking with respect to Nietzsche, as indeed to Illich.
When Illich refers to Peabody’s The Winged Word, he is referring to just this compelling
context: the context of prayer and celebration as well as of recollection.44 The point is
not coincidental for Illich, who emphasizes here that
We sometimes forget that words are creatures of the alphabet. The Greek
language originally had no word for ‘a word’ singly identified [Illich’s
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reference is Erik Havelock — BB]. Greek had only various terms
referring to sounds and other signals or expressions: utterances could be
articulated by the lips, the tongue, or the mouth, but also by the heart when
it spoke to the friend by the thymos (which we might call “gall”) which
rose in Achilles and drove him into battle, or by the onrush of a wave of
blood. (Vineyard 39)
Indeed, this is the rhythmic point that Nietzsche sought to bring out in his effort to
articulate what he would come to call the “spirit of music,” and that is all about sound.
As Illich helps to explain — reading Anne Carson’s Eros, the Bittersweet can also help us
here, along with Illich’s earlier remark regarding the Greek as a one-off invention for the
preservation of sound — in general
the alphabet is an elegant technology for the visualization of sounds. Its
two dozen shapes trigger the memory of utterances that have been
articulated by the mouth, the tongue, or the lips, and filter out what is said
by gesture, mime, or the guts. Unlike other writing systems, it records
sounds, not ideas. And in this it is foolproof: readers can be trained to
voice things which they have never heard before. (Vineyard 39)
The elusive discussion in Illich of Marcel Jousse,45 and the emphasis on gesture and
rhythm in memory, in communication, and in prayer, is all part of this.
In what follows, Illich quotes Aristotle on form and orientation with respect to what for
the Greeks became “the metaphysical constitution of the universe”:
Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and the empty are
the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being: the full and
solid being being, the empty non-being. One substance (for them)
generates all things ... and does so by three modifications, which are these:
shape order and position. They say that the real is differentiated only by
“rhythm” and “inter-contact” and “turning”. Of these rhythm is shape,
inter-contact is order and turning is position. A differs in shape from N.
AN differs from NA in order. H differs from Ξ in position. (Aristotle,
Metaphysics, 34, 985b, cited in Illich, Vineyard 40)
At stake is not simply a mnemonic technique; what is involved is the essence of prayer,
the reaching of the gods, as per Nietzsche; the word "with wings,” as Peabody’s title has
it. Thus Illich writes:
When the child is rocked during a cradle song, when the reapers bow to
the rhythm of a harvest song, when the rabbi shakes his head while he
prays or searches for the right answer, or when the proverb comes to mind
only upon tapping for a while — according to Jousse, these are just a few
examples of a widespread linkage of utterance and gesture. (Vineyard
61)46
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Illich refers to Jousse with a gloss that has yet to be unpacked, explaining as it does a
veritably performative physiology of prayer — the rabbi’s rhythmic bowing, shaking “his
head while he prays,” is davening — noting that “Jousse was a French Jesuit stationed in
Beirut, who spent his entire life in the study of the embodiment of Semitic sayings”
(Vineyard 61, note 40).47 And the point for Illich has everything to do with the monastic
tradition, and this has everything to do with school.
Illich writes of the perfect coordination of meaning and sense, of relief, words, and rites
as these can be felt by the child in an order in Hugh of St. Victor’s day, in our day, and
for Harry Potter too:
Within a few weeks the child would associate the rustling of cloak at the
end of each prayer with the rising of the monks and the gloria Patri. The
rhythmic repetition of the gesture of rising and bowing and its coincidence
with a small canon of short formulas was easily associated with pious
feelings and habits even before the novice was able to spell out the literal
meaning of the Latin words. Deo gratias — thanks be to God — is felt as
a response of relief at the end of a long Bible reading which takes place in
the middle of the night. So also in the refectory at noontime, it is the
anxiously awaited sign that mealtime prayers are over and dinner may
begin. (Vineyard 68)
For Illich, even before learning begins, there is an incorporation, an embodiment,
essential for any approach to Hugh of St. Victor’s Guide to the Arts:
The ceremonial celebration of the book, Latin, chant, and recitation thus
form an acoustic phenomenon embedded in a complex architecture of
rhythm, spaces, and gestures. All this could not but stick to the bones of
the pupils when, after a short sleep before dawn and two more morning
assemblies for Mass and the “little” hours, they finally sit cross-legged in
front of a drill master for their dictatus, to give shape with their hands —
inscribing the words on their wax tablets — to the Latin in whose melodic
use they were already steeped. (Vineyard 70)
7. Harry Potter and the Secret Life of Professors
As always, Illich is telling tales out of school, tales out of the life of scholasticism, as this
has all but perished in our day. And yet it lives on, as in the example of Rowling’s Harry
Potter — in Snape’s clerical garb, expressed perhaps in all of Rickman’s concern to get
the sleeves long enough, and Harry’s too (along with the concern of Ron and every other
student at Hogwarts), as all of this serves to indicate a point that anyone can make if
called upon to give a commencement speech. To this day: all of us dress like monks
when it comes to graduation ceremonies at school.
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Here, to illustrate Nietzsche’s rhythm, recall the dueling scene in Harry Potter and the
Chamber of Secrets, featuring two British actors: the late Alan Rickman in his portrayal
of Professor Snape in a scene counterpoised against Kenneth Branaugh’s Professor
Gilderoy Lockhart. The scene is articulated by way of a very choreographed, very
rhythmic fencing standoff on a table that serves as the fencing piste, wands as weapons in
place of foil, sabre, and épée. What is at stake is poise, balance, and articulation. Those
who try and fail in the spell do so because they do not speak the words, but, as
Shakespeare tells us, “mouth them.” The same holds for the wonderfully pompous, and
once again note the name and its rhythms, Gilderoy Lockhart, such that after the
appropriate bowing, and dueling back to back pacing off, the duel is settled not with
wand flourishes but with a single word: Rickman’s Expelliarmus! The dramatic efficacy
of Snape’s gesture and word renders Lockhart, flat on his back, out cold at the end of the
table.
Secondly, and this is again the reference to Jousse as Illich emphasizes it, Nietzsche
argues that the function of rhythm is to appease or to “purify” the feelings of the gods
themselves (just as, as Nietzsche notes, music calls forth powerful human feelings), and
Nietzsche argues that rhythm works, thirdly, as mnemonic aid for the deity (who would
appear to have trouble remembering what is petitioned), in analogy with rhythm’s
functioning for human beings, where we have already emphasized, via Peabody’s Winged
Word, the fourth role of rhythm for Nietzsche: as a means to reach the distant heavens.
In the same way, Nietzsche reprises these aspects of both rhythm and prayer in The Gay
Science. To this same extent, it may be argued, all religious ritual, all magic, all prayer,
is inevitably “sympathetic” magic. And here too Nietzsche’s analysis of the death of
tragedy would correspond to the ascendance of insurgent rationalism, because, as the
sensibility for a more “natural causality awakens in place of a more magical causality, in
the same measure, rhythm makes its retreat” („Griechische Lyriker,“ Werke 380).48
By the time we have attained the advances of our modern era we believe in pure reason,
and that also means that we are ill prepared to pay attention to the importance of
language, the way and the how of our speech, the role of subtleties. Not because these
things have ceased to be efficacious. Sociolinguists with an expertise in physiology have
not analyzed the specific voice of an actor like Alan Rickman for nothing. It is claimed
that it is due to a speech defect, that is to say, on Rickman’s own account of it that his
voice had the qualities it had not because he was born gifted but because he learned to
work with and around his certain limitations. Lots of people today mumble or fail to
enunciate for reasons that also have to do with the structure of their mouths, teeth, jaws,
and in The Hallelujah Effect I point to qualities of sound that depend on the room as a
sounding board, and to Adorno’s argument that much of what we call the culture industry
results from the translation of that resonance to radio sound (and the locative reduction to
the loud speaker that subsequently entrains the mind), and what Adorno named
“physiognomy.”49 By this phenomenological and carnal or embodied object-phrasing
Adorno intended to refer to the literal acoustic, sonic translation in space, but also in time
and above all in acoustic transformation, transposing an orchestra, a chamber quartet, a
rock band from its original place-space, time-space into a little box (and it makes no
difference here if we are referring to binaural earphones, per a single speaker, or a set of
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boxes, high- or low-end, in our living rooms: we have yet to catch up to what Adorno
meant when talking about the space-time continuum of music and sound).
8. Our Lives Are Measured Out by Teachers
Our teachers are sometimes thanked. More commonly they are forgotten, rather like the
Suabian joke about a man, teetering home late at night, as drunk as can be imagined,
coming to a narrow bridge to cross a stream, who in good piety stops to say a prayer to
get safely across the bridge, only, attaining the half way point, to cry out jubilantly,
declaring he could have managed very well on his own, which promptly lands him in the
ditch. We tend to think we could have done everything without the particular teachers we
happen to have had, even when we think to thank them, for appearances or politeness’s
sake. We are as wrong as the Suabian tipped by his pride into the nighttime water,
muttering to himself, Surely the Good Lord understands a joke? Our inattention to our
teachers is like that. Yet there they are, even if we only catch sight of their value in
retrospect, like William Carlos Williams’ singing of love (and disloyalty to his wife —
that was the point of his poem “Asphodel, That Greeny Flower,” sung from the bottom of
hell).
To my mind, Alan Rickman meant something like this replying to an interviewer’s
question by saying, emphasizing that this can only be seen in retrospect, “Our lives are
measured out by teachers.” Beyond flesh and blood encounters, some of our teachers are
also those we meet in the books we read: fictions like Severus Snape; but also those for
whom Machiavelli would take care to dress up when he read, encounters with teachers
never known in our lifetimes, teachers still living in the books we read.
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Notes
1

This essay grew out of a lecture originally presented in German in honor of Ivan Illich
at a conference in Bremen. In its current version it was originally invited for presentation
as a plenary lecture for the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, Columbia
College, Chicago, Illinois, 4 November 2016. The author is grateful to the editors of the
journal and especially for the words of two anonymous reviewers.

2

There is no definitive biography of Ivan Illich and, to date, most accounts of his
thinking, including those that undertake to offer an account of his life as well as of his
influence, differ in precision (not to mention their conflicting details) according to the
orientation and concerns of the author in question. For the sake of hermeneutic reflection,
it is best to read between accounts, and a good place to begin is with the different voices
of the friends included in Hoinacki and Mitcham.

3

Patrick Heelan wrote on Werner Heisenberg’s philosophy of quantum mechanics, and
for a very readable discussion of the debates surrounding quantum mechanics, including
those involving Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein, see his posthumously published The
Observable: Heisenberg’s Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics. And see, too, on the
space of vision, including the art of Cezanne and van Gogh, Heelan’s Space-Perception
and the Philosophy of Science.

4

Cf. J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone (London: Bloomsbury,
2000 [1997]) and Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (New York: Scholastic, 1998).

5

See, for example, Schrag. See too, for a reading that is not always commensurate with
Illich’s life, Hartch. See, for a discussion, Babich, “Tools for Subversion: Illich and
Žižek on Changing the World,” in Mazzini and Glyn-Williams.

6

Illich, ”The Cultivation of Conspiracy,” speech presented at the Villa Ichon, Bremen,
March 14, 1998, on the occasion of the receipt of the Culture and Peace Prize of Bremen.
The lecture appears in English in Hoinacki and Mitcham 233-242.

7

On peace, here, Illich writes: “The European idea of peace that is synonymous with the
somatic incorporation of equals into a community has no analogue elsewhere.
Community in our European tradition is not the outcome of an act of authoritative
foundation, nor a gift from nature or its gods, nor the result of management, planning,
and design, but the consequence of a conspiracy, a deliberate, mutual, somatic, and
gratuitous gift to one another. The prototype of that conspiracy lies in the celebration of
the early Christian liturgy in which, no matter their origin, men and women, Greeks and
Jews, slaves and citizens, engender a physical reality that transcends them. The shared
breath, the con-spiratio, is peace, understood as the community that arises from it.”
Illich, ”Cultivation” 241.
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8

Indeed, and this is connected to his notion of Umsonstigkeit or freely given, unearned,
gracious, ‘gratuitous’ grace.

9

Note here that ‘gratuity’ is a poor choice in English as it means tip or emolument, and
‘gratuitousness’ is not much better. See Cayley’s book conveying what Cayley took from
his conversations with Illich.

10

Hadot elsewhere translates this line, „Die Gegenwart allein ist unser Glück,“ as “The
present alone is our joy,” and describes it as “the climax of part two of Goethe’s Faust.”
Hadot, “Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse,” in his Philosophy as a Way of Life (69).

11

There is almost a parallel to Snape, I submit, in any case, though not since Goethe’s
Faust, in the person of Mephisto (and there in performance, on stage as on screen, it is
the actor who makes all the difference: think of Gustaf Gundgrens), and it will also help
to recall that evil nearly always has a good conscience; thus Rickman in the UK
television series The Barchester Chronicles, or as the mastermind Hans Gruber in the
Hollywood film Die Hard, or as the Sheriff of Nottingham by contrast with the
traditionally Jesus-like Robin Hood (not that this would have been Kevin Costner’s
Robin Hood).

12

Arguably this is the key to his villain’s heart in Snape, expressed by a white doe, his
‘Patronus’, in Rowling’s subversive invention.

13

To be sure, Rickman himself gives the raised-eyebrow award to his fellow Hogwarts
actor, Maggie Smith.

14

With its own bookish reference, it is a commentary, or scholarly guide, to a scholarly
guide. Illich’s In the Vineyard of the Text illuminates or offers the reader an opportunity
to experience what the author writes about. There are details to discover, or perhaps even,
to use Illich’s language, to ‘taste’, on every page; between every sentence, every word;
ensconced in the footnotes, beyond what we ordinarily suppose about the things we read
as about the art of reading as such. See too Illich and Sanders, and for a focus on Greek
as well as Latin letters, see Carson.

15

As a tool for communication and control from its imperial outset, Latin letters were
used to write Latin by those who knew and read Latin. When this began to change —
that is, when Latin letters came to be used for the vulgate — the change corresponded to
nothing less than an imperial appropriation. But to this day we speak of the Roman
alphabet. Heidegger, and it is increasingly uncool to talk about Heidegger, makes this
point as bluntly, and Illich is anything but ungenerous as he observes that scholars are
increasingly coming to recognize the complexities of what follows from this dominion.
Here, Illich’s example is a subtle one that can continue to elude us: thus we think and
sometimes we even teach that the church somehow restricted the use of letters to Latin,
ignoring a reflection on the relation between letters and language(s).
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16

As Illich explains: “The alphabetic recording of Germanic or Provençal dialects did not
immediately lead to the recognition that the alphabetization of speech had brought about
the creation of other languages comparable to Latin. One of the best proofs for this
comes from Uwe Pörksen. For the first two generations in which there was a heavy
demand for Provençal texts in Germany, and vice versa, not one of the great songs was
translated directly from one vernacular language into the other. In every instance, a Latin
version of the song was made first, and only then a translation from the Latin language
into recorded vernacular speech” (Vineyard 72-73). For a discussion of the oral tradition
of the Provençal in its significance for Nietzsche as author of The Gay Science, subtitled
in Provençal as “la gaya scienza,” see Babich, “Gay Science.”
17

I am grateful to Tracy B. Strong, who pointed out to me that Twain claimed, in order to
testify to a non-British but American English, to use at least 7 dialects, and that others,
according to Strong, count as many as 11.
18

See Babich, “Getting to Hogwarts,” and Babich, “Pedagogy and Other Defenses.”

19

See also Illich, La perte des sens, for his epochal history of vision, whereby the first
optical regime of vision would later be characterized as the ‘agent intellect’ expressed in
antiquity’s theoretical account of mind and optics: « Dans le régime antique, le regard
rayonne depuis la pupille pour embrasser un objet, se fondre avec lui, au point que l’œil
est teinté aux couleurs de l’objet. La fin de ce régime d’un regard qui embrasse tout
commence dans l’Égypte des Fatimides, autour de l’an mil » (203). Illich goes on to
articulate the second optical regime as that of the church, the monastery, and the
university. This is the « régime scolastique [ou] le regard demeure actif », « mais la
vision n’intervient plus où se trouve l’objet: l’œil a désormais le pouvoir d’extraire des
universaux des formes que les choses émettent par leur rayonnement.… Un troisième
régime naît de l’union du regard et de l’objet à l’aube de la Renaissance; de plus en plus
l’œil est perçu comme un instrument sur le modèle d’une caméra, d’un appareil
photographique, dont diverses techniques permettent d'étendre la portée … un quatrième
âge est celui du show, un âge au cours duquel l’œil devient dépendant de l’interface (nos
écrans) plutôt que de l’imagination » (197).

20

Thus, likewise qua performance practice, the impact of Rickman’s Snape as master of
potions in Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (2001) could scarcely have been more
dramatic. Entering from the rear of the class, door slamming, striding to the front with
black cape flaring, Snape declaims from the moment he enters the class, silencing preclass murmurs. It is Snape’s manner, particularly his way of speaking, that impresses
children and adult filmgoers alike, including those too young to care about Die Hard
(1988), where Rickman played a “real villain” (as opposed to Snape) by contrast with the
American-style, torn t-shirt, utterly unbuttoned hero Bruce Willis; or else, to have been
seen in the genre of ideal or noble love, again recall the importance of distance, qua
initially unacknowledged, as the essence of romantic love for Rickman’s Colonel
Brandom, who married Kate Winslett and starred with Emma Thompson in her
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screenplay version, once again as film rather than book, of Jane Austen’s Sense and
Sensibility (1995).
21

Viewers familiar with Rickman recognize him despite his disguise (he wore a wig as
the Sheriff of Nottingham in Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves). Yet several commentators
point out that even at the start of the ten-year film franchise, the actor was too old, by
decades, to play a Snape who should have been in his thirties, old enough to have been
Harry’s biological father but described in unappealing terms as extremely thin, greasy of
complexion, complete with a barely kempt mane of black hair, head to toe in black,
wearing a high topped vest, and with all those buttons that Rickman himself insisted
upon.
22

Although a school of witchcraft and wizardry seems firmly located beyond good and
evil, the dyadic division reflects our expectations of the good and the bad; and in the first
class, the camera cuts to a knowing smile from the little Draco Malfoy, a lad to be
groomed for negative things. Malfoy, as if his name didn’t tell us this already, is evil,
and Draco is blond, like his father. The dyadic coding in Harry Potter gives us Harry
himself, dark haired, like Hermoine. Ron, the redhaired kid, is a ringer, simply
underwriting the convention locating Malfoy on the side of evil, sure to be among the
‘select few’ ones, possessing the needed ‘predisposition’. The entire film-book series is a
study of such race-codes or race elements and is thus invaluable for illuminating race
studies and the Victorian, social Darwinist ideology that tells us that blood will out.
23

And not even Harry — who, if we read the book, starts out by assuming that Snape
does not like him, only to draw even more dismal conclusions as the series proceeds.
24

See for a discussion, particularly of Milton and also concerning asphodel and snakes,
as well as with reference to ancient authors and aphrodisiac effects, the eponymous essay
in Graves. See more recently Phillips, who refers to Homer’s Odyssey, Book 24, with the
tiniest of worries on the part of this reader, given Phillips’ assumption that some parts of
Homer’s poem were, for example, by the poet’s hand, as he implies, and some not,
begging the Homer question entirely. All is redeemed, however, by the sections
“Daffodils and Ashes.” And see also Dweck, who refers to the invocation of “the
daffodil as a potent of death” in Herrick’s Hesperides, “probably connecting the flower
with the asphodel, which the ancient Greeks planted near tombs” (24). And the
connection then with asphodel explicates the inclusion of the daffodil in the list of “every
flower that sad imbroidrie wears” in Milton’s “Lycidas,” reading “Bid Amaranthus all his
beauties shed, / And daffadillies fill their cups with tears, / To strew the laureate herse
where Lycid lies” (ll. 148-151).
25

William Carlos Williams, “Asphodel, That Greeny Flower” (1955), begins as follows:
“Of asphodel, that greeny flower, / like a buttercup / upon its branching stem — / save
that it’s green and wooden — / I come, my sweet, / to sing to you. / We lived long
together / a life filled, / if you will, / with flowers. So that / I was cheered / when I came
first to know / that there were flowers also / in hell…” (ll. 1-14).
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26

„Du, Geist der Erde, bist mir näher; / ... / Schon glüh ich wie von neuem Wein“ (Faust
158).

27

„Ich fühle ganz mein Herz dir hingegeben! / Du mußt! Du mußt! Und kostet’ es mein
Leben!“ (Faust 158).
28

„Du flehst eratmend, mich zu schauen, / Meine Stimme zu hören, mein Antlitz zu sehn;
/ Mich neigt dein mächtig Seelenflehn: / Da bin ich! — Welch erbärmlich Grauen / Faßt
Übermenschen dich! Wo ist der Seele Ruf? / Wo ist die Brust, die eine Welt in sich
erschuf / Und trug und hefte? Die mit Freudebeben / Erschwoll, sich uns, den Geistern,
gleichzuheben? / Wo bist du, Faust, des Stimme mit erklang, / Der sich an mich mit allen
Kräften drang? / Bist du es, der, von meinem Hauch unwittert, / In allen Lebenstreifen
zittert, / Ein furchtsam weggekrümmter Wurm?“ (Faust 159).
29

See Heidegger’s own reflection on Goethe (and Herder) in Being and Time for this
reference.
30

See Babich, « Vers une éthique ». An English version is forthcoming as “Solicitude:
Heideggerian Care and Assistance” in Paul Fairfield and Saulius Geniusas, eds.,
Relational Hermeneutics: Essays in Comparative Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury,
2018).
31

See Babich, “Who is Nietzsche’s Archilochus? Lyric Poetry, Quantitational Rhythm,
and the Problem of the Subject in The Birth of Tragedy,” which is forthcoming in Charles
Bambach and Theodore George, eds., Philosophy and Poetry (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2018). And see as well, for the German, Babich, „Nietzsches Lyrik.
Archilochus, Musik, Metrik.“

32

Of course I have argued that this was otherwise for Nietzsche, and I read Carl
Dahlhaus as in part supporting a similar claim. I have made this argument for some time,
but see in addition the last three chapters of my The Hallelujah Effect and „Wort und
Musik.“
33

This assumption that ancient music must be presented in a script holds even with
respect to more recent work on ancient Greek music; it can be seen in the coffee-table
sized sourcebook collection curated by Pöhlman and West.
34

Nietzsche, “Greek Music Drama.” See Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Music and Word”
[„Über Musik und Wort“], in Dahlhaus, 106-119, esp. 107. This modern presumption
leads us astray when it comes to the ancients. As Nietzsche writes in “On Music and
Word,” to speak of anything like a “necessary relation between poem and music ... makes
no sense for the two worlds of tone and image are too remote from each other to enter
more than an external relationship. The poem is only a symbol and related to the music
like the Egyptian hieroglyph of courage to a courageous soldier” (Dahlhaus 112).
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35

This is an older question, going back to Rousseau and earlier still. See, for a related
discussion with respect to Nietzsche, Corbier.

36

Of course this goes back to Herder, to Rousseau, and to others. Nor is this claim
dissimilar to points Claude Calame also makes, if Calame himself is not reading
Nietzsche, and if his references are more mainstream or comparative, indeed concerned
with gender in addition to his intriguing reflections on ethnophilology and ‘anthropoesis’,
as he traces his own reading to Friedrich Max Müller. Calame also follows Nagy. See
Calame, « Chanter », esp. 72, and see too Calame, « Le chant choral ». I also recommend,
in particular, Miller, as well as several contributions to Budelmann, especially Battezzato.

37

„1) Aus dem Volksleben tritt die orchestisch-chorische Musik in den Agon ein.... 2) Es
kommt die reine Instrumentalmusik hinzu.... 3) Das System der Tonarten erweitert sich
durch phryg. Musik.... 4) Von hier an findet eine Notirung der Musik, Notensystem des
Alphabets, statt....“

38

Koller names this a „Betönungsakzent.” See Amy M. Dale’s several studies. There
are other traditions as well, including the French, complete with elaborate articulations of
positions and figures, especially in Maurice Emmanuel on dance, in addition to the Italian.
This is not to say that Koller, any more than Dale, cites Nietzsche’s inspiration. Nor
indeed, when it comes to ancient Greek lyric poetry, the late Martin West. But the
connection remains, via Lloyd-Jones (206f.) and Maas among others, such as Bornmann.

39

„Der Rhythm. Ictus ist nicht bezeugt, äuβert keine Wirkungen, wird vielmehr geradezu
ausgeschlossen.“

40

Thus Koller differs in his return to the 19th century schema antecedent to Nietzsche,
corresponding less to ancient Greek music and word than to the relation between music
and poetic word in German (or French or English or Italian), precisely where the word
can be, as Nietzsche claimed that for the ancient Greeks it could not be, distinguished
from the music. Koller evinces several differences from both Nietzsche and Dale, as he
himself centers on the figurative aspect of the various muses as such, fairly romantically.
Despite Koller’s (more modernistic) insistence on the notion of a separate musical
melody imposed upon the melody that is inherent to the words (Koller 12), he agrees with
both Nietzsche and Dale, underlining that the same musical melodies, be they
supervenient or not, would have been constrained to follow (and there is no departure
from the dicta of antiquity) the melody of the words themselves. For Koller, and still
more for today’s readers, one comes to grief with modern sensibilities on the variations
between poetic meter. Thus Koller invokes a certain poetic sovereignty (we speak, in
English, of poetic license), entailing the frustrations of parsing this musicality via metric
or quantity. Koller cites Howald on Humbolt’s Agamemnon as support for this assertion
(cf. Koller 13). If Koller is subsequently absorbed with a rather literalizing apotheosis of
dancing maidens and nymphs as the muses ‘themselves’ (15 and 17ff, 25ff, etc.), which
he invokes as the best way to understand the meaning of mousiké techné, these
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metaphorically incarnate muses do not quite correspond to, even as they represent, the
breadth of ancient Greek mousiké. See Babich, Mousiké techné as well as the last three
chapters in The Hallelujah Effect and, most recently, „Nietzsches Lyrik. Archilocus,
Musik, Metrik.“ For his part, Howald (whom Koller does quote) cites Georgiades who
(as I show elsewhere) returns the argument to Nietzsche. The point here, as Howald
makes it, is that we perhaps cannot have ears for this via „Akzent,” i.e. what Nietzsche
called ‚Iktus’.
41

„Warum stellen wir die Musik nicht neben das Wort, sondern in das Wort?“

42

„Die Lyrik ist älteste Form der Poesie.“

43

„4fach.“

44

Illich writes that “Preliterate Greek speechmaking and epic singing were based not on
visual memory but on the recollection of formulas uttered to the rhythm of a lyre”
(Vineyard 38). In his notes he refers to Peabody.

45

Marcel Jousse, a Jesuit priest, was student of Marcel Mauss and an ethnographer in the
spirit (today largely channeled by Bruno Latour) of the enterprise of turning the lens of
anthropology (and sociology) on not only the other but also the observer: ourselves. See
Jousse, Oral Style, and see too Meschonnic. With reference to Nietzsche, including a
discussion of Jousse, see Kremer-Marietti.

46

The reference is to Jousse, L’Anthropologie du geste.

47

As Illich continues here, Jousse “first explored the connection between movement and
memory (« Le Style oral rythmique et mnémotechnique chez les verbo-moteurs, »
Archives de Philosophie, 2 [1924]: 1-240) and then the dissymmetric, bilateral nature of
these movements corresponding to voice rhythms (« Le Bilatèralisme humain et
l’anthropologie du langage, » Revue anthropologique, Aug.-Sept. 1940, p. 1-30). His
influence on the young Milman Parry during the late 1920s led Parry to develop his
theory on orality” (Vineyard 61, note 40).

48

„Je mehr Sinn für natürliche Causalität stat magischer Causalität erwacht, um so mehr
tritt der Rhythmus zurück.“ Thus Nietzsche traces a poetic declination from
“Empedocles,” who, as Nietzsche recounts, “is almost wholly a poet to Plato who is yet
half a poet, in interim as prose comes to be rhythmic, Democritus with a metrical
resonance whereby Aristotle shows the abstraction from the rhythmic and the growth of
pure reason.” („Empedokles, der noch fast ganz Dichter ist, Plato, der noch halb Dichter
is u. bisweilen in Prosa rhythmische wird, Demokrit mit metrischem Anklang, Aristoteles
zeigen das Abnehmen des Rhythmischen, Zunahme der reinen Vernunft“ („Griechische
Lyriker,“ Werke 380).

49

See for discussion and further references, Babich, “Adorno’s Radio Phenomenology.”
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Two Concepts of Educational Freedom
Emily Wenneborg
This article is intended to challenge one common conception of educational freedom, and
to propose an alternative conception.1 Even if we rarely employ the terminology of
freedom, the concepts of and concerns about educational freedom are highly relevant to
the contemporary educational context; for example, debates regarding formal and
informal education often portray informal learning contexts as inherently freer — and
therefore better — than formal ones. Even without being explicitly stated, beliefs about
freedom inform many policy debates, such as those regarding student-directed online
learning, the increasing prevalence of the homeschooling movement, and the increasing
dominance of rules and regulations both inside and beyond the classroom. Accordingly,
it is important to carefully consider what conception of educational freedom may be most
fruitful for those engaged in such discussions.
The view that I want to challenge sees educational freedom as the mere absence of
constraints. This approach involves an unhelpful confusion regarding the concept of
educational freedom and an inaccurate, binary view of the relationship between freedom
and constraint. In contrast to the view that freedom and constraint are opposed to one
another, so that one increases exactly as the other decreases, the view that I advocate in
this article recognizes that freedom and constraint are in fact inseparably linked to one
another. Freedom is not a simplistic absence of constraints, but rather is determined by
the scope of action afforded by one’s social setting. My argument in this article is that,
while the former approach to educational freedom dominates educational debates today,
the latter approach leads to more nuanced and productive discussions in important areas
of policy and practice.
In order to clarify the two approaches to educational freedom just mentioned, I first use
the contrasting lenses of two educational theorists whose work was most widely read in
the 1960s and ‘70s, a historical period deeply invested in promoting individual freedom
and challenging traditional authority and institutions, both within education and in society
more broadly. My purpose in discussing these two educators is not to evaluate them in
themselves; that work has been done repeatedly. Rather, I use them to exemplify two
contrasting conceptions of educational freedom. I then explain the concepts of “agency”
and “structure,” which I borrow from Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory. With these
concepts in mind, I develop my own agency-based conception of freedom. Finally, I
demonstrate the usefulness of this alternative view of freedom by applying it to the
educational debates mentioned in this introduction.
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1. A. S. Neill and Educational Freedom
The first approach to educational freedom is exemplified by the work of A. S. Neill, who
put into practice the principle of student freedom more thoroughly than any other
educator during his many decades as founder and headmaster of Summerhill, a residential
(i.e., boarding) school in Suffolk, England. Summerhill’s most frequently discussed
features, and those most relevant to understanding Neill’s view of educational freedom,
were self-government and non-compulsory lessons.2 Self-government was carried out
via weekly meetings of the entire Summerhill community to discuss matters of communal
concern. At these meetings, anyone could raise an issue for the community to discuss,
and anyone could offer his or her view on the issue being discussed. When the time came
to vote, each person had one vote, regardless of age or rank: as Neill said, “My [i.e., the
headmaster’s] vote carries the same weight as that of a seven-year-old” (16). However,
the school did not make all decisions by communal vote — only those concerning
matters such as rules, inter-personal conflicts, and punishments. Neill or the staff decided
about accepting new students and hiring new teachers, oversaw finances and purchases,
and addressed food and safety concerns without consulting the children (18). As for
lessons, students had “freedom to go to lessons or stay away, freedom to play for days or
weeks or years if necessary” (3). Teachers were not allowed to compel students to attend
lessons, nor were other students supposed to compel their fellows to stay away from
lessons (though Neill admitted that this sometimes happened). Overall, Neill boasted that
Summerhill School had “[s]elf-government for the pupils and staff, freedom to go to
lessons or stay away, freedom to play for days or weeks or years if necessary, freedom
from any indoctrination whether religious or moral or political, freedom from character
moulding” (3).
To illustrate the kind of freedom found at Summerhill, consider Neill’s story of a young
student, Winifred, who came to Summerhill at age thirteen. At first, she rejoiced when
she found out she was no longer required to go to lessons or study any subject she did not
want to. However, a few weeks later she grew bored and asked Neill to teach her
something. He asked what she wanted to learn, but she said she didn’t know. Several
months later she asked him to help her pass the college entrance exams. He concludes
the anecdote with this self-satisfied report: “Every morning she worked with me and
other teachers, and she worked well. She confided that the subjects did not interest her
much, but the aim did interest her. Winifred found herself by being allowed to be
herself” (Neill 126). Even in this brief anecdote, we can see the problem with Neill’s
view of freedom as the absence of constraints: it seems just as likely that Winifred found,
not herself, but the only conceivable alternative to boredom. Whether Neill’s goal was to
help Winifred discover what she truly wanted to learn, or to push back against her overreliance on adults to tell her what to do and to keep her entertained, his laissez faire
approach failed in its intent. I return to the case of Winifred in a later section, and
suggest how Neill might have acted differently toward her if he had had a more nuanced
conception of educational freedom.
Neill exhibits the first conception of freedom, freedom as the absence of constraints,
throughout his account of the Summerhill approach to education. In this view, children
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are free when they can do what they want without being constrained by society. In
Neill’s own words, “Freedom means doing what you like, so long as you don’t interfere
with the freedom of others. The result is self-discipline” (44). Although Neill designed
Summerhill in order to remove any and all societal constraints so that children could be
truly free, he downplayed at least four key ways in which society necessarily does
influence the individual.
First, caregivers limit children’s self-regulation for the sake of safety, not only for
themselves and for the children under their care, but also for the safety of others (see
Neill 36 and Barrett). Second, even at Summerhill, numerous decisions that affected the
daily lives of the children were not resolved by the whole community (in accordance with
Neill’s concept of self-government), but by Neill or another member of the staff — for
example, the food to be served at meals, the hiring and firing of staff, bedroom
arrangements, and textbooks. Neill dismisses these non-democratic decisions: “None of
these factors comes into self-government. Nor do the pupils want them to. Selfgovernment to them means dealing with situations that arise in their communal life” (18).
Of course, one might wonder whether the children were really indifferent about these
matters, or might have cared about them had they been given the chance to be involved in
the decision. But the more important point is that Neill downplayed the extent to which
such decisions shaped the children’s lives and choices. Third, even without explicit
coercion, children are persuaded toward or away from certain actions by observing and
interacting with both their peers and the adults in their community. For example,
although the adults at Summerhill were not supposed to force children to attend lessons,
children themselves could and did keep one another away from lessons (129). Neill
bemoaned this occurrence, but in fact it was inevitable. And fourth, it is not only other
individuals that exert influence over the individuals with whom they interact; societal
structures do so, as well. A prime example of this is the General Meetings that enabled
Summerhill to be a self-governing community. (I elaborate on the structural nature of
self-government in a later section of this article.)
To summarize, Neill’s conception of freedom failed to recognize that ignorance of
available options can significantly hamper students’ ability to choose what they truly
want to learn, and that merely telling them to be independent is insufficient for helping
them escape over-dependence on adult authority. Consequently, he did not see the need
for either exposing students to a variety of areas of learning or guiding them in choosing
what and how to learn. Moreover, his account of free education at Summerhill
downplays the role of social structures and influences in shaping the choices of even
those individuals who are relatively “free” by Neill’s own definition (that is, who are
neither required to do things they do not want to do, nor prevented from doing whatever
they do want to, except under certain special circumstances). For all these reasons, if our
standard is the total absence of constraints, then educational freedom is completely
unattainable.
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2. Ivan Illich and Educational Freedom
We can begin to see the alternative approach that I propose, viewing educational freedom
not as the absence of constraints but as the scope for action, in the work of Ivan Illich, a
lapsed Catholic priest who was heavily involved throughout the 1970s in the influential
Center for Intercultural Documentation (Centro Intercultural de Documentación) at
Cuernavaca, Mexico. Like Neill, Illich also critiqued schooling, calling it “the agespecific, teacher-related process requiring full-time attendance at an obligatory
curriculum” (26). Yet Illich’s conception of freedom is subtly but crucially different
from Neill’s.
For Illich, the primary characteristic of unfree learners is dependency (2). Specifically,
unfree learners are dependent on teachers for their learning (that is, they are unable to
learn without being taught), and they are dependent on schools for access to instruction.
It is important to note here that Illich does not believe anyone actually is incapable of
untaught learning — on the contrary, he frequently emphasizes that most learning does
not require direct, planned instruction. In fact, he writes, “learning is the human activity
which least needs manipulation by others. Most learning is not the result of instruction.
It is rather the result of unhampered participation in a meaningful setting” (39). Schools
do not change the fundamental nature of human learning, but they do change learners’
views of human learning. “Most people learn best by being ‘with it’, yet school makes
them identify their personal, cognitive growth with elaborate planning and manipulation”
(39). Thus, unfree learners could learn on their own — but they don’t realize this. They
expect to be unable to learn without teaching, and so they never attempt to do otherwise.
Thus, their view of themselves as dependent learners becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
If unfree learners are dependent on institutions and teachers to package and deliver their
learning, then free learners are the opposite: independent. This need not mean that they
never make use of formal instruction and even institutions that look a lot like traditional
schools. But when they do, they do so for their own purposes, not for those determined
by others; in other words, they “tak[e] control of their own learning” (Illich 8). Free,
independent learners are characterized by “action, participation, and self-help” (64) as
well as “autonomy [and] motivation” (104). If a free learner wants to learn something,
she is able to set her own learning goals (perhaps with the help of a friend or teacher), to
seek out the most effective means for herself (which may differ from what is most
effective for a different learner), and to actively pursue her goals (again, possibly in
conjunction with a role model or peers). She does not have to be constantly reminded to
complete her learning tasks, nor must she be externally rewarded for doing so. She is
motivated by purposes of her own.
The difference between Illich’s conception of free learners and Neill’s is subtle, but
crucial. If freedom is simply the absence of constraints, then any societal constraint —
even the gentlest suggestion or influence — means the end of freedom. But if freedom
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means independence, then societal structures and even constraints do not destroy
freedom. Rather, these structures raise questions such as ‘What do these structures
enable students to do?’ and ‘How are students able to act by means of these structures,
but not in total dependence on them?’ As these questions indicate, Illich is fully aware
that even free learners need access to resources; they cannot pursue their own, selfgenerated learning goals in a vacuum. Illich identifies four types of resources that are
necessary for learning:
Someone who wants to learn knows that he needs both information and
critical response to its use from somebody else. Information can be stored
in things and in persons.... Criticism can also come from two directions:
from peers or from elders, that is, from fellow learners whose immediate
interests match mine, or from those who will grant me a share in their
superior experience. (78)
So learners need some way to access educational objects, role models and instructors,
peers with mutual interests, and elders with wisdom to share. Despite this fairly thorough
account of the positive resources needed for self-education, the problem of providing
access to such resources remains. It is not sufficient for learners to stumble upon the
necessary resources in a haphazard fashion (though even that would be better than being
unable to access them at all). Rather, to facilitate learning, we need some sort of
structure for connecting learners with these different types of resources for learning; in
fact, we may even need institutions for doing so. But Illich believes that obligatory, agegraded, curriculum-oriented schools engender the exact opposite of independent,
autonomous learning. Clearly, we need some vision of what a freedom-promoting
institution would look like.3
Illich provides a pair of terms for distinguishing between institutions that promote
freedom and those that restrict or undermine it; freedom-promoting institutions are
“convivial,” and freedom-restricting institutions are “manipulative” (53). Convivial
institutions “exist to be used rather than to produce something” (55), while manipulative
institutions are just the opposite. The “product” created by unfree institutions may be a
physical object or a service such as schooling or healthcare (which Illich often calls
“treatments”). But whatever they produce, these institutions exist to produce more of it,
whether or not anyone actually desires those products. Then, in order to justify their
existence, manipulative institutions have to create societal or psychological demand for
their products; thus, “much of the elaboration and expense is concerned with convincing
consumers that they cannot live without the product or the treatment offered by the
institution” (55). Manipulative institutions may even generate rules that “call for
unwilling consumption or participation” (55). In contrast, “[t]he rules which govern
institutions for use [that is, convivial institutions] have mainly the purpose of avoiding
abuses which would frustrate their general accessibility” (55). This regulation “sets
limits to their use” (55); it never forces people to use the institution if they do not want to.
Overall, the key distinction is that convivial (i.e., freedom-promoting) institutions are
used willingly while manipulative (i.e., freedom-restricting) institutions are not.
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Illich further distinguishes between institutions that are more like “funnels” and those that
are more like “webs” (vii). A funnel corrals all learners into one predetermined learning
path, regardless of individual learners’ needs and desires. A web, on the other hand,
allows for a multitude of diverse learning moments — diverse both across different
learners and within one learner’s lifetime. The goal of a web is “the autonomous
assembly of resources under the personal control of each learner” (70); free, web-like
institutions “develop … independence and learning” (77). In contrast, the goal of a
funnel is to deliver “packages” of learning to its “clients” (i.e., students); thus,
manipulative, funnel-like institutions develop “bureaucracy and teaching” (77).4 Even
with these distinctions, however, a web is still a structure, and so it still places constraints
on educational actions. But these constraints are qualitatively different from the
constraints imposed by a funnel: a web opens up far more possibilities than a funnel does.
As we continue to extend Illich’s theory, we may find it useful to think of the structures
of educational possibilities (such as funnels and webs) as lying on a spectrum rather than
as being opposed to one another. At one end is the strictest form of funnel, a one-sizesupposedly-fits-all “package” of educational “treatment.” A slightly more flexible
structure offers a choice among a limited set of “packages,” such as between regular,
vocational, or college-preparatory high school programs. Such a structure is less like a
web, in Illich’s sense, and more like a set of funnels (i.e., there is only one choice to be
made, and that choice is limited to a highly restricted number of options). Illich’s web
probably lies even further along the spectrum, offering not few but many possible options
and combinations of options. And at the furthest extreme from the single funnel (and
pushing the physical metaphor to its limit), we might think of educators as inviting
students to make their own way through an open terrain. Yet even this is not the kind of
unconstrained “freedom” advocated by Neill; students are still influenced and constrained
by the very nature of what they are learning, as well as by the very invitation to pursue
exploration itself. Furthermore, the point along this spectrum that represents a truly
freedom-promoting structure largely depends on the characteristics of individual students.
Finally, we must remember that for Illich freedom-promoting structures are identified not
only by whether they are more like funnels or more like webs, but also by whether the
decision concerning which of many possible paths to take remains in the hands of the
learner herself.
To summarize, Neill and Illich both criticize the traditional approach to schooling as
detrimental to students’ freedom. However, their proposed solutions do differ, and those
differences are significant for illuminating a crucial problem in contemporary discussions
of freedom and constraint in education. Neill holds that the only way to preserve
students’ freedom is to remove all societal constraints, letting each individual develop as
she chooses. Yet this is neither sociologically feasible nor educationally desirable. Illich,
on the other hand, recognizes that structure and constraint are unavoidable; moreover,
certain structures are actually necessary for promoting true educational freedom. He
offers two related markers of freedom-promoting structures: they keep control in the
hands of the user, and they support many possible paths rather than only one. Illich’s
conception of educational freedom as “independent use of web-like structures” (78)
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redirects our focus toward a consideration of the kinds of structures that make free
learning possible.
Yet the key difference between Illich’s view of educational freedom and Neill’s is still
not clear. I therefore believe that we can and must go further than Illich did in moving
away from thinking of educational freedom as the mere lack of constraints. In the next
section, I use the terminology of structuration theory — in particular, the concepts of
“agency” and “structure” — to develop a more useful conception of educational freedom
in which freedom becomes the positive scope for action, action that is always necessarily
dependent on structures and even constraints.
3. Freedom as Agency
Having illustrated two contrasting views of students’ freedom, I now propose a
vocabulary that enables us to conceptualize the relationship between educational freedom
and structural constraints in a non-dichotomous way. I suggest that, rather than framing
the problem in terms of freedom versus constraint, we may more fruitfully conceive of
agency within structure. But in order to make the case for this conceptual shift, I must
explain what I mean by “agency” and “structure.” The explanation of these terms that I
give here draws on the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens. Giddens developed
structuration theory as a response to the dualism found in mid-twentieth-century social
theory, in which human agency was pitted against rigid, quasi-deterministic social
structures. Giddens sought to move beyond this dichotomy and present a unified theory
in which agency and structure were each inseparable parts of the other.5
Despite the undeniable influence of Giddens’ theory of structuration on the social theory
of the late twentieth and early twenty-first theory, structuration theory has had little
impact on either the sociology or the philosophy of education. Chris Shilling calls for
sociologists of education to give “serious attention” (84) to structuration theory, yet
almost two decades later Laura Day Ashley notes that “[c]ompared with other fields ...
Giddens’ structuration theory appears to be under-used in educational research” (338). If
structuration theory is “under-used” in empirical research on education, it has had
practically no impact on theoretical inquiries into education. Accordingly, I propose a
new use of structuration theory: I use it not to inform the empirical study of educational
situations, but to frame the philosophical conceptualization of educational freedom.
Specifically, I suggest that we think of the agency-structure dualism found in
structuration theory as analogous to the freedom-constraint dualism I have been
discussing so far in this paper. Seen in this light, Giddens’ new conceptualizations of
agency, structure, and the relationship between them point towards a more productive
way of thinking about educational freedom.
In structuration theory, agency is the capability of individuals to do things, rather than to
have things done to them — to act of and for themselves in the world. In Giddens’
words, “Agency refers to doing” (10). Someone who has agency — an agent — is not
necessarily unconstrained; rather, she is the efficient cause of her own actions, whatever
other influences, including constraints, may have contributed to those actions. The
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contrast at the heart of talk about agency is not between constraint and lack of constraint,
but between activity and passivity.
Agency is intimately related to power. Giddens expresses the relationship between the
two as follows:
To be able to ‘act otherwise’ means being able to intervene in the world,
or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a
specific process or state of affairs. This presumes that to be an agent is to
be able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) a range of causal
powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others. Action
depends upon the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a
pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. (14)
Thus, power is simply the ability to act in the world. If someone has agency, she also has
power, and vice versa. This applies even to those who are typically perceived as being
“subordinate” or even “oppressed”:
We should not conceive of the structures of domination built into social
institutions as in some way grinding out ‘docile bodies’ who behave like
the automata suggested by objectivist social science.... [A]ll forms of
dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can
influence the activities of their superiors. (16)
In other words, no human, group of humans, or social structure is able to render another
human or group of humans completely powerless. Some structures do limit agency more
than others, a point I elaborate on below. We do well to attend to the degree to which
various structures, including schools and educational policies, curb the ability of
particular humans to exercise their agency. But even the most limiting structure
imaginable cannot turn a human being into a powerless non-agent.6
Once we grasp this conception of agency, i.e., not as total autonomy and independence
from social influence, but as the ability to act of oneself in the world, we are well
positioned to understand structure as well. Giddens defines structure as made up of
“[r]ules and resources” (377). This broad definition includes not only the formalized
institutions that are Illich’s focus but also cultural norms, patterns of behavior, ways of
speaking, and so on. Structure is not an independent force that influences or even
determines human behavior; rather, human action itself constantly reproduces or alters
structure. At the same time, structure makes human acts what they are. As Giddens
insists, “[s]tructure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining
and enabling” (25). In other words, in the absence of structure, it would be impossible
for humans to exercise agency.
It is relatively easy to see how resources can be enabling: wealth, prestige, political
office, and other physical and social resources are resources precisely because they
widen the scope of action for those who possess them. Rules, on the other hand, are often
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thought of as constraints on the possibility of free action. Yet rules, which Giddens
describes as “techniques or generalizable procedures applied to the enactment/
reproduction of social practices” (21), show us how to carry out particular acts in the first
place; they constitute those acts as meaningful within a given social setting. Thus, rules
as well as resources are necessary for enabling humans to act with agency. The rules and
resources of a particular social structure do not only set limits on the scope of human
action; they also make it possible for that action to occur. Social structures are like train
tracks: Trains have to go wherever the tracks go, but the tracks make it possible for trains
to go anywhere in the first place. So train tracks enable the movement of the train by
constraining it. Likewise, by constraining human action, structures enable agents’
actions.
Thinking in terms of agency and structure, as I have explained them here, leads us to
view the matter of educational freedom in a more balanced, nuanced way. We can
recognize the ways students have agentive control over their actions, even in the most
restrictive educational settings — and the ways even the most restrictive educational
settings provide students with rules and resources for action, even while significantly
constraining that action. Yet the shift to the concepts of agency and structure that I
propose does not preclude critical evaluation of educational rules and regulations; on the
contrary, it offers a more coherent criterion for identifying overly constraining
educational structures and policies.
All structures, as I have explained them here, both enable and constrain. Nevertheless,
we can still evaluate different structures as relatively more agency-enabling or agencyconstraining. Accordingly, we can judge different structures with respect to their
relationship to human agency.7 Agency-friendly structures are particularly important for
education, because agency must be developed: children learn how to exercise their
agency through participation in educational structures that support their growing abilities
to control their own learning.
I suggest that we reconceptualize educational freedom, not as the simple absence of
constraints (and thus something that one either does or does not have), but as the relative
scope for human agency provided by one’s social contexts. We could think of this in
terms of the breadth and depth of agency: the range of different things one is able to do,
and how meaningful or significant one perceives those things to be. Or, in keeping with
the idea, explained above, that structural conditions are necessary for human action, we
might look at both the flexibility of rules and access to resources: who decides the rules,
who is able to change them, and how easily; who has certain resources, how easily they
are obtained, and how easily they change hands. Undergirding such inquiries is the idea
that it is not primarily the amount of constraint that matters, but rather its nature; in other
words, the difference between freedom-promoting and freedom-restricting structures is
qualitative, not quantitative.
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4. Illustrations of Freedom-as-Agency
To demonstrate the usefulness of my proposed agency-based conception of freedom, I
first revisit Neill’s account of Summerhill. I then briefly discuss the three contemporary
educational debates mentioned in the introduction to this article (student-directed online
learning, the increasing prevalence of homeschooling, and the increasing dominance of
rules and regulations) in order to show how the conception of freedom-as-agency brings
greater clarity to these debates and opens up new directions for discussion.
As I have already mentioned, Neill failed to recognize the structures that did exist at
Summerhill. To illustrate this, I will look at two contrasting examples of structure and
constraint at Summerhill: the issue of self-government and the General Meeting, and
Neill’s interaction with Winifred. I argue that the structures of self-government were, in
fact, necessary for promoting the genuine freedom experienced at Summerhill; in
contrast, in the case of Winifred, it was not structure, but the lack of structure, that truly
constrained her educational freedom.
The most obvious example of structure at Summerhill was the school’s policy of selfgovernment, embodied in the weekly General Meeting. We can recognize the General
Meeting as a structure — and a freedom-promoting one at that — by analyzing its rules
and resources. The resources provided by the General Meeting included a time and place
for the entire community to come together, the mechanisms for raising and addressing
grievances or other matters of communal concern, and the policy of one vote per person.
The rules of the General Meeting were both explicit (e.g., “each person gets exactly one
vote, regardless of age or status”) and implicit (e.g., “it is better to persuade others by
reasonable arguments than by force or authority”). These rules sanctioned certain types
of behavior and not others (e.g., bringing up a bully at the meeting was a more accepted
way of dealing with him than exacting personal vengeance); they also constituted the
meanings of certain acts (e.g., the act of voting had no meaning if there was no meeting
in which to vote, and the act of breaking someone else’s private property had no meaning
if there was no government to back up the notion that property could be private and had
value [see Neill 31]).
Clearly, self-government and the General Meeting were enabling: they allowed laws to
be made, cases to be heard, and punishments for deviant behavior to be decided by the
community itself. Less clearly, but just as certainly, this structure was also constraining.
If one wanted to bring an issue before the community, one had to do it at the time and
place of the General Meeting, not at some other time or place. This very constraint was
what enabled all members of the community to come together and participate in decisionmaking. In addition, as Neill acknowledged, under self-government dissenting minorities
are constrained to accept the majority decision (21). It is difficult to see how this
constraint is also enabling, but the rule of the majority is inherent in the very nature of
democracy. To do away with self-government in the interest of minority rights would be
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even more constraining, as the children learned during the few occasions of total anarchy
at Summerhill. The discussions and votes that took place at General Meetings lent such
legitimacy to the community’s decisions that, in general, minorities usually accepted the
will of the majority without protest. In these ways, then, Neill’s practice was better than
his theory (as in many other instances as well): although he explicitly considered freedom
to be opposed to all forms of societal constraint, he permitted, and even encouraged, selfgovernment because he valued the opportunities for freedom — understood as agency —
that it afforded.
The need for certain structures and even constraints in order to promote educational
freedom can be seen most clearly in the story of Winifred, who asked Neill to “teach her
something.” When she did not know what she wanted to learn, Neill refused to offer any
guidance or suggestions at all. So she chose to study for the university entrance exams,
not because she found the subjects interesting, but because she considered them better
than the boredom she felt when she had nothing to study. As Neill tells it, this is a
laudable example of the lack of constraint at Summerhill. Winifred was not required to
take certain subjects, as she would have been at another school; in fact, she was not even
constrained by the slightest suggestion from Neill of a possible course of action. But I
would suggest that she was effectively limited to the choices she perceived to be
available to her at Summerhill — boredom or the university entrance subjects. Although
Neill’s refusal to guide her in discovering what she wanted to learn might appear to
increase her freedom, in reality it constrained her to choose from the subjects of which
she already had some awareness. A few thoughtful suggestions from Neill, while in one
sense constraining her (by influencing her decision), would have also enabled her to
choose from a wider range of possibilities than a thirteen-year-old could be expected to
know about on her own.
Of course, it is possible that Neill’s true intent was not for Winifred to find something
genuinely interesting to learn. Instead, he may have been trying to wean her from her
over-dependence (as he perceived it) on adults for direction and entertainment. If this
interpretation of Neill’s motives is correct, then the fact that Winifred made her choice
without any input from Neill does indeed look like success. But in fact, Winifred was
still almost entirely dependent on adult influences: she chose a highly conventional
learning goal (again, most likely because she knew of few other options), and once she
made her choice, there is every indication that she pursued it in a highly conventional
way. Thus, whether Neill was trying to help her find what she truly wanted to learn or to
make her less dependent on adult authority, his unyielding refusal to influence her in any
way ultimately undermined his educational goal.
Furthermore, in coming to Neill, Winifred was already displaying her agency in seeking
out an education for herself. Neill would not have harmed her agency by offering
guidance; on the contrary, by refusing to give her the help she asked for, he further
restricted her ability to act. As Winifred saw the situation, she had two educational
options: she could either get Neill’s help in finding something interesting to learn, or
pursue the only learning possibility she herself knew about (the university entrance
subjects), which she admitted “did not interest her much” (Neill 126). Of these options,
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she preferred the former; thus, when Neill refused to help her, he closed off the
educational choice she herself had made. To be sure, Winifred’s agency was already
curtailed by her limited knowledge about what and how she could learn — but that is
precisely why she needed guidance from Neill. Such guidance would have extended, not
restricted, her agency by offering her an even wider range of options from which to
choose.8
The alternative conception of freedom that I advocate also sheds light on contemporary
educational debates, such as discussions of formal and informal learning contexts.
Understanding freedom as agency guards us against an overly simplistic association of
formality with constraint and structure, and informality with freedom and lack of
structure. Quite the contrary, both agency and structure can be found in dynamic
interaction within every learning context, regardless of where that context falls on the
formal-informal spectrum. More specifically, the agency-within-structure conception of
educational freedom enables us to recognize two claims: first, that informal, implicit
structures (such as those found in families) are indeed structures, composed of rules and
resources that shape human action; and second, that formal structures (such as those
found in classrooms) can still promote learners’ agency, often more effectively than
informal structures can. The question is not, ‘Which learning contexts provide structure,
and which ones provide agency?’ Rather, we should be asking, ‘How does the interplay
of structure and agency manifest itself in various learning contexts, and what structures
(both formal and informal) best promote learners’ agency within those diverse contexts?’
To illustrate these points, I use the agency-within-structure lens to briefly analyze four
learning contexts: two relatively informal, and two relatively formal.
First, online learning. In many ways, resources like Kahn Academy and MIT
OpenCourseWare are the latest iteration of the same student-directed learning movement
that Illich, Neill, and even John Dewey have been part of. The advocates of online
learning frequently point out that these resources enable students to exercise educational
agency. Online learning resources do give students more control in certain areas than
traditional schools do. However, these resources are still quite structured; they present
students with a highly organized array of learning materials, often fairly linear in
progression, precisely in order to allow students to learn without constant direction from
a teacher. Thus, the freedom that these resources offer students is agency-withinstructure. At the same time, online learning resources do also constrain students’ access
to other important types of learning, such as face-to-face interaction and open-ended
feedback. As with all structures, the trade-off in enabling certain actions is constraining
others.
Similar types of constraints and possibilities are evident in a second area of debate,
homeschooling. A key characteristic of present-day homeschooling is the apparent
tension between parents’ rights to educate their children as they choose, free from state
interference, and children’s rights to a decent education, whatever their parents’ means
and desires. An adequate treatment of how the conception of freedom-as-agency
provides greater clarity to this thorny issue will have to wait for future work. For now, I
merely wish to point out that being educated at home — rather than at school — is itself a
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particular structure. Homeschooling does limit students in certain ways, as opponents
point out. For example, homeschooled students may have more limited opportunities to
interact with other children from diverse backgrounds. At the same time, homeschooling
also allows students to meet community members of all ages and backgrounds.
Furthermore, much like student-directed online learning, homeschooling enables students
to explore and find out how they learn best, rather than requiring them to follow the
school schedule and teaching methods. In this respect, at least, the structure of
homeschooling may be much more freedom-enabling than that of traditional schooling.
Both online learning and homeschooling are often seen as less formal learning contexts
than classroom-based instruction. But the dynamic of agency-within-structure also
manifests itself in traditional classrooms. Consider the portion of the classroom day
given to reading instruction and practice. It might seem that the literacy period is
necessarily formal, structured, and constraining; how else can teachers ensure that all
their students learn to read? But in fact it is possible to deliberately build student choice
and agency into the very process of learning to read, even in a traditional classroom
setting. For example, the Daily 5, a well-known way of structuring literacy periods in the
elementary grades, seeks to give students greater choice and independence (i.e., agency)
in how they spend their literacy time, while maintaining high expectations regarding
appropriate behavior during that time. In order to achieve these goals, the Daily 5
presents students with highly structured choices regarding what, when, where, and how
they complete the required literacy tasks. In particular, students choose the order in
which they complete five literacy tasks: Read to Self, Work on Writing, Read to
Someone, Listen to Reading, and Word Work (i.e., spelling practice). The creators of the
Daily 5 report,
Even though [the literacy tasks] are non-negotiable, students enjoy the
freedom to choose the order in which they will participate in each
activity.... Choice is one of the key reasons that students love the Daily 5,
develop the habits of readers, and greatly improve their reading. (Boushey
and Moser 16)
It would be a mistake, both theoretically and pedagogically, to see this methodology as
exhibiting structure (and hence lack of choice) in some areas, and freedom (and hence
lack of structure) in others. Rather, the structure itself — the clearly specified options for
what to do and how to do it — makes it possible for students to make meaningful choices
regarding how they spend their literacy time. The absence of the Daily 5 structure would
lead to less freedom, not more. By giving students structured agency, the Daily 5
methodology ensures both that they have ample opportunities to develop as readers and
writers and that they can exercise their agency in doing so.
Finally, although this article has focused on students, my proposed conception of
freedom-as-agency also applies to teachers. One of the biggest educational policy
debates today has to do with regulation. The rhetoric of this debate often displays the
dichotomy between freedom and constraint, particularly in arguments made by opponents
of regulation. But shifting perspective to focus on agency-within-structure opens up new
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possibilities for debating both the costs and the benefits of regulation. We can still
critique certain regulations as overly constraining by pointing to the ways they limit
teachers’ agency in making pedagogical choices that are appropriate for their own
students. At the same time, we can also recognize what regulations enable teachers to do.
For example, increased standardization allows teachers to coordinate their instruction
with teachers in other grades and even other districts.
One final note in passing: the conception of freedom-as-agency that I advocate here has
no inherent predisposition toward either libertarian or interventionist policies and
practices. In each of the debates outlined above, and in countless others, the exact same
educational structure might be freedom-promoting in one situation or for one student or
group of students, and freedom-restricting for another. As just one example, consider
Lisa Delpit’s critique of “child-centered, whole language, and process approaches” to
teaching writing that fail to give children from non-White, non-middle class backgrounds
the tools needed to succeed in a society that will inevitably judge them on the basis of
their “product” and their mastery of the codes of power (Delpit 31). In such a context,
more explicit instruction is in fact more empowering — though, as Delpit makes sure to
point out, it must not undermine respect for the students’ own knowledge and agency, nor
divorce their writing practice from “real audiences and real purposes” (33). By directing
our focus to what educational structures enable particular students to do, the conception
of freedom-as-agency highlights the merits of Delpit’s critique and of her proposed
solutions.
5. Conclusion
In this article I have contrasted two approaches to educational freedom. One views
freedom as the mere absence of constraints, such that any increase in constraints
necessarily entails a decrease in freedom (and vice versa); I argue that this view of
freedom, while widespread in educational debates today, is overly simplistic. The second
approach views freedom as the scope for personal action, which is always supported by
social structures and even constraints. I suggest that attention to agency and the
structures that promote it brings greater clarity to contemporary discussions of
educational freedom, such as student-directed online learning, homeschooling, and
increasing regulation.
In each of these examples, I have tried to shift our thinking from freedom versus
constraint to agency within structure. Once we make this conceptual shift, an entirely
new type of question opens up: since all structures enable certain actions and constrain
others, which actions should be enabled by educational structures? In other words, what
kinds of actions do we want to make sure we enable, even if we do so at the expense of
others? It is my contention that conceiving of freedom as agency helps to direct our
attention toward precisely these all-important questions.
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Notes
1

I would like to thank those who read and commented on earlier versions of this paper,
including Nicholas Burbules, Anne Haas Dyson, Helga Varden, Chris Higgins, and
Elizabeth Hoiem. I would also like to thank the University of Illinois UrbanaChampaign's Philosophy of Education Discussion Group and the Society for the
Philosophical Study of Education, as well as the reviewers and editors of the Journal for
the Philosophical Study of Education, for their valuable feedback.

2

I use the past tense in this discussion because my focus is on in Neill’s own description
of how Summerhill worked; however, it is worth noting that Summerhill is still in
operation today.

3

Illich does not develop an institutional theory in Deschooling Society, and so I do not
attempt to offer one here. Later in this article I introduce the concept of ‘structure’,
which I take to be broader than ‘institution’ (i.e., an institution is a particularly
formalized manifestation of structure).

4

Note that Illich is not opposed to teaching as such; rather, he protests the dependence of
the learner on institutionally determined learning goals and teacher-packaged instruction.

5

For an excellent overview of the roots of structuration theory in earlier debates
concerning structure and agency, see Shilling.

6

Giddens’ account of power clearly reflects the influence of Foucault in arguing that
power is not “an inherently noxious phenomenon,” a unidirectional relation of dominance
that social structures could potentially transcend, but rather a multidirectional dynamic
enacted by agents in all structures (31-32).

7

To be sure, there are many other good criteria besides this one for evaluating
educational institutions and regulations. My focus here is on the criterion of students’
agency.

8

The analysis in this paragraph applies equally to all ‘dependent learners’ as described by
Illich, insofar as they deliberately choose — on the basis of their limited awareness of or
access to opportunities for self-teaching — to learn through official schools and teachers.
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Teaching as Entertainment: An Examination of Effects
Ross M. Miller
Steven J. Bourgeois
In 1969, wrapped in good intentions, Sesame Street debuted on public television. It was
revolutionary and served as preschool for many American children who, at the time,
could not attend a real school for financial reasons. Operating as the televisual
manifestation of President Lyndon Johnson’s Head Start program, Sesame Street was
designed to confront some of the challenges being addressed by the president’s War on
Poverty. Today, not only is Sesame Street still going strong, but it has morphed into
various international incarnations, from Mexico and Sweden to Saudi Arabia and
Germany. It is a cultural phenomenon and beloved by its millions of viewers. It is also
deeply valued by educators, and its influence is felt throughout all levels of public
schooling.
We want to be clear about the nature of our objections to the program. In a television
landscape full of “reality” programming, 24-hour everything, and specials that dig into
the worst excesses of human nature, it can be said that Sesame Street is one of the more
worthwhile television endeavors. However, as social commentator and philosopher Neil
Postman said in “Five Things We Need to Know About Technological Change,” every
advancement or technological development has an idea that lies at its center. This idea
may be counter-productive or beneficial, but it is seldom ambivalent. What is the idea
behind Sesame Street, and what subtle impact has this program had on the education
landscape? Our contention is that Sesame Street has led to an increasing perception of
education through the prism of entertainment, and that profound effects ensue from this
perception.
In the annals of education, among the works of the great educators and the thinkers who
have written about education, one generally discovers that in writings about what it
means to be educated, to acquire knowledge, entertainment or fun is not mentioned. This
is not a critique of the use of humor in education; humor can enhance student
memorization. However, when we speak of such concepts as entertainment or fun, we
are talking about the idea of entertainment for its own sake, without an academic tie-in.
We are speaking of tools that are utilized in place of (either purposefully or de facto)
more meaningful and impactful, more authentic methods. What should be taught and
emphasized is anything that draws out the natural interest inherent in a subject to appeal
to the natural curiosity inherent in the student. We see this phenomenon of conflating
education with entertainment as a form of false engagement for two reasons: one,
entertainment as teaching is counter-intuitive to the educational process in general; two,
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entertainment as teaching infers that teaching and the acquisition of knowledge are, in
and of themselves, not enough. The prevailing thought behind this assumption is that
school and learning are boring, dry, and in desperate need of revitalization.
As a result of the technological and televisual changes brought about by Sesame Street
and other factors, over the last several decades, a tide of entertainment-centered
technological innovation has swept through the education system within the United
States, and in doing so, it has revolutionized the profession. In its wake have been left
questionable practices, a diluting of knowledge, and a perversion of purpose. With each
frantic attempt to attract student attention, the student becomes further disconnected from
and disenchanted with the knowledge being presented. With every effort to cater to how
students operate outside of school via entertainment and technology, the worth of the
knowledge presented inside of schools is further cheapened.
In this paper, we seek to identify the problems adherent in common educational practice
and the ideas that serve as their basis. Though applicable throughout the curriculum, our
narrative focuses on ideas and experiences that relate to our own classroom experiences
in the liberal arts, specifically within the area of historical studies at the secondary level.
While taking a critical approach in this commentary, we recognize that teaching is an art
form, requiring a nuanced approach. This view in fact informs part of our critique of the
conflation of education and entertainment.
1. Teaching as Entertainment
The infiltration of entertainment into education is pervasive, and teachers would be hard
pressed to spend a day — even an hour — without encountering it. So where does the
impact of Sesame Street fit in? Education and knowledge acquisition are given a very
light treatment in elementary school. Within the realm of historical education we
ourselves can recall at the core of elementary school experiences memories of the
Thanksgiving play or of the history teacher who dressed up as George Washington. We
could almost concede to this method in elementary schools, which conflates history with
play-acting, were it not for the fact that the games and other fun activities carry on into
the higher grades.
In the late elementary and middle school years, high-stakes testing requirements become
intensified; the child must confront aspects of learning that, at least on the surface, are not
fun. In fact, the confrontation between entertainment and achievement represents the
central controversy for teachers during the middle years. Over the course of these years,
students develop and change in many ways, filling various roles within the school and
taking various approaches to their studies. However, there are two major directions
students might go: one, they might swallow the testing paradigm, and constantly fret
about their grades; or two, they might progressively lose interest in school and education
altogether. Between these two bookends, we perceive a continuum; however, we would
like to address these two major categories separately.
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The former type of student comes across as frenetic and anxious. Not all of the “best”
students are like this, but enough are to generalize about them. In middle school, these
students become the overachievers, told by parents and teachers alike that their entire
livelihood hinges on each and every day, each and every quiz and test. The worst part
about it is that some of these kids — our “best” students — hate school. They are
punching a clock and ticking boxes towards graduation, passage through a good
university, and a job where they will earn six figures. These students are the product of
one of the most cynical and destructive trends in our society: the monetization of
education. Education is no longer about opening doors, but about feeding a
specialization. There is no authentic engagement; the focus of the student is to meet the
minimum requirements for graduation and (usually) to begin college. This is the pursuit
of knowledge in its most base form.
The latter group also consists of victims of a lack of authentic engagement, but in a
different way. One might think that the infusion of entertainment would enhance this
group’s engagement. However, evidence from our own classrooms seems to indicate that
entertainment-oriented lessons and approaches have an inverse relationship with
academic interest and cognitive development. While the day-to-day endeavor of teaching
this group of students centers on ensuring success on standardized tests, exposure to new
ideas is rare because new ideas and concepts do not appear on tests.
The matriculation into high school only exacerbates the problems encountered by both
groups of students. To be sure, students change, and the cauldron that is the middle
school years has an impact on how the student approaches studies. However, the high
school years represent the ossification of attitudes towards education that first materialize
at the end of the elementary and middle school periods.
Therefore, it is in the last half of public schooling that entertainment as an educational
tool becomes most impactful. Instead of intensifying as the students grow presumably
more capable of increased demands, the learning experience becomes shallower. What
does entertainment look like at the high school level? We have seen at least one teacher
within each of the many schools where we have taught who conducts class as if it
consisted of screenings of Masterpiece Theater. To be fair, there are many schools
seeking to do away with movie watching in class — or at least watching the entire movie
— but this prohibition has more to do with the length of the films rather than with the
medium itself.
Proponents of increased technology in schools suggest that, in part, we are using
resources to which the students most gravitate. It is often said that students today are
visual learners, and such tools as films — as a part of our educators’ toolbox — are key
to getting the students ‘into’ the material. The problem is that such strategies, devices, or
tools are created within an entertainment paradigm, not an educational one. Perhaps a
video snippet could give the students a taste of a topic, but certainly it cannot serve as a
substitute for reading, studying, and seeking to understand. We support John Dewey’s
warning that it is not a teacher’s task “to make things interesting” (23). Instead, the
teacher should begin with the student’s intrinsic interest, and “carry forward,” bringing
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that interest into new domains (34). What would ‘making something interesting’ look
like anyway? Some history teachers tend to expound upon student questioning to
connect student ideas to events that occur at a later date or that occurred at an earlier
time, or else to link student ideas to current events. Even if the questioning does not
connect with the timeline being discussed, a thoughtful teacher can still address a query
while maintaining the lesson for the day.
Students in Advanced Placement history classes are perhaps very smart and capable, but
many of these sudents are unwilling to break out of their surface-oriented approach to the
class. For these students, various “funny” online U.S. history videos teach the basics.
However, this approach, in lieu of their reading the text, only helps them address some
multiple choice questions. When students are asked to demonstrate their knowledge by
way of an essay, many struggle mightily to accomplish the task. The average AP student
in history has only taken in the course content at an informational level. As a result, the
student cannot demonstrate substantial evidence of his or her knowledge of the subject
through providing context, nuance, and interpretation, as often occurs in writing an essay.
And then, there is the History Channel. The issue with the History Channel is not unlike
the issue pertaining to Sesame Street. Where the latter created a gross misinterpretation
of how to approach education in general, the History Channel has done the same
specifically for the subject of history. Like Sesame Street, it is not the fault of the
creators of the History Channel how it is used and valued. Still, the viewer is expected to
sit there and absorb, and nothing more is required. Then, the child is expected to treat
history as the science it is.
Failing grades in history come as a bit of a shock — both to the student and to the parent.
History is always a given. Nothing is pressed within this subject, which is considered fun
and easy — so much so that the advanced students stop studying. Students in regular
classes expect the same middle-school approach to continue in high school. However,
when faced with even a scintilla of the discipline of history, some students struggle and
fail. Parents email, saying, “I don’t know why little Johnny is failing. He always loved
history — never made anything less than an ‘A’. He watches the History Channel all the
time.”
While the above comments might seem irreverent in tone, we feel that entertainment in
education has serious implications. Beyond history, entertainment has crept into every
subject found in your local high school. In short, there is nothing wrong with the History
Channel, or Bill Nye the Science Guy, or any of the myriad programming examples out
there, except for their impact on scholarship and on the student’s ability to accept or
understand the purpose of scholarship. The drive to find the easiest path has corrupted
the learning process to the point that it will be difficult to reverse the trend.
Many teachers use such tools; but again, the assumption (or the fervent, cock-eyed,
optimistic hope) is that the students are also reading. The students are not completely at
fault, either, having been taught that the course grade, in the end, is the only thing that
matters. Standardized tests have shown that knowledge is not what is important, but
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rather that a narrow strip of skill sets and snippets of information suffices. Students are
not ‘in the moment’ because they are not required to be — they are not authentically
engaged because it is not necessary to be engaged in order to score the right grade or get
into the right school.
Some of the questions that teachers often confront include, ‘Will this be on the test?’
‘How will it be graded?’ ‘What impact will this have on my overall grade or grade point
average?’ Not unlike a well-trained lawyer, the students are taking in the information as
possible test fodder while the teacher is striving to underscore the authentic, interesting
worth of the material. In a concept related to authentic engagement, the Buddha
emphasized the importance of right mindfulness. Respected Vietnamese Buddhist monk
Thich Nhat Hanh writes in his book The Heart of Buddha’s Teaching that mindfulness is
about being in the moment. In moments of what Buddhists call mere recognition, “When
we sit, we know we are sitting. When we stand, walk or lie down, we know we are
standing, walking or lying down” (Hanh 69). In writing about his first travels through
Yosemite Valley, famed naturalist John Muir noted his focus on every rock, every flower
and every tree. He declared that while in a city, “I am a captive, I am bound” (qtd. in
Badè 110). Yet walking through one of the natural wonders of North America, his
mindfulness of the moment set him free. He was no longer restrained and blinded by the
din of city life but set free by being able to fully focus on the here and now. While Hanh
and Muir articulate a deep involvement in the moment, our students appear to be jumping
ahead — always already leveraging the extrinsic value of their academic endeavor
without considering its intrinsic worth.
2. The Opposite End of the Spectrum: The Hard School
In the 1973 film The Paper Chase, based upon the 1971 book by John Jay Osborn, Jr.,
first-year Harvard law student James Hart encounters the legendary Professor Kingsfield,
a formidable educator and practitioner of the Socratic Method. He is the embodiment of
what can be termed the hard school. The film opens with Dr. Kingsfield randomly
calling on Hart to state the facts of the assigned case — a case that Hart has not yet read,
since he was expecting a mere overview of the course. Rejecting Hart’s initial excuses,
Dr. Kingsfield follows up relentlessly as the first-year law student flounders in front of
his peers. Showing no pity, Professor Kingsfield presses Hart with questions that go
beyond the details of the case, asking him to respond to a hypothetical example to draw
out a fundamental point of law.
After this painful public emasculation during his first class in law school, and after Hart
races to the bathroom to lose his lunch, the plot of the film takes an interesting turn.
While the fellow students gossip about how Kingsfield took down another first-year law
student, Hart gathers himself and systematically rebuilds his confidence. He later joins a
study group, preparing relentlessly, extending lessons to include independent research,
with special attention to archival writings by Kingsfield himself. Joining the “upper
echelon” of students in Kingsfield’s contract law class, Hart volunteers to answer
questions, engaging publicly with the famed professor, while others cower in the back of
the lecture hall.
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Worth noting is the closing scene of the film, where Hart receives his final grade for
Kingsfield’s contract law course. The viewer sees the professor placing a 93 on Hart’s
final examination, indicating a resounding success and his most meaningful academic
accomplishment. However, in a twist of dramatic irony, the viewer sees Hart on the
beach receiving his report card from a friend. Instead of opening the sealed envelope,
Hart turns it into a paper airplane and throws it out over the ocean, never viewing its
contents. While this perplexing response may cause discomfort in the audience of today,
the director’s intention was most likely to show that Hart had no interest in the numerical
grade at all. For him, learning the fundamentals of contract law, overcoming his fear of
public failure, and to some extent overcoming his fear of Dr. Kingsfield, transcended the
value of any report card. For Hart, whose last name stems from the German word for
“hard,” the actual grade was irrelevant.
This example of the hard school approach may seem a little out of place in today’s
educational culture. In the present-day high school classroom, a student who is not
prepared for a class discussion can typically downplay the oversight, make an excuse, or
just admit to a lack of preparation. In most cases, the teacher will take pity, move on, and
call on the usual suspects — students who do prepare — and this will provide the teacher
with an easy transition, avoiding prolongation of an uncomfortable moment. However,
based upon our time in the classroom, we wonder if avoiding public embarrassment
actually benefits a student in the long run. We wonder if there is a time in a student’s life
when students require a hard school, a line in the sand that requires force of will to
overcome a genuine challenge.
Cultivation of will would appear to be antithetical to current educational practice,
particularly in the K-12 setting. While recognizing the irony of exemplifying educational
rigor through a film designed primarily as entertainment, in the above discussion we
draw out an educational contrast in terms of both style and substance. While we seek to
highlight differences between education as entertainment and what we term the hard
school, we recognize a continuum of approaches that resists categories. The best
educators can move seamlessly along this continuum, providing students with humor,
entertainment, structure, and challenge as appropriate. In keeping with the image of
cultivation, one can think back to the German term Bildung, which resists translation.
While representing education in general, Bildung has also been associated with the terms
image [das Bild], development, transformation, and growth. Although Goethe’s
elaboration of Bildung in the context of cultivation of plant life is often cited, a rarer,
though no less appropriate, source, also from the Enlightenment, is Immanuel Kant’s On
Education [Über Pädagogik], where Kant writes, using the auricula, a type of alpine
primrose, as analogue:
when raised from a root this plant bears flowers of one colour only; when
raised from seed, the flowers are of the most varied colours. Nature has
placed these manifold germs in the plant, and their development is only a
question of proper sowing and planting. Thus it is with man. (9)
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While Kant’s analogy characterizes education as “only a question of proper sowing and
planting,” he also implicitly recognizes a proper time for strict discipline — namely,
while children are young and require “nurturing,” well before they are ready for scholarly
pursuits.
Also implicit in Kant’s analogy is the need for different approaches to education at
different periods of a child’s life. Particularly during the formative years, Kant indicates,
nurturing may often, though not always, require discipline [Zucht] and will [Wille].
Nietzsche writes extensively on the cultivation of will, often within the context of
education. Some of his posthumous writings detail his approach to schooling, including
his observation that “The most desirable thing is still under all circumstances a hard
discipline at the proper time, i.e., at that age at which it still makes one proud to see that
much is demanded of one” (482).
While Nietzsche did not explicitly state when within a child’s educational journey the
proper time would be to experience the hard school, we expect he had in mind a
progression in which expectations and challenge increase as the child matures.
Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power as the ability to obey internal commands is
enigmatic to the extent that it supports inner causation — a process that can be refined
and hardened through suffering. In concrete terms, the individual “commands” to the
extent that he or she forms internal goals, while paradoxically also serving as the being
who “obeys” those internal commands. Nietzsche clarified this point:
this is what distinguishes the hard school as a good school from all others:
that much is demanded; and sternly demanded; that the good, even the
exceptional, is demanded as the norm; that praise is rare, that indulgence is
nonexistent; that blame is apportioned sharply, objectively, without regard
for talent or antecedents. (482)
Tying the theoretical in with the practical is exemplified by Leiden University in the
Netherlands. One of the more famous sites within the school is het Zweetkamertje, or the
“Sweat Room.” The room was used as a waiting area before students proclaimed and
defended their knowledge in front of a panel of professors. Approaching the room, two
charcoal drawings can be seen on either side of a single wooden door. On one side is a
depiction of a nervous student, worried about his future and sweating over the possibility
of failing his exam. On the other side of the door is a depiction of an exuberant graduate
skipping out of the room. Above the door is Dante’s warning from his Divine Comedy,
“Lasciate ogni speranza; voi ch’entrate [Abandon hope all ye who enter here].”
Inside, where only a single desk sits at the center of the room, are walls covered by
signatures of graduates who managed to pass their examinations and then signed their
names to mark their time spent in this otherwise small, unremarkable room. Among the
more noted luminaries whose signatures adorn the walls are those of Queen Beatrix of the
Netherlands, Dutch resistance fighter Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Sir Winston Churchill,
and Nelson Mandela. While a recent restoration has highlighted the more famous
signatures, the room and the experience associated with it were great equalizers. It was
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not whose name was on the wall, but rather what had been endured and accomplished to
justify the signature, that mattered.
The bareness of the room focuses the attention, in a way reminiscent of the Spartan room
within Wartburg Castle where Luther translated the New Testament into German. There
is nothing for the waiting student to think about or be distracted by. To stand in the
middle of this room, to see the thousands upon thousands of signatures of graduates, the
famous and not so famous, but who each sought to make a mark after such a shared
tribulation, is indeed an awe-inspiring experience. However, the imagery conjured up by
the room’s name, considering the standards of today’s public high school experience,
presents a terrifying notion — in two key ways. One, we do not levy such assessments;
and two, even if we did, we do not demand from students the ability to explain their
knowledge, i.e., to contextualize it, to interpret it, to pursue it in depth. Ironically, the
name Leiden is a derivative of the Dutch and German verb “to suffer.” But the suffering
experienced in Leiden University’s Sweat Room is not the type of suffering that leaves
us, at the end of the day, covered in boils and considering our own mortality. Rather,
suffering in this context provides the means to achieve a purposeful life, and stands at the
opposite end of the easy and the trivial.
Students often look back on their high school career and harken back to that single
teacher who made strict demands, who pushed them beyond their preconceived limits.
The teacher’s lack of pity could be described as generosity to the extent that he or she is
investing in the student’s ability to overcome and persist, often through strict adherence
to rigorous academic standards. This is an issue that extends beyond our classrooms or
any one discipline or grade. What we are discussing is a system-wide re-examination of
how we educate our students. We are proposing a system that, from the beginning, does
not apologize for content learned, but highlights the importance and the inherent interest
of every subject and endeavor. Methodology will vary depending upon the age of the
student, but the progression will ensure an increase of intellectual stamina. Throughout
the public education experience, there must be an increasing demand placed on the
student — not the fabricated demands of test scores and AP exams, but rather a demand
that focuses on skills that supersede the capricious nature of current industrial and real
world requirements. The student must be capable of a greater amount of sustained and
productive study and learning.
3. Practical Implications: Operationalizing the Hard School
What we suggest is not easy for either the student or the teacher. We may attempt to run
our class in the way it should be run, but we are working in isolation. From the onset,
students must see school and the classroom as a gateway to understanding the world. A
natural curiosity exists within each person, as is evidenced by a two-year-old’s obsession
with grass in all of its manifestations. We are born inquisitive people, and education
must be a vehicle through which this curiosity is magnified and nurtured, not suppressed
and destroyed.
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In the book The Once and Future King by T.H. White, the magician Merlyn gives advice
to a young Arthur about the importance of learning:
“The best thing for being sad,” replied Merlyn, beginning to puff and
blow, “is to learn something. That is the only thing that never fails. You
may grow old and trembling in your anatomies, you may lie awake at
night listening to the disorder of your veins, you may miss your only love,
you may see the world about you devastated by evil lunatics, or know your
honour trampled in the sewers of baser minds. There is only one thing for
it then — to learn. Learn why the world wags and what wags it. That is
the only thing which the mind can never exhaust, never alienate, never be
tortured by, never fear or distrust, and never dream of regretting. Learning
is the thing for you.” (185-186)
Historically, places of worship have been sanctuaries, in an ecclesiastical sense as well as
a practical one. Our classrooms should also be sanctuaries, indeed the sanctum
sanctorum. Currently, cell phones, tablets, laptops, online surveys, online responses
shown on a screen, online quizzes and tests, online textbooks and the like create a din that
hampers attention and focus on the part of the students. In their 2009 commentary on
experimental studies of deep reading, Maryanne Wolf and Mirit Barzillai found that,
while online reading can offer a litany of information that greatly enhances reading, often
it serves as a distraction and creates a skimming that prevents authentic, internalized
comprehension. To use Heideggerian language, the classroom should be a place of
refuge or a clearing where students can escape the hectic and superficial world outside
the walls of the school to focus on the essence of that world with which few are in
contact. Throughout history, voices in the wilderness have called upon us to focus on the
nature of learning. In 19th-century America, transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson
and Henry David Thoreau suggested that society in general, and technology in particular,
was corrupting. On this topic, Thoreau stated with regard to “modern improvements,”
there is an illusion about them; there is not always a positive advance....
Our inventions are wont to be pretty toys, which distract our attention
from serious things. They are but improved means to an unimproved end,
an end which it was already but too easy to arrive at.... (67)
While we are not ascetics, we believe there is value in putting aside the distractions and
the noise in order to focus attention and attempt to understand the world.
At the center of the learning experience are three vital and integrated components:
reading, discussion, and questioning. All societies built on learning hold the acquisition
of knowledge, and discussion about and questioning of what is known and what is not
known, as key tenets. Any reform of the modern American education system must
include these three ideas as fundamental building blocks of the classroom. The 20thcentury Austrian philosopher Otto Neurath narrowed this even further, saying that the
essential building blocks of education are discussion and argument, to allow the student
to differentiate in the process of argumentation the fundamentals and the ancillaries (Cat).
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The form this focus will take will look different depending on the discipline, but these
traits are at the core.
Still, this is not the easiest path. In many ways, people are wired to seek the easiest,
simplest path — the shortest distance between point A and point B. It is our nature. But
as with many other things that come to individuals naturally, education can allow us to
take a path that is more rewarding and stimulating. In education, as American theologian
and philosopher Abraham Heschel originally posited with regards to religion, what is
rational and what is appropriate must bend the will — which always seeks the easier
road. Educators must ask, as Herschel does, “what is the power that will make me love to
do what I ought to do” (260)? Educators must lead their students to this question, as they
also have the responsibility to try to answer it themselves and to stand against what is
simple and (sometimes consequently) degrading. Historically, and contrary to any earlier
assertion, we as a people are also capable of excelling when we toil in the shadows, and
not in the light. The history of the United States is replete with examples of how
Americans have risen to new heights through adversity: the war of independence against
the British, the Civil War, the Great Depression, and World War II, as well as the fight
for equality through various civil rights movements, to name a few examples. This is not
only an American trait, but a human one, and one that should be applied within the
classroom as well.
As teachers, we embrace the necessity of engaging the student, but the method typically
employed is not authentic. Many students today have been weaned on an ethos that
values finding the short-cuts, the tricks, the tips, the angles in being educated. While in
pursuit of these approaches, students may expend a tremendous amount of energy, time
and effort; however, they do so under false pretense. To confuse such an expenditure of
energy with the true pursuit of learning undermines the value of that effort. Simply
stated, the students’ effort is misplaced. The difference lies years down the road. Such
an approach offers only the illusion of knowledge; what we are here discussing is simply
the acquisition of information. Despite the current dogma uttered like mantras in public
schools today, the acquisition of knowledge and the gathering of information are not the
same.
Proponents of the use of entertainment or of other like educational methods do not value
knowledge for its own sake but promote a debasement of knowledge to something as
banal as information gathering. In our devotion to the gods of technology and
entertainment, we are sacrificing the basis of what should be the pursuit of knowledge.
We also monetize, and in the process, devalue what it means to be educated. Worst of
all, the adults who are created by this method are less than what they could be. In Plato’s
Phaedrus, in the context of the written word, Socrates criticizes the use of “external
written characters” in the learning process, suggesting that such use creates a “semblance
of truth” rather than true knowledge. Plato’s voice can be heard bemoaning the
infiltration of technology into palaces of learning when he suggests that “[students] will
appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company,
having the show of wisdom without the reality.”
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From our experience, teachers who employ the severe approach of Professor Kingsfield
are conspicuous for their absence. We have seen rampant grade inflation and coddling of
students by our well-intentioned colleagues throughout our teaching careers. Most
teachers are well aware of the perfect storm of complaint they will receive when they
award a student an 89% rather than following the standard practice of kicking it up to a
90% at the end of a grading period. Complaints come from all directions, including the
student, parent, counselor, vice principal, coach, and often fellow teachers. Only the
most self-possessed teacher can hold up against such opposition.
Following Postman’s contentions in Teaching as a Conserving Activity, we support the
conserving and criticizing function of education: education’s “aim at all times is to make
visible the prevailing biases of a culture and then, by employing whatever philosophies of
education are available, to oppose them” (Teaching 20). To embody this concept, we
need to take steps toward the hard school model. By acquiescing to the frivolous and
counter-productive inclinations of modern educational thinking, we, as Aesop warned,
provide the means of our own destruction. We recognize that our argument could be
characterized as a step backward, particularly by those who seek to draw students into
academic content by means of entertainment. It is our point that the “fun” is a product of
the work — that when a student is tasked with investigating and reading about a subject,
interest will build.
Nietzsche wrote that only the discipline of suffering is responsible for the achievements
of man thus far. Thus we propose to interject into the classroom the creation of not some
medieval torture chamber, but an oasis for study, reflection, conversation, and
knowledge. In doing so, not only will we create an educated, confident individual, but
we will also create a person who is increasingly capable of dealing with the challenges
that lie ahead. With respect to the long-term education of our children, and in contrast to
educational policy that champions something one day and discards it a couple of years
later, Martin Buber declared that our primary concern should always be “the person as a
whole, both in the actuality in which he lives before you now and in his possibilities,
what he can become” (123). The future is where our motivation and duty as educators
lie.1
The idea behind Buber’s words looms large in the modern education system — again,
though, because it is made conspicuous by its absence. Parents and teachers alike know
their actions have long-lasting implications when they are raising and educating a child.
To that point, what parents and teachers understand suggests a level of awareness that is
not possessed by school districts. Much of what takes place in public schools today is
designed to address or appeal to the “right now.” School, district, and state
administrators seek immediate redress in situations where students’ high-stakes
assessments are unsatisfactory and reflect badly on the administration’s ability to ensure
education for all students. These evaluations are not just political, but ultimately
economic in nature, affecting grants, programs, and general funding. The political sphere
has never been a patient one, and the steps politicians and school administrators take
show a haphazard and short-sighted approach.
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That does not mean that such institutions do not recognize the importance of long-term
considerations — in words if not in deeds. Nearly every school district (and school) has
a mission statement, which invariably includes the empty concept of creating “lifelong
learners.” There is very little in the messages of district administrators that promotes
lifelong learning. The best hope for such a development lies with individual teachers
who are able to establish genuine teacher-student relationships that build on the interest
inherent in the subject. Yet from an administrative point of view, the focus is on the here
and now.
Our industry sabotages the future in various ways. When we, as components in a system,
focus on the end result — the grade on the test or on the report card — we undermine the
importance of the process of learning. When one considers the overall approach toward
education today, which holds that education is something achieved or accomplished, one
realizes that we are teaching the idea that there is a conclusion to learning. If there is an
idea more antithetical to the creation of lifelong learners, we are not sure where it exists.
When we tie the school experience to what is obtained at university or in the workplace,
we undermine the importance of knowledge for its own sake. When we focus our
processes on technology and entertainment in order to make education more fun or easier,
we undermine and trivialize what it means to become knowledgeable and wise.
Entertainment as a teaching tool, intentional or not, does not set the mind free to learn. It
increases the noise and distraction; it erodes the attention. We have enabled a collective
attention deficit disorder in our students, and made it worse by asking no questions about
the impact of entertainment and technology within our sacred learning spaces. What the
students need is authentic engagement — a real relationship with the knowledge we want
them to seek and to hold dear.
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Notes
1

The authors would like to clarify what could be interpreted as conflicting or mutually
exclusive statements. Earlier, we argued that students are distracted and tend to dwell
ahead of themselves with respect to their academic activities. Our impression is that
students have become increasingly focused on the instrumental value of their schooling;
that is, students engage in learning activities for the contingent reward (grade,
recognition, scholarship, praise) that is so overtly connected. At the same time, we state
here that “the future is where our motivation and duty lie.” Here we are speaking not
about students, but about educators who need to take a long view toward the intellectual,
social, and moral development of their students. Thus, we hold that it is the duty of a
teacher to ensure the comprehension of curricular content here and now, but also to
develop within students an intellectual foundation that will sustain them in college and
beyond, when the trappings of elementary and high school, along with the contingent
rewards, may not be present. To further clarify, we suggest a need for students to
become immersed in learning activities on a daily basis, so as to provide cumulative
validation that learning as an activity is intrinsically valuable. At the same time, we
suggest a nuanced approach for teachers, who must dwell in the learning moment with
students, but also project possibilities for a deeper meaning for the learning that may only
become beneficial in the distant future, beyond the standardized assessments, beyond
college entrance exams, beyond job applications. In this way, we suggest that teaching
and learning are sacred tasks with profound implications.
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Enantiodromia and Integrality: The Rhythm of the Cultural
Continuum
Robert Mitchell
1. Introduction
The human cultural continuum is in a critical phase of transformation. Over the next
several generations, the evolution of consciousness along that continuum may well
determine the future of humanity and, perhaps, the degree to which we will remain fully
human. Rapid developments in computer technology, cybernetics and artificial
intelligence now have some futurists predicting a cybernetic-human synthesis that could
ultimately transform humanity into something other. Science fiction gives us a picture of
this future as often alluring and inevitably frightening.
Emphasizing this infatuation with technology and the interface between human and
artificial intelligence, the K-12 educational curriculum is focused on science, technology,
engineering and math (STEM). This curriculum captivates the individual and collective
imagination and subtly implies that the interface with technology is more important than
our relationships with humanity, our community, our families, and our world. The more
prominent this attitude becomes, the more important it is to find a balance that makes
technology subservient to the preservation of our humanity.
For some 2,500 generations our humanity has been preserved because adults taught each
successive generation to be carriers of the culture. While this fundamental concept
should guide the development of a K-12 cultural curriculum, it is not enough just to study
the cultural continuum; we must each traverse this pathway into the future. Re-visioning
the K-12 curriculum to emphasize the humanities and embrace the evolution in
consciousness teaches young people to be the carriers of the cultural continuum into the
future. To better understand what this means to education, we can look at two concepts
that shape the rhythm of the cultural continuum: enantiodromia and integrality.
2. Enantiodromia
Applied to the cultural continuum, enantiodromia describes a wave-like pattern — an
ever-changing dynamic flow between poles — rather than an overcoming of cultural
obstacles in a direct, linear progression.
The concept of enantiodromia originated with the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher
Heraclitus around 500 BC. “[All] Pre-Socratic thinkers were struck by the dominance of
change in the world of our experience. Heraclitus … probably expressed the universality
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of change more clearly and more dramatically than his predecessors; but for him it was
the complementary idea of the measure inhering in change, the stability that persists
through it and controls it, that was of vital importance” (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 186).
In Carl Jung’s more psychological definition, enantiodromia is likened to a “play of
opposites,” a dynamic flow in the course of events where “everything that exists turns
into its opposite.” For example, day turns to night and night to day; life to death and
death back into life. Jung says, “Just as all energy proceeds from opposition, so the
psyche too possesses its inner polarity … as Heraclitus realized long ago” (Jung and Jaffe
346). This polarity in the psyche, says Jung, is an indispensable prerequisite to life.
Thus, psychologically, enantiodromia describes a dynamic intercourse between the inner
poles that Jung defines as distinct psychological fields: the fields of the unconscious and
of consciousness. These are complementary polarities in the psyche that communicate
through the transcendent function: the stability that Heraclitus sought that persists
through transformation. This important, defining element in the rhythm of the cultural
continuum can be applied to pedagogical technique as well as to the curriculum.
The first application of Jungian psychology to education pertains to education’s first
objective: to develop consciousness in the child. The field of thinking consciousness is
not an a priori condition of the psyche but grows with the processes of psychological
development and education. However, “The psyche of the child in its preconscious state
is anything but a tabula rasa; it is already preformed in a recognizable individual way,
and is moreover equipped with all specifically human instincts, as well as with the a
priori foundations of the higher functions” (Jung and Jaffe 348). Thus, nurturing and
developing the field of consciousness is an open-ended, two-sided process.
On the one hand, we gather information from the natural, cultural, and social
environments of the external world. This process requires attention to factual details. As
consciousness matures over time, the process will configure facts into cogent hypotheses
about the nature of external reality. In formal education, the objective is not just to learn
how to gather factual information and form hypotheses, but also to inculcate a critical
reasoning capacity to apply to those hypotheses.
However, if this development of the field of consciousness remains one-sided — that is,
if it is focused on the thinking function and the world of external reality — then it
neglects the transcendent function that maintains the connection to inner reality. Critical
reason, when not guided by the transcendent function, subtly incorporates into itself the
cultural biases of collective consciousness, as for example distortions of history or the
rigidity of cultural mores. These biases are used to construct a “mass psyche.” This
biased, one-sided model — STEM — now dominates K-12 education in the United
States, and perhaps in much of the rest of the industrial world (Mitchell).
In contrast, the open-ended, two-sided development of consciousness is evident in more
holistic models of education. The drive behind holistic education is given meaning in a
simple and succinct statement by Jung:
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Reason sets the boundaries [of life] far too narrowly for us…. The more
the critical reason dominates, the more impoverished life becomes; but the
more of the unconscious, and the more of myth we are capable of making
conscious, the more of life we integrate. Overvalued reason has this in
common with political absolutism: under its dominion, the individual is
pauperized. (Jung and Jaffe 302)
Thus, our culturally biased views of reality are tempered by making conscious the
contents of the unconscious. Becoming conscious of psychic material that exists in the
unconscious comes from the observation and interpretation of the non-rational intuitive,
instinctive, imaginative and feeling-toned perceptions that emerge in symbolic form as
dreams, premonitions, and synchronistic events.
Just as consciousness of external reality is developed in education by the rational
acquisition and critical assessment of facts, consciousness of internal reality is developed
in education by emphasizing the tools of interpretation. Primary among those tools —
tools that can be taught at elementary and secondary education levels — is the symbolism
inherent in fairy tales, mythology and the arts. These symbols manifest in expressions
that give form to the spiritual forces of the archetypes in the culture and exist in the
collective imagination rather than in collective consciousness.
A holistic model of education teaches interpretation, understanding, acceptance and
assimilation of influences from the unconscious — that is, the influences of the instincts
and archetypes. Jung says,
The archetypes, which are pre-existent to consciousness and condition it,
appear in the part they actually play in reality: as a priori structural forms
of the stuff of consciousness. They do not in any sense represent things as
they are in themselves, but rather the forms in which things can be
perceived and conceived…. They account only for the collective
component of a perception. (Jung and Jaffe 347)
Thus, the acquisition of a repertoire of archetypal symbols is essential to developing
consciousness. The goal of becoming conscious of one’s own true nature cannot be
served by a one-sided development. Enantiodromia, which allows communication
between the conscious and unconscious poles of the psyche, is a significant factor in
shaping both pedagogical technique and the curriculum so that both can serve the
educational objective of developing consciousness in the child.
The second principle of Jungian psychology that can be applied to the K-12 classroom
involves the relationship between the child’s developing consciousness and the human
cultural continuum. Jung says, “Consciousness is phylogenetically and ontogenetically a
secondary phenomenon” (Jung and Jaffe 348). Therefore, “Attainment of consciousness
is culture in the broadest sense, and self-knowledge is therefore the heart and essence of
this process” (Jung and Jaffe 324-325). This concept justifies a redesigned cultural
education curriculum (Mitchell).
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For Jung, the principle Ontogeny Recapitulates Phylogeny implies that individual
development carries forward the earlier psychical structures of human development. “If
the unconscious is anything at all, it must consist of earlier evolutionary stages of our
conscious psyche” (Jung and Jaffe 348). Jung describes these “evolutionary stages” in a
psychological context that supports ontogenetic development, rather than in terms of
phylogenic evolution. The instincts and archetypes that Jung describes psychologically
as inherited qualities (Jung, Structure 133) are the contents of the collective unconscious
that are brought to consciousness in symbolic form. The integration of unconscious
content into mental ego-consciousness is what Jung describes as the transformative
process of individuation. This psychological explanation is ontologically beneficial, but
it does not provide a complete picture because it does not address the phylogenic
evolution of consciousness on which the ontological model is based.
To examine these “earlier evolutionary stages of our conscious psyche” (Jung and Jaffe
348) from the perspective of the cultural continuum and the evolution of consciousness,
we can turn to one of Jung’s contemporaries, the German-Swiss cultural philosopher Jean
Gebser. Born in Prussia in 1905, Gebser lived in Spain and Paris in the 1930s and
entered Switzerland just before the border was closed in 1939. He lived the rest of his
life in Bern. His opus, The Ever-Present Origin, was published in 1954. Gebser lectured
in Zürich in the 1950s and ‘60s, and there is anecdotal evidence that Gebser and Jung
knew each other, but no record of professional correspondence between them has yet
surfaced.
Nonetheless Gebser’s description of structures in the evolution of
consciousness provides a cultural background for Jung’s transformative process of
individuation.
Gebser describes four successive structures in the phylogenic development of
consciousness — the archaic, the magical, the mythic, and the mental — that have traced
an enantiodromic pattern along the cultural continuum and form the pattern of our
ontological development as well. The fifth structure of consciousness, the one we are
currently engaged in discovering — integrality — defines a synergistic integration of the
preceding four structures.
3. Integrality: The Structures of Consciousness and the Rhythm of the Cultural
Continuum
Integrality is more than a simple integration of earlier consciousness structures. “[The]
process, which makes the integral consciousness structure accessible, is a new capacity,
and not a mere sum of the old” (Gebser 543). That is, its wholeness lies beyond the
instinctive unity of archaic consciousness, beyond the emotional power of magical
consciousness, beyond the imagery and complementarity of mythic consciousness, and
beyond the division and synthesis of mental consciousness. Gebser’s concept of
integrality describes culturally what Jung describes psychologically, drawing archaic,
magical, and mythic consciousness out of the unconscious and into a new unity with
mental consciousness. Individuation and integrality, together, describe the next level in
the evolution of consciousness in the individual and in humanity, and offer another
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possible outcome to humanity’s progression through the cultural continuum: to become
most completely human.
Gebser’s four structures of consciousness that precede integrality are represented
enantiodromically by both efficient and deficient modes. These opposing modes of the
four sequential consciousness structures provide us with the phylogenic pattern for
ontological development, as follows.
3. 1. Archaic Consciousness
This structure of consciousness belongs to our distant past and is “[t]he structure closest
to and presumably originally identical with the origin.” Gebser continues, “It is akin, if
not identical, to the original state of biblical paradise: a time where the soul is yet
dormant, a time of complete non-differentiation of man and the universe” (Gebser 43).
From an evolutionary perspective, it belongs to a period of human development that lacks
a defined sense of self. Though connected to the world, one had no sense of being “in the
world” because there was no central point of reference — no sense of self — from which
to relate to space and time. Relationship to the world occurred through instinct,
presentiment, and impulse. Living in small social groups, “humanity” existed in a
passive relationship to the natural environment.
Though we may hold a vision of bipedal humanoids existing in the archaic past of our
evolutionary biology, we are compelled to imagine the archaic structure of consciousness
more symbolically. In its efficient mode, humanity existed in a balanced union between
nature and divine consciousness — an idyllic existence; a Garden of Eden. The deficient
mode of archaic consciousness is represented by the “fall”: expulsion from the garden;
alienation from both nature and divine consciousness.
Ontologically, this archaic structure of consciousness is evident in the newborn child
during the first year of life. In his book The Child, Erich Neumann calls it the extrauterine embryonic phase in which the child remains in a “unitary reality” with the
mother. He says, “In the pre-ego stage characteristic of earliest childhood … the child is
still contained within its mother, though its body is already born” (Neumann, Child 11).
It is difficult to find a clear picture of this unitary reality in modern society. However, in
her book The Continuum Concept, Jean Liedloff describes it very succinctly in terms of
the nurturance instinct. Liedloff documented this complex physical-emotional bond
between mother and child from her experience living with the Yequana, a South
American Indian tribe, in the 1950s. She compares the nurturance instinct — leading to
healthy, happy children — to the loss of that instinct in the childrearing techniques of
modern culture, often leading to an over-stressed, unhappy childhood.
Liedloff describes the continuum concept as an instinctive “good sense” that guided
human behavior for eons, but that in the past few thousand years has been brought into
disrepute. “[O]ur innate sense of what is best for us is short-circuited by suspicion while
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the intellect, which has never known much about our real needs, decides what to do.”
She continues, “It is not, for example, the province of the reasoning faculty to decide how
a baby ought to be treated. We have had exquisitely precise instincts, expert in every
detail of child care, since long before we became anything resembling Homo sapiens”
(Liedloff 21-22).
As noted above, Jung understood the instincts and archetypes that make up the collective
unconscious as a priori conditions of the child’s pre-conscious psyche. He postulates
five “basic instincts”: hunger, sexuality, activity, reflection, and creativity (Jung,
Structure 118). The instincts generate physically perceived impulses, pressures, and
desires. Jung uses a simile from physics, suggesting that when instincts are charged with
enough energy (perhaps through the parents’ nurturance instinct) they jump valence and
become archetypal (Jung, Structure 212). The archetypes are spiritual, and produce
images, ideas, and intuition, the source of which the child is aware of only a-perceptively.
That is, instinctual and archetypal forces exist in counterpoise to rational-mental
consciousness that will become centered in the developing ego. Liedloff’s continuum
concept acknowledges this charge differential and advocates developing a free flow of
information between the continuum of innate awareness and developing consciousness.
The axis of this free flow of information, in Jungian terms, is the transcendent function.
Liedloff presents a vivid example of how the efficient mode of the archaic structure of
consciousness is fostered in the child through nurturing the child’s natural exploration
and auto-discovery of its instincts. But modern society tends toward propagating the
deficient mode — a fracturing of the individual’s unity with nature and divine
consciousness through the disruption of the continuum concept.
It begins with traumatic separation of the baby and the mother at birth and the placement
of the child in the nursery ward, physically isolated from the mother. At home, infants
are separated from the mother in nurseries, cribs, strollers and baby carriages, rather than
sleeping with and being carried by her. “The violent tearing apart of the mother-child
continuum … may understandably result in depression for the mother, as well as agony
for the infant” (Liedloff 36). This is equivalent to being alienated from the natural
environment that, for the infant, is the mother’s body, and also alienated from proximity
to “the ever-present origin.” This proximity is carried in what Neumann refers to as the
“two-footedness” of the archetypal bond between mother and child:
When two human beings are united by a powerful bond, their mutual
appetency forms a bilateral connection between them, releasing
corresponding archetypes in the psyches of each other. So it takes two
individuals to effect or set in motion these transpersonal factors of
archetypes…. Once we have grasped this interhuman reality and the ‘two
footedness’ of the archetype, it will be clear to us that an archetype cannot
be evoked by any spontaneous process within the psyche…. (Neumann,
Child 85-86)
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The concept of the two-footedness of the archetype implies that the Mother archetype,
expressed as the mother’s nurturance instinct, stimulates the child’s auto-evocation of
instinctual drives out of the Child archetype that resides in the Self: the child’s own
“godhead”; the “ever-present origin.”
The deficient side to the archaic structure of consciousness in modern societies ignores
the psychological significance of mother-child bonding. This alienates the child from the
nurturance instinct and can result in the “wounded child syndrome.” Without grounding
in the two-footedness of the archetype, the child’s survival depends not on nurtured
instincts but on the premature and distorted development of a self-identity built on
foundations of frustration, stress, and rage. This can manifest in personality disorders,
some symptoms of which are lack of an ability to give and receive affection, selfdestructive behaviors, cruelty to self and others, phoniness, extreme control problems,
lack of friendships, and learning disorders (Magid and McKelvey 254-257). There are
many such children in modern societies that, to varying degrees, come to exhibit sociopathological personality disorders that are evident to every classroom teacher. This
deficient mode of archaic consciousness lies at the root of some of our most significant
individual, psychological, social, and cultural problems.
3. 2. Magical Consciousness
The magical structure of consciousness began to evolve in the timeless pre-historic past.
Gebser attributes five characteristics to the magical structure of consciousness: 1)
egolessness — there is no individual ego-self, but there is an emerging collective ego of
the tribe or clan; 2) visible interchangeability of the real with the symbolic; 3)
spacelessness and timelessness; 4) an active merging with nature in order to control it;
and 5) a magic reaction to this merging, which gives mankind power (Gebser 48).
With this growing consciousness — which is not centered in the individual, but rather in
the collective — there is a sense of freedom from the power of nature. Gebser says,
Man replies to the forces streaming toward him with his own
corresponding forces: he stands up to Nature … then he begins to be
conscious of his own will. Witchcraft and sorcery … are the natural
means by which he seeks to free himself from the transcendent power of
nature.... (Gebser 46)
Ontologically, the magical structure of consciousness appears in the domain of young
children. In its efficient form, also depicted in Liedloff’s continuum concept, we find the
child securely embedded in the group ego of the family, clan, or tribe. Another
manifestation of magical consciousness is that of the imaginary friend, where the
numinous, or spiritual, takes form in the child’s imagination and a visible
interchangeability occurs between the real and the symbolic. It also is a fundamental
characteristic of fairy tales. And it is evident in the way a small child senses his or her
ability to merge with and have power over nature. Walt Whitman captured the efficient
mode of magical consciousness most succinctly in a poem that begins:
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There was a child went forth every day,
And the first object he looked upon, that object he became,
And that object became a part of him for the day or a certain part of the day,
Or for many years or stretching cycles of years. (Whitman 108)
Of this efficient mode of magical consciousness, Gebser says, “Only where the magic
structure in the individual still works through impulse and instinct [that is, without
knowing; without consciousness] does it realize its eminent, life-dispensing value in our
day and age” (Gebser 60). It is an emotional, somatic quality, evident in the mystical
participation of the archetypal mother-child bond; in the empathetic identification evident
in twins and in lovers; in the communication between humans and animals; in telepathy;
and in Jung’s concept of synchronicity (Neville, “Towards Integrality”).
However, as with the archaic structure of consciousness, the dominant mode of magical
consciousness today is deficient. The power structure in modern society is obsessed, not
with actively merging with nature, but with controlling nature from the outside —
attempting to decipher the “laws of nature” and apply technology to control it. That
control over nature extends to controlling human nature, as well. Gebser says,
All magic … occurs in the natural-vital, egoless, spaceless and timeless
sphere. This requires — as far as present-day man is concerned — a
sacrifice of consciousness; it occurs in the state of trance, or when the
consciousness dissolves as a result of mass reactions, slogans, or “isms.”
(49)
There is great danger in this deficient mode of magical consciousness. Erich Neumann
says, “The building up of the persona, and the adaptation to reality under the guidance of
the superego [the collectivity] as the court of consciousness, [constellates] the mass man”
(Origins 438-439). Additionally, Jung warns, “The collective attitude hinders the
recognition and evaluation of a psychology different from the subject’s, because the mind
that is collectively oriented is quite incapable of thinking and feeling in any other way
than by projection” (Psychological Types 10).
The mass psyche, the deficient mode of magical consciousness, obstructs communication
between the conscious and unconscious poles of the psyche and subverts the transcendent
function. To the degree that the mass psyche directs the educational model of
standardization, it becomes increasingly difficult for individuals to assess the instincts
and archetypes and regain the momentum toward individuation and integrality.
3. 3. Mythic Consciousness
The mythic structure of consciousness began to emerge with the Great Mother cults of
the Neolithic Era, but it evolved in stages that overlapped the magical structure up to the
rise of the great classic civilizations. Here we find the seeds of identity defined as soul.
As the sense of soul developed, there was a growing temporal and spatial awareness.
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Time was experienced rhythmically, through the cycles of the seasons. Space was
experienced numinously, so that the emerging soul was connected spiritually to all things
through the symbolic imagination. That connection was exemplified in mythology,
conveyed through poetry and the visual arts, and taught to successive generations through
an initiation/education process.
Gebser says, “the essential characteristic of the mythical structure is the emergent
awareness of soul” (61). “The mythical structure … has an imaginatory consciousness
reflected in the imagistic nature of myth and responsive to the soul” (Gebser 67).
Today, we see an active mythological structure of consciousness in anthropological
studies and in psychology. Dreams, visions, fantasies, and delusional ideas open up “a
field of psychic phenomena which are themselves the matrix of all mythology” (Jung,
Symbols 390).
In its efficient mode, mythological consciousness conveys the sense that humans have a
role to play in the dynamic unfolding of a cosmic drama designed by the gods and told
through mythologies. Thus, the cultural period when the efficient mode of mythological
consciousness was most dominant was the Heroic Age. Heroes existed as personalities
that took upon themselves the numinous, archetypal mythologem in order to bring some
benefit to the community:
The hero himself appears as a being of more than human stature. He is
distinguished from the very beginning by his godlike characteristics.
Since he is psychologically an archetype of the self, his divinity only
confirms that the self is numinous, a sort of god, or having some share in
the divine nature..... The hero is the protagonist in God’s transformation
of man. (Jung, Symbols 391-392)
Today, because of the modern ego’s involvement, we would call this psychological
inflation. But the Heroic Age was pre-egoic in the sense that individual self-awareness
emanated from the archetypal spiritual imagination rather than from the mental structure
of consciousness. The heroes lived their myths by embodying personality patterns
established by the gods. These myths evolved into re-enactments in ritual and in the arts.
Thus, the imaginative characteristic of the mythological structure of consciousness, and
its manifestation in the arts and literature, provides the repertoire of symbols that lead
directly to the acceptance, interpretation, understanding, and assimilation of the dreams,
premonitions, and synchronistic events that emerge out of the unconscious and are drawn
toward integration into consciousness.
Developmentally, the mythological structure lies in the natural domain of children. When
the imagination is firmly grounded in the mythic structure of consciousness, it anchors
the soul-end of a complementary polarity between the soul and the emerging ego. Jung,
Neumann, Edinger, and others have called this polarity-link the ego-self axis. This axis
— the transcendent function — maintains communication between the mythological,
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imaginal soul-consciousness of the child and the emerging mental ego-consciousness of
the adult.
The deficient mode of mythological consciousness is characterized by breaking
communication through the depletion of the imaginative — symbolic — function of the
psyche and a depletion of the individual’s ability to interpret and assimilate the symbolic
language of the unconscious. Here, it would be overstating the obvious to enumerate all
the ways in which the modern educational system and modern culture diminish the
imagination of the child and produce the deficient mode of mythological consciousness.
We no longer carry mythological narratives within us, though they are carried for us in
books and in often-distorted forms of mass media and virtual reality. But the greater
poverty lies in our growing inability to accept and understand the mythological
symbolism as a defining part of our humanity, rather than a fantasy projection.
This assault on the imaginative faculty disrupts the enantiodromic intercourse between
the ego and the archetypal self, causing the personality to become centered in the ego and
its relationship to the collectivity. The seat of consciousness shifts to the cultural
superego, and the ego becomes a servant of what Jung calls “the spirit of the age” (Jung,
Structure 340). This is a definitive act of socialization that disrupts the continuity of the
child’s holistic development. And this, in turn, results in the disrupted continuity of the
cultural continuum as it is recapitulated in the development of the individual personality.
Some children are instinctively aware of being separated from an identity that has its
origin as an a-perceptive archetypal image in the soul, but often they are incapable of
articulating a response, though many suffer greatly for it. This may be one reason why so
many young people turn away from education, with its single-minded emphasis on
developing a dominating, standardized, culturally biased rational-mental structure of
consciousness and identity. Yet without an education that teaches an alternative, young
people still fall victim to the collectivity’s hold on the individual’s consciousness and
personality through the mass psyche.
3. 4. Mental Consciousness
Gebser equates the rise of the mental structure of consciousness with the rise of the “law
giver.” Among the Israelites, this figure arises with Moses, around 1225 BC, about the
same time that the patriarchal Greeks defeated the matriarchal Trojans to end the
mythological Golden Age. But Gebser also sites as examples the Indian lawgiver Manu,
the Cretan King Minos, and Menes, the pharaoh who united Upper and Lower Egypt:
Wherever the law giver appears, he upsets the old equilibrium (mythical
polarity), and in order to re-establish it, laws must be fixed and
established. Only a mental world requires laws; the mythical world,
secure in the polarity, neither knows nor needs them. (Gebser 76)
The centering of the personality in the ego is the primary characteristic of the mental
structure of consciousness. A cultural superego emerges out of a collective mentality
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reminiscent of the magical, tribal structure of consciousness and vies with the
mythological archetypes for dominance over the developing personality.
This
development does not unfold to reveal the soul, as in mythological consciousness, but
unfolds to reveal the ego and its progressive capacity to express complex, abstract
cognitive structures. The ego becomes the new subjective center from which to make
temporal and spatial assessments about the natural, social, and cultural environments and
the nature of reality. Time becomes linear, sequential and quantifiable. Space is
perceived in three dimensions. Reality is increasingly divided through subject-object
duality. Spirit is perceived increasingly in abstract, prosaic terms rather than in poetic
images.
In its efficient mode the mental structure of conscious is integrated with the efficient
modes of both the mythic and magical structures. For example, in classical Athens or
renaissance Florence, conceptual thinking was combined with a rich imaginative and
symbolic life (Neville, “Towards Integrality”). Gebser points to the pre-Socratic Age,
when all citizens were predisposed toward initiation into the mystery cults — which kept
the collective spiritual imagination alive in them. Poetic language and proximity to myth
distinguished early, pre-Socratic philosophy from later philosophical systems.
Coming to a similar conclusion about pre-Socratic Greece, Jung says, “The weird and
wonderful nature of the gods was a self-evident fact in a hundred living myths and
assumed a special significance in the no less credible philosophical refinements of those
myths” (Jung, Aion 177). It is important to note that the 300 years of the pre-Socratic
philosophers — when the mytho-magical and emerging mental structures of
consciousness were in some degree of balance — was also a time when democratic
consciousness flourished in the Greek polis.
Gebser goes on to say that the proliferation of philosophical systems — after about 300
B. C. — is accompanied by a proportional decrease of mythical elements (84). He says
that mental consciousness began its decline toward the deficient aspect with Lao-Tse in
China, the Buddha in India, and Socrates in Greece.
About Socrates, Nietzsche wrote, “Whereas in all truly productive men instinct is the
strong, affirmative form and reason the dissuader and critic, in the case of Socrates the
roles are reversed: instinct is the critic, consciousness the creator” (Nietzsche 84-85).
This reversal characterizes the deficient mode of mental consciousness by emphasizing
the power of mental abstraction. What Nietzsche emphasizes is the importance of the arational instincts as the driving creative force and the suggestion that mental
consciousness should be the refining, critical element in the creative process.
Jung builds on this concept. Using a simile from modern physics, he says that when the
instincts acquire a certain amount of energy, they jump valence to become archetypal.
This is the foundation of creativity. The sequence from archaic creative instinct to the
magical, emotional power to direct nature, to mythological imagination, to critical mental
consciousness, can be read as a creative-consciousness continuum in its most efficient
form.
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The final stage in the deficient mode of mental consciousness — the rational-mental
phase — began to blossom with the European Age of Enlightenment, which denigrated
mysticism and systematized the abstract way of looking at reality. When the rationalmental phase dominates the psyche, the deficient modes of the archaic, magical, and
mythic structures of consciousness all converge in the shadows of the unconscious.
These deficient modes affect our perception of reality. Through education we emphasize
the dominance of the rational-mental phase of consciousness, trapping the archaic,
magical, and mythic modes in the unconscious.
Ontologically, the mental structure of consciousness begins to dominate the personality
during the years of early adolescence. It results in an egoic-rationalistic way of looking
at reality through the lens of what child psychologist Jean Piaget called formal
operations, or abstract-conceptualization. One result of this is that many young people
are fearful of expressing their singular uniqueness — the “true” nature of their soul.
They are timid in expressing their instinctive creativity, and they are neurotically selfconscious about conforming to the collective behavioral norms of the peer group. Some
of these characteristics are “normal” aspects of creating a strong ego-consciousness that
will eventually strive toward integration and individuation. However, where the deficient
mode of mental consciousness is most dominant they become symptomatic of a mass
mentality that poses grave dangers because it breaks the link between the individual and
the culture continuum. How did we go from the liberating promise of higher
consciousness to being trapped in the mass psyche?
The post-Darwinian concept of the evolution of consciousness evolved into the widely
accepted conclusion that Ontogeny Recapitulates Phylogeny. In a linear progression,
rational-mental consciousness is necessarily considered superior to what the 19th century
anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl called the participation mystique of “primitives.” It
was believed that the child, like the “primitive,” existed in a state of mystical
participation with reality (see Mousalimas 33, note 1). From the standpoint of
consciousness development, the child’s psyche was a tabula rasa upon which
consciousness, in its highly developed mental-rational form, could be written.
Additionally, the theory of cultural evolution espouses the idea that Western culture —
with over 400 years of Enlightenment — is superior to cultures still grounded in a more
balanced perspective.
Thus, the linear-historical view of the development of
consciousness and the hierarchical view of Western cultural superiority remain deeply
ingrained in our educational philosophy and curriculum.
The advent of depth psychology at the beginning of the 20th century is responsible for
arguing that the mental structure of consciousness cannot be divorced from its
foundational roots in archaic, magical and mythic consciousness and does not offer a
sufficient finale to the question of the evolution of consciousness. It is only logical to
assume that it is, therefore, not an adequate terminal to the problem of educating children.
This brings us to the concept of integrality as the next step in consciousness’s evolution.
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3. 5. Integrality
Integrality, which describes the next stage in the evolution of consciousness, has surfaced
in both Eastern and Western philosophies. In the views of these philosophies, each of us
carries within us the seed of Divine Consciousness. It could be called the spark of
divinity at the core of the psyche, or could be equated to Jung’s concept of the Self.
Gebser called it the “ever-present origin.”
The developmental objective is to transcend the state in which the ego dominates the
personality — that is, to transcend the egoic-rationalistic mode of mental consciousness
on which modern culture, with all of its technological advances, is based. Jung says that
we have within us an inherent tendency called the transcendent function:
The tendencies of the conscious and the unconscious are the two factors
that together make up the transcendent function.
It is called
“transcendent” because it makes the transition from one attitude to another
organically possible, without loss of the unconscious. (Jung, Structure 73)
This fundamental idea of the individuation process gives us the capacity to transcend the
ego’s dominant position without dissolution, maintaining the integrity of the personality
while expanding consciousness.
But transcendence on both the individual level and the level that transforms humanity
takes place over generations and requires two adjustments to the way we educate our
children: 1) it requires an education that teaches the acceptance, awareness and
assimilation of archetypal images — that is, the significance of living a “symbolic life”
relevant to one’s chosen vocation; and 2) it requires a curriculum that teaches the
enantiodromic flow of the cultural continuum rather than a linear view of history. This
enables the twin processes of individuation-integrality to progress toward the next stage
in the evolution of consciousness.
Gebser is also clear on the need to re-visualize educational philosophy from a mentally
oriented, utilitarian model to one that reintegrates the structures of consciousness that
have been repressed into the unconscious:
If our consciousness … cannot master the new reality and make possible
its realization, then the prophets of doom will have been correct. Other
alternatives are an illusion; consequently, great demands are placed on us,
and each one of us have been given a grave responsibility, not merely to
survey but to actually traverse the path opening before us. (Gebser 5)
Jung has stated the problem very succinctly. He contends that the spirit of the age will
not let itself be trifled with: “It is the popular way of thinking, and therefore it is decent,
reasonable, scientific, and normal” (Structure 340). Thus, the “spirit of the age” is the
greatest impediment to the evolution of consciousness. What needs to change is the kind
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of thinking that is perpetuated in our schools, and the realization that the new structure of
consciousness correlates Gebser’s concept of Integrality with Jung’s concept of
individuation.
4. Integrality and Individuation
Because individuation is a transformative adventure that takes place over a lifetime, the
seeds of individuation must be nurtured from an early age in the home and in the school.
Thus, to preserve the drive toward individuation and integrality requires a cultural
educational curriculum that teaches the rhythm of the cultural continuum. Enantiodromia
gives definition to the dynamic intercourse between the conscious and unconscious poles
of the psyche, as opposed to a linear progression from participation mystique to mental
consciousness. Integrality gives us a cultural objective to teach our children. And
individuation is the psychological process that draws the conscious and unconscious
fields together into a holistic personality. Together, these three processes inform the next
level in individual and cultural evolution, based on an integrative model.
Why consider such drastic changes to education? Psychologically, the conflict between
one’s true nature and the demands of the collectivity begins to emerge most prominently
in early adolescence. But the child’s natural tendency toward separation-individuation
from the family group is not greeted by a ritualized welcoming into the greater
community (except, perhaps, in gang initiations). More often, the adolescent is absorbed
into the mass psyche of the collective peer group. The narrow confines of the peer-group
imagination, external factors in our social environment, new standardization policies in
education, and peer-group bullying in schools repress the tendency toward individuation.
These forces drive young people toward alienation and destructive behaviors, on the one
hand, and, on the other hand, toward a mass psyche dominated by a superego of
ideologies and ‘isms’.
Erich Neumann argues that “The super-ego is not, like the Self, an individual authority of
the personality, it is a later introjected collective authority which endeavors to impose the
demands of … the collectivity, on the individual by violence” (Neumann, Child 204).
The violence is evident in the ways young people repress, or are forced by group pressure
to repress, their own true nature — their soul identity — in order to conform to the
collective ideal of ego development. Such behaviors can begin, at the ages of nine or ten,
as bullying of anyone who acts differently from the peer group, and can become endemic
by the time the student reaches junior high and high school. Gebser further illuminates
this dichotomy within the personality:
The current situation manifests on the one hand an egocentric
individualism exaggerated to extremes and desirous of possessing
everything, while on the other it manifests an equally extreme collectivism
that promises the total fulfillment of man’s being…. [As a result] the
individual is being driven into isolation while the collective degenerates
into a mere aggregation. (Gebser 3)
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Since the spiritual foundations of both the culture and the self are expressed symbolically
in the archetypes of the collective unconscious, our greatest challenge in raising and
educating children is to nurture archetypal influences on the developing personality so
that they can temper the introjected influences of the superego.
In many young adolescents there is a real conflict between individuation and satisfactory
social adaptation — between development of the personality from within and adaptation
to a place in the social economy that is defined from without. Young people are
instinctively aware of this conflict, and there is a real struggle in many young people over
the question of which authority is going to dominate the psyche. A cultural educational
curriculum that gives young people the a-perceptive tools they need to interpret the
archetypal symbols gives them a better foundation for answering that question for
themselves. Thus to promote the goals of individuation-integrality requires a new
cultural education curriculum that incorporates the history of the evolution of
consciousness structures (Mitchell).
5. Conclusion
The objective of a re-visualized cultural curriculum is to take the young adolescent
through these various emergent structures in the evolution of consciousness as they lead
toward integrality — that is, toward “the unfolding and intensification of consciousness,
[that] manifests itself as an increasingly intense luminescence of the spiritual in man”
(Gebser 542). The objective of this curriculum is not to arrive at integrality any more
than it is to arrive at individuation, but only to set the individual on a pathway that allows
the process of individuation-integrality to unfold naturally and progress, undeterred by
the demands of the collectivity. Thus, the educational objective is to transform the
deficient modes of the archaic, magical, mythological, and mental structures of
consciousness into efficient modes that work together. As Gebser puts it,
By returning to the very sources of human development as we observe the
structures of consciousness … [unfold] … we can not only discover the
past … but also gain a view into the future which reveals the traits of a
new reality amidst the decline of our age. (Gebser 2)
Should this not be the primary goal of education?
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Humanity in the Womb of History
Thomas M. Falk
What we do not understand can be frightening.... But when one is
troubled by the reality of this world, it can be comforting to consider other
possibilities, even if those possibilities disturb us, so strong is the desire to
escape the tyranny of consciousness and the narrow boundaries of our
perceptions, to unlock the prisons of thought in which we trap ourselves,
all in hope that a better world, or a better version of ourselves, perhaps,
may lie on the other side of the door.
Trade Minister Tagomi, The Man in the High Castle (Bucksey)
If one gauges a society’s future by the pronouncements of its artists, scientists, and
intellectuals, then of late ours would appear bleak. Both Stephen Hawking and Noam
Chomsky have recently warned that right now is the most dangerous time our species has
ever faced, considering the hydra of existential threats that confront us, including climate
change, soil depletion, epidemic disease, acidification of oceans, nuclear war, and mass
species extinction (see for example Hawking). Citing among a number of other troubling
developments the election of Donald J. Trump in the United States, the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists has moved the Doomsday Clock to two and a half minutes to midnight,
the closest it has been since the first hydrogen bomb tests by the Americans and Soviets
in 1953 (Bulletin). Writing in the Summer 2017 Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, Gerardo Ceballos, Paul Ehrlich, and Rodolfo Dirzo report that
Earth is experiencing a huge episode of population declines and
extirpations, which will have negative cascading consequences on
ecosystem functioning and services vital to sustaining civilization. We
describe this as a “biological annihilation” to highlight the current
magnitude of Earth’s ongoing sixth major extinction event … and the
window for effective action is very short, probably two or three decades at
most. All signs point to ever more powerful assaults on biodiversity in the
next two decades, painting a dismal picture of the future of life, including
human life.
Whatever the veracity of these prognostications, the new millennium appears to have
ushered a script change in the collective mind of Western society. Few events have
imprinted more powerfully upon the psyche of millennials than the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the global financial collapse of 2007-2008, the ensuing
wreckage of which has fanned flames of neo-fascism across Europe and the Americas. It
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has now become easier, Slavoj Žižek observed, to imagine apocalypse than a truly
different and better future.
And yet, the new millennium simultaneously presents an alternate horizon in which
humanity figures out how to work together as a species to eliminate poverty, restore the
health of our ecosystem, and as one race set off to explore the reaches of inner and outer
space. With the growth of the Internet, we appear to be in the incipient stages of
developing a global neocortex, sharing more information and connecting more minds
with each passing day. This spectacular tool, however, presents the potential for great
evil as well as great good, and for dividing as well as uniting us. In any case, it requires
that we bring the best of our humanity to the table.
In his 2016 encyclical Laudato Si, Pope Francis addressed the need to “care for our
common home” by delving into “the heart of what it is to be human,” and by reference to
Saint Francis of Assisi, who spoke to flowers and loved small creatures as brothers and
sisters. Speaking to a joint session of the United States Congress that September, Francis
called upon Americans to follow the example of Thomas Merton, the Trappist monk
who, standing one day in downtown Louisville, awoke “from a dream of separateness.
He looked at all the people on the street and said that there were no strangers” (Pope
Francis, “Visit”; see also Ellsberg). These words forge a tenuous link between American
culture and the Unio Mystica, an uncanny phenomenology attuned to the oneness of
humanity and all life on earth, of which vestiges may be traced to the roots of the
Western philosophical tradition.
Through their skole and annual rites at Eleusis, the ancient Athenians institutionalized
pedagogies of consciousness change. While recognizing their society to be flawed, these
forebears also believed their nature to be Promethean. The early skole, as Joseph Pieper
argues, were not schools as we understand them today but religious cults devoted to the
worship of leisure, a capacity considered to be at once both human and superhuman,
allowing men and women to reach beyond themselves and achieve transcendence (Pieper
28). Beginning in fear and even terror, the Mysteries ultimately revealed this
transcendental dimension. Featuring the word digenes, conveying the sense of “twiceborn,” accounts tell of a world suddenly transformed from an inert pile of matter into a
living, ethereal tissue binding all of humanity and nature (cf. Wasson, Hofmann and Ruck
26, 47; see also Huston Smith 18). Wrote Cicero:
Though Athens brought forth numerous divine things, yet she never
created anything nobler than those sublime Mysteries through which we
became gentler and have advanced from a barbarous and rustic life to a
more civilized one, so that we not only live more joyfully but also die with
a better hope. (Qtd. in Wasson, Hofmann and Ruck 142)
Against the background of an evolutionary model of consciousness, contemporary forms
of life — principally related to our economic system, neurochemistry, and habits of
digital technology usage — constitute phenomenological curricula that nurture atavistic
aspects of our humanity and contribute to the hydra of maladies now threatening most life
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on earth. With reference to the traditions of ancient Greece, deliberately entertained
curricula of consciousness might aid us in the work of self-transformation that appears
necessary if humanity is to deliver itself through the gathering storms.
1. A Circuit Model of Consciousness
[O]ur normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it,
is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it
by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness
entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their
existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in
all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably
somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of
the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of
consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question, for
they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may
determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a
region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature
closing of our accounts with reality.
William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience
All that we can know of self and the world must pass through the lens of consciousness.
Human beings possess the most highly realized form of consciousness of which we are
aware, our brains being capable of ten to the power of 2.7 million connections, more than
the number of stars in the known universe (Wilson, Prometheus. See also Wilson,
“Techniques”). Yet we share our most basic neurocircuitry with the first creatures to
emerge from the oceans hundreds of millions of years ago. We are half animal and half
spirit, Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde.
Although the mind has throughout history demonstrated a capacity to both perceive and
exhibit the mystical, modern humanity is by and large conditioned to inhabit what may be
called waking or rational consciousness.
Because the immediate environment
consistently bombards us with a superfluity of stimuli, this ordinary consciousness distills
the humming, buzzing confusion around us down to that which serves our survival
(Time-Life 106). Something as simple as crossing the street requires ignoring ninetynine percent of the sights, sounds, and smells that surround us (Shulgin).
While awareness may be shifted so as to bring these ignored yet perhaps somehow useful
stimuli to attention, our culture perpetuates a powerful and peculiar ideology in which the
ordinary, waking state of consciousness is the only necessary and valid state. Thomas B.
Roberts, of the University of Northern Illinois, refers to this as the “singlestate fallacy”
and suggests that we instead consider states of consciousness as being to the mind what
applications are to computers. Remaining forever in the waking state is like having
access to a computer’s many applications but only ever using that computer to word
process (Thomas Roberts 69-70).
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Allowing that the map is not the terrain, the following evolutionary model of
consciousness derives from Robert Anton Wilson, who drew from Sigmund Freud, C. G.
Jung, Timothy Leary, and Carl Sagan (Wilson, Prometheus). Whereas Wilson’s model
assumes that human beings are genetically equipped with eight neurocolloidal circuits, or
layers of mind, I simplify by using only five.
The first layer, our reptilian survival circuit, is hundreds of millions of years old. Our
most powerful program, distributed among the amydgala, hippocampus, and adrenal
gland, this circuit hard-wires us for maternal attachment and fight-or-flight response.
Very early in life and due largely to chance circumstance, the child imprints either infofilia or info-phobia. That is, we become powerfully predisposed to see either a world that
is essentially safe and interesting or a world that is terrible and frightening, although most
fall somewhere between the two ends of this spectrum. Some psychologists argue that
autism, incidence of which has increased three-fold within the past twenty years, is a
genetically predisposed and environmentally imprinted condition wherein the outside
world appears so horrible that the individual retreats into the safety of the self (Centers
for Disease Control; see also Wilson, “Techniques”).
We share our second circuit, centralized in the thalamus and cerebellum, with fellow
mammals; this circuit wires in pack affiliation and ego-territoriality, emotion and the
politics of submission and domination. With activation of this circuitry, the child begins
to test his or her status in the family hierarchy. Those who take their heaviest imprinting
on this circuit approach personal interactions as contests to be won or lost (cf. Schwartz).
Freud called this layer the anal stage, averring to toddlers seeking pleasure through
control of their bowel movements. According to Jamie Glowacki, an expert in the field
of potty training, children over the past ten to fifteen years have experienced greater than
ordinary problems in learning how to use the toilet, due, she argues, to our quickening
pace of life and increasing levels of anxiety (Glowacki 146-150).1
With the intersection of the first and second circuits, the bio-survival unit extends beyond
the mother figure to the larger nexus of tribe, kin, or nation-state. Just as the feudal
political economy linked the bio-survival of peasant to lord, the capitalist political
economy links the bio-survival of the working class to an employing class wielding
control over access to food, shelter, medical care, education, and all other things that
money affords.
The third circuit, symbolic-verbal rationality, situated in the frontal cortex, is unique to
humanity and thrusts us into history. The ancient Greeks spoke of this circuitry as the
faculty of mind attuned to linear time that produces and possesses truth. Synonymous
with instrumental reason, this circuitry, called the ratio in the Middle Ages, is the source
of Newtonian science, a. k. a. the plumbing level of reality, and the modern idea of
progress (Pieper 28). According to Wilson, the first-and-third-circuit binary constitutes
the basis for the essential dialectic of history: over time, communication intensifies and
information spreads, which threatens ruling elites who react with inquisitions and other
varieties of repression (“Techniques”).2
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When activated, first-circuit consciousness and its attendant stress chemicals are
notoriously capable of overpowering the rational mind. As Edward Herman and Noam
Chomsky illustrated in Manufacturing Consent, advertisers and politicians regularly rely
on fear to advance consumerism, war, and other logical absurdities. Fear, goes the Bene
Gesserit litany from Frank Herbert’s Dune, is the mind-killer. Reason, declaimed Martin
Luther, is a whore (Whitford).
Working in dialectic with the third circuit, the fourth circuit, associated with morality and
tribal taboo, functions as an evolutionary brake by sanctioning thought and action. In
particular, local cultural taboos define for us with whom it is permissible and
impermissible to mate. Typically, by our early thirties, the worldview inherited from and
suited to the circumstances of our local culture will harden and set for life, in effect
dooming us to a certain blindness regarding the greatest portion of the surrounding
ontological plenum. In this sense culture is both home and prison. Thus leaving one’s
local reality, in one way or another, outwardly or inwardly, is indispensable to breaking
its spell.3
Beyond reason and morality, there appear higher levels of consciousness notoriously
resistant to language and yet indispensable to the progress of civilization. Throughout
history, virtually all world cultures have recognized the powers of a few special, highly
realized beings: Moses, Christ, Buddha, Mohammad, Theresa of Avila, and countless
others — men and women able to see, intuit, and dream in uncanny ways. The ancient
Greeks identified this circuitry, called the intellectus by Medieval scholars, with the
faculty of mind attuned to the eternal present that receives and becomes possessed by
truth, associated variously with intuition, wonder, grace, spiritual vision, gestalt
perception, and the pineal gland (Pieper 28). Known as dhyana in the East, meaning “the
trance of unity,” this state of consciousness brings ego dissolution, enhanced compassion
and sensitivity to others, including plants, animals, and works of art (Mirante; see also
Zigler 164).
While expressions of fifth-circuit consciousness would seem historically to emerge
spontaneously and rarely, a vast majority of the world’s cultures appear to ritually
occasion its rapture. In her 1973 study of 488 world cultures, Erika Bourguignon found
that 437 practiced one or more ritual forms of consciousness-raising. Although her
sample primarily included non-state societies, institutionalized elevation of consciousness
appears to play a significant role in the foundation of Western culture.
Each autumn from roughly 1400 B.C. into the Christian era, thousands of pilgrims
traveled to the temple of Demeter to be initiated into the central mystery of Greek
civilization, considered to be the culminating experience of a lifetime. Following months
of spiritual preparation and ingesting kykeon — a sacred potion likely featuring barley
ergot — devotees would awaken to the rapture of the intellectus, revealing a world of
beauty, terror, and wonder, and dissolving boundaries between self and other. Dedicating
themselves to the cultivation of this faculty, members of the Athenian leisure class
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established skole, which in the Greek, properly speaking, does not refer to “school,” but
to leisure (Pieper 19).
Relieved from the daily struggle of earning one’s bread, these “founders of Western
culture” — Pericles, Herodotus, Hippocrates, Aristotle, Euripides, Phidias, and many
others — re-envisioned and re-created themselves through the arts of Politics, History,
Medicine, Philosophy, Poetry, Comedy, Sculpture, etc (C. L. R. James; see also Wasson,
Hofmann and Ruck). Pieper remarked upon the transcendental nature of their endeavors:
Because Wholeness is what man strives for, the power to achieve leisure is
one of the fundamental powers of the human soul. Like the gift for
contemplative absorption in the things that are, and like the capacity of the
spirit to soar in festive celebration, the power to know leisure is the power
to overstep the boundaries of the workaday world and reach out to
superhuman, life-giving existential forces that refresh and renew us before
we turn back to our daily work. Only in genuine leisure does a “gate to
freedom” open. (50-51; see also 22-23 and 57)
Through the Middle Ages, cycles of rituals and feasts institutionalized a shifting of the
window of consciousness from the corporeal to the cosmic, from harvest time to dream
time, and from daily toil to divine worship. Inhabiting these “two minds” remained
essential to achieving a fully human state of being, apprised of its divine nature and place
in the larger order of existence. Over the past centuries, however, the world of work has
infiltrated and eroded these sacred spaces “with such a velocity,” warns Pieper, that we
may speak of it as a “demonic force in history” (53). “Construction of a civilization that
knows little or nothing of these deeper realities can only make things worse” (Pieper 11).
2. The Phenomenology of Capital
Settle the economic question and you settle all other questions. It is the
Aaron’s rod which swallows up the rest.
William Morris, Factory Work as It Might Be 5
When economics is the dominant factor, once again we will bring down
everything to the level of survival,,,, It is the laws of the jungle again —
the survival of the fittest.
Sadhguru Vasudev, “Allowing the Feminine to Flower”
Joseph Campbell once said that you can determine a society’s state of consciousness by
looking at its urban skyline (Campbell and Moyers). Standing today in any major
downtown, one sees financial institutions looming above church towers and state capitol
buildings, an image indicative of the economic order overshadowing the religious and
political. A peculiar form of economic consciousness lies deep within our cultural DNA.

81

JPSE (2018)
An archaeological dig into the depths of the modern mind might take us to the records of
early contacts between the conquistadors and indigenous Americans. Following his
initial encounter with the native Arawaks, Columbus wrote in his journal:
They willingly traded everything they owned. They do not bear arms, and
do not know them, for I showed them a sword, they took it by the edge
and cut themselves out of ignorance.... They would make fine servants....
With fifty men we could subjugate them all and make them do whatever
we want. (Qtd. in Zinn 1-2)
Welcoming him as their returning god, a Quetzalcoatl, the Arawaks offered Columbus
gifts of gold, which he mistakenly assumed to be plentiful in the land. Massively
indebted to Queen Isabella of Spain, the sailor demanded ten pounds of the precious
metal from each native. As they returned to him empty-handed, he punished their noncompliance by chopping off hands and watching the victims bleed to death. Seizing the
next-most valuable commodity available, the sailor loaded the Arawaks themselves onto
his ships and hauled them across the Atlantic to be sold as slaves.
Had Columbus been receptive to those he encountered, he may have wished to learn and
live among them. More sensitive observers of the New World recognized the natives’
humanity and lamented their demise: “Endless testimonies,” wrote Bartolome de Las
Casas, “prove [their] mild and pacific temperament.... But our work was to exasperate,
ravage, kill, mangle and destroy” (qtd. in Zinn 6).
Whereas the actions of the conquistadors and colonizers may be perceived as devilish and
immoral, they are better understood as traumatic clashes of competing moral imperatives.
These men were not simply cold-blooded psychopathic killers, but, as David Graeber
contends, men caught in webs of greed and shame, driven by the frantic urgency of debt
repayment on interest-bearing loans that was added to the righteous indignation of having
to owe anything after enduring such a perilous journey (Graeber 317-318). Blinded to
the Arawaks’ humanity by the morality of debt, Columbus and his men could see only
commodities to be turned into money
Five hundred years later, under and surrounding our urban skyscrapers, temples to
money, roughly one hundred and fifty million fellow Americans, or half the population,
live paycheck-to-paycheck while another hundred million enjoy less than six months of
financial cushioning (Hazen). Considering the cosmic duality of mind and matter,
widespread insecurity regarding basic needs — food, shelter, safety — ensures that
general anxiety and first-circuit vigilance maintain a steady grip on the body social,
significantly limiting neurological activity associated with receptive awareness.
As a 2013 study of poverty’s effect on IQ concluded, “the all-consuming fretting” that
comes with poverty can cost a person as many as thirteen IQ points. Rather than
suggesting that the poor are stupid, the British-American team determined that precarious
living limits “mental bandwidth” in a way that is comparable to losing an entire night’s
sleep. “The poor are often highly effective at focusing on and dealing with pressing
problems,” remarked Eldar Shafir, professor of psychology and public affairs at
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Princeton University. “But they don’t have leftover bandwidth to devote to other tasks”
(qtd. in Kelland). “Poverty is bleak and cuts off your long-term brain,” wrote Linda
Tirado in a 2014 essay. “It doesn’t leave you much room to think about what you are
doing, only to attend to the next thing and the next. Planning isn’t in the mix.”
Economics is widely misunderstood in our society due to the enduring ontological
framework of the Western Enlightenment. Whereas Newtonian philosophy draws us to
see discrete objects and individuals, modes of production are better understood through a
language of processes and relationships. Instead of seeing the economy as a way of
producing things, we could look at it as a mode of producing forms of consciousness and
modes of associated living.
During the Age of Enlightenment, the rise of capitalism coincided with the ascent of
Reason. Voltaire beheld commercial societies and saw them as weaned from the
fanaticism of religious war. According to Georg Hegel, markets brought together diverse
cultures and oriented individuals to the needs and concerns of each other. Hegel
concluded, as did Adam Smith, that the new economy fostered a calculative attitude that
freed the human spirit by weakening the hold of tradition and making individualism
possible in fantastic new ways (Muller 139-165).
Among these novel virtues, however, critics began to spot forms of psychic and cultural
degradation. The rational being birthed by the market revealed itself to be part human,
part monster. Observing the frenetic bustling of the French marketplaces, Friedrich
Engels described “a horde of ravenous beasts (for what else are competitors?) who
devour one another.”
Although the calculative mentality engendered by market societies appeared to weaken
the stranglehold of ecclesiastical authority, critics charged that it threatened to
subordinate all other attitudes and modes of thought. Max Weber, Werner Sombart, and
György Lukács all cautioned that technical thinking and narrow focus upon means would
obstruct the ends to which those means contribute (see Muller 240-241; 257; 263-271).
Instrumental rationality, warned Martin Heidegger, might ultimately eradicate the
“meditative thought” — those refined thoughts, perceptions, and emotions arising
through contemplation and reflection — that is the very essence of our humanity (Carr
222).
In their 2011 publication Lost in Transition, Christian Smith and colleagues from Notre
Dame University explained that millennials increasingly navigate ethical propositions
based only on time, feeling, benefit, and desire. Concepts such as virtue, morality, and
justice, prevalent throughout much of Western history, were non-considerations (Fleet;
see also Lyon). One can see throughout contemporary society the ghastly consequences
of calculative reason applied to situations where it does not righteously belong.
Pharmaceutical companies suppress studies warning of their medicines’ lethal effects;
automakers withhold vital safety features from cars and trucks; oil and gas companies
hide research indicating that fossil fuel consumption is rending the biosphere (Dowie 1832; Hyde 62-64; Goodman and Nissen; Carrington and Mommers). Although it might
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tempt to label the actions of corporate executives in such cases as corrupt and immoral, it
is more instructive to consider the actors as abiding to the peculiar laws and moralities of
the institutions they serve. Nonetheless, these men and women, incapable of recognizing
their connections with and responsibility to others, exhibit a careless, immature humanity.
3. The Neurochemistry of Capitalism
We are so close to the world of work that we can’t see what it does to us.
We have to rely on outside observers from other times or other cultures to
appreciate the extremity and the pathology of our present position.
Bob Black, “The Abolition of Work”
Mirroring its architecture, a society’s state of consciousness is reflected and shaped by its
choice of drugs. Our language often misleads us to believe that the self possesses an
essence independent of what it ingests; but we are not merely persons who “take” drugs;
we are neurochemical organisms in which drugs become active parts, living through us as
we live through them.
Writing in 1998, Marshall Sahlins illustrated caffeine’s indispensable contribution to the
development of the industrial economy, which required workers to be productive for
many hours a day beyond innate biorhythms. Beginning with only a small, two-hundredpound-a-year sample of Chinese tea in the mid-1600s, the English were, a century later,
importing two million pounds annually, and up to twenty million by the turn of the
nineteenth century. Tea quickly became “an indispensable necessity of life” (J. L.
Cranmer-Byng, qtd. in Sahlins 418) and “the god to which everything else was
sacrificed” (E. T. Pritchard, qtd. in Sahlins 418).
According to Zygmunt Bauman, attention itself has become the principal limit to capital
growth in the information age, as societies appear, consciously or not, to be seeking ways
to push physiological boundaries. Franco Berardi goes so far as to argue that the
“irrational exuberance” of the 1990s was due in large part to millions of workers in
Silicon Valley “consuming tons of cocaine, amphetamines, and Prozac.” When the
supply of these drugs was cut off and removed from the workers’ neurochemistry, the
bubble burst. The years since have witnessed an explosion in the licit market for coffee,
energy drinks, B12 shots, and other attention-preserving stimulants (sometimes explode).
Although attentional disorders have been recognized since at least the turn of the 20th
century, it was not until the 1980s and 90s that doctors regularly prescribed children and
adolescents powerful drugs — Ritalin and Adderall — to treat Attention Deficit
Disorders. In an April 2015 edition of the New York Times, Alan Schwarz reported that
the first generation of Americans to grow accustomed to taking amphetamines as study
drugs in college had graduated and carried the habit into the workforce. Adults are using
the drugs not to get high, writes Schwarz, but to get hired. One financial industry source
told him, “Friends of mine in finance, on Wall Street, were traders and had to start at five
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in the morning on top of their games — most of them were taking Adderall. You can’t
be the one who is sluggish.” Asked about her own habit, the worker testified:
I did my job faster than anybody. I was on a mission, and I was not going
to stop until I succeeded and got what I wanted.... It’s like this at most of
the companies I know with driven young people — there’s a certain
expectation of performance.... And if you don’t meet it, and I’m not really
worried how, someone else will. (Qtd. in Schwarz)
The proletarian, argues Bernard Stiegler, beyond simply a worker, is one who has been
reduced to a functional unit of an economic system, denied agency and denuded of
savoir-vivre, i.e., knowledge of how to live. Capital’s war to proletarianize consumers
and producers, he writes, exerts powerful pressure upon technological and
phenomenological becoming (States of Shock 128). Whilst increasing and intensifying
work-focus capacity, caffeine and other stimulants may simultaneously arrest what Karl
Polanyi referred to as subsidiary awareness. Polanyi argues that comprehension of
certain phenomena, such as those dealt with in history, philosophy, and religion —
essentially the Humanities — often requires one to de-focus the mind, allowing details
and explicit parts to recede into the background so as to perceive larger patterns.
“Unbridled lucidity,” he wrote, “can destroy our understanding of complex matters” (qtd.
in Zigler 164). Our attentional bandwidth liquidated through daily economic warfare, we
are left to consult outside observers as to the present condition of our being.
Hailing from the Amazon Rain Forest, mother of all the world’s forests, Davi Kopenawa,
a Yanomami shaman, travels to the modern world to raise awareness about the
destruction of his home at the hands of loggers, prospectors, and cattle ranchers. Versed
in reconciling the local and the global, the infinitesimal and the infinite, Kopenawa draws
firm connections between the despoiling of the Amazon and the lives of those he calls the
“white people.” Visiting New York City, financial capital of the planet, he sees men and
women entranced by a love of merchandise and deaf to the spirits who plead on behalf of
the forest (Kopenawa and Albert 375-377).
Impressed by the ingenuity of their architecture, Kopenawa nonetheless observes that the
white people, tormented by their work and money, “only see their wives, their children,
and their merchandise when they sleep. They must anxiously think about their work and
their trips. In the din of their cities,” he continues,
multitudes of people moved very fast and in every direction, like ants.
They started one way and turned around, then went the other way. They
looked at the ground all the time and never saw the sky…. People there
live piled up one on top of each other and squeezed side by side, as
frenzied as wasps in their nest. It all makes you dizzy and obscures your
thought. The endless noise and the smoke covering everything prevent
you from thinking right. This is probably why the white people can’t hear
us!... The lives of white people who hurry around all day like ants seem
sad to me. They are always impatient and anxious not to get to their job
late or be thrown away. They barely sleep and run all day in a daze. They
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only talk about working and the money they lack.... [T]he babble of
televisions and radios cover all the other voices. White people are always
worried because of all this racket through which they hurry all day. Their
hearts beat too fast, their thought is seized with dizziness, and their eyes
are always on the alert. I think that this endless noise prevents their
thoughts from joining together. It is so. In the end, their thoughts become
scattered and fixed at their feet, and this is how you become stupid.
(Kopenawa and Albert 349; 354-355).
Leaving the heart of nature for the epicenter of the global order, Kopenawa finds himself
immersed in a toxic mental environment. Consumed by the struggle to survive and
“make it” in this world, and suffering twin epidemics of stress and lack of sleep, thought
reduces to reflex (Daily Mail Reporter). From the vantage point of the rain forest
shaman, we appear something less than fully human.
4. The Net
Evil is that which makes for separateness; and that which makes for
separateness is self-destructive.... Conversely, the qualities which have
led to biological progress are the qualities which make it possible for
individual beings to escape from their separateness — intelligence and the
tendency to co-operate. Love and understanding are valuable even on the
biological level. Hatred, unawareness, stupidity and all that makes for
increase of separateness are the qualities that, as a matter of historical
fact, have led either to the extinction of a species, or to its becoming a
living fossil, incapable of making further biological progress.
Aldous Huxley, “Beliefs” 350
Save for the alphabet and the printing press, the Internet may be the single
most powerful mind-altering technology that has ever come into general
use.
Nicholas Carr 116
Two generations ago, Marshall McLuhan recognized that all tools are essentially
prosthetic. In other words, human beings change themselves through the creation and
incorporation of tools into their lives. Automobiles extend the powers of our legs; radios
extend the reach of the voice and ear; clothing extends the protective functions of skin
and hair. More than all other types, McLuhan insisted, communications technologies
transform the human world (McLuhan, Understanding Media). Two and a half thousand
years ago, spread of the phonetic alphabet spurred the rise of empires, along with the
academic tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Five hundred years ago, the printing press gave
rise to the Protestant Revolution, the nation state, the Western Enlightenment, Science,
the Industrial Revolution, and the modern school. Once again, at the dawn of the 21st
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century, we appear to be in the midst of seismic changes, both curative and toxic,
resulting from a revolution in our communication technology.
With the advent of the digital age, McLuhan envisioned a global village in which
physical distances ceased to serve as barriers to human connection. Such a new
“electronic information environment,” he wrote, “compels commitment and participation.
We have become irrevocably involved with, and responsible for, each other” (The
Medium is the Massage 12). In only the past decade, folks around the world have utilized
digital communications technologies to break through the de-facto censorship of
corporate and state media to raise awareness of injustice (love translated to the public
sphere) and spark political movements, from Black Lives Matter to Occupy Wall Street
and the Arab Spring. In the wake of natural disasters, we have seen citizens organize
relief efforts in the absence of aid from governmental agencies, autonomously directing
food, shelter, and physicians to areas of greatest need (Smolan). And yet, we may ask
whether our newfound connectedness has in fact brought humanity any closer together,
and in so doing contributed to the love and understanding side of Huxley’s spectrum.
One could argue that we have thus far, in the third millennium, moved farther apart from
one another and closer to self-destruction.
Perhaps our problem is the same one that Neil Postman saw in Huxley’s Brave New
World: “Huxley feared,” wrote Postman in Amusing Ourselves to Death, “those who
would give us so much [information] that we would be reduced to passivity and egoism”
(qtd. in Andrew Postman). As both Nicholas Carr and Bernard Stiegler argue, caring and
critical consciousness — the combination of emotion and reason that we need in order to
deal intelligently with the world — require focused, undistracted attention; but these are
neither native to our species nor encouraged by our habits of digital media use (Stiegler,
Taking Care).
Human beings evolved short, distractible attention spans through thousands of
generations of life in environments where we survived by attuning ourselves to subtle
changes of light and sound, a moving shadow or the snap of a twig alerting us to either
predator or prey. What we today refer to as “thought” emerges from cultural traditions
(and likely the mastery of fire) that train the mind away from its inherent distractibility
(Carr). Most humans are “reason-able,” writes Stiegler, meaning that we are capable of
acquiring the intellectual and attentional prowess requisite for both citizenship and
mature personhood. Attainment of these faculties by the masses, Stiegler argues, has
been the raison d’être of the modern school. However, this project has fallen under
heavy assault by the consumer programming industries. Guided by experts in the field of
psychology and informed of the intricacies and intimacies of our lives, these agencies
seek to destroy reason in order to render us infantilized consumers, incapable of selfauthorship (Stiegler, States of Shock).
Over the past decade, a growing weight of psychological and sociological research has
found that our habits of digital technology usage are re-wiring the mind and altering the
dynamics of our relationships. While digital media present us with unprecedented
opportunities to cultivate socialized intelligence and critical consciousness, we appear to
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be using them in ways that weaken the mental faculties that would allow us to seize these
opportunities. Socialized intelligence and critical consciousness, writes Carr, “emerge
from neural processes that are inherently slow” (220). Yet the more time that we spend
with digital technology, the faster our internal clocks move.
Jonathan Sweller, an Australian educational psychologist, explains that the human
capacity to wrestle with complexity, essentially “intellectual prowess,” is a function of
“schemas” that develop out of long-term memory, which is not just a storehouse of
information but also the seat of problem-solving and understanding (Carr 124-125).
People become “more intelligent” when information initially perceived in short-term
memory becomes incorporated into long-term memory, where it augments our schema.
By ingesting information slowly and steadily, such as in undistracted book reading, this
process transpires efficiently and effectively.
However, our tendencies while reading on screens are to do so not in steady, focused
ways, but instead by scanning, skimming, and jumping from page to page. By
bombarding ourselves with stimuli — hyperlinks, news-feeds, pop-ups, and message
alerts — we overload working memory, so that new inputs continually push information
out of the mind before it can be assimilated into our schema (Carr 139-143).
Mounting research demonstrates that increased demands upon working memory blunt our
critical and empathic functions. For example, although we can instantaneously
empathize with others whom we witness suffering physically, the mental operations
required for appreciating the psychological and moral dimensions of emotional suffering
unfold slowly. While smart phones and other digital devices extend our abilities to
locate, categorize, and assess, they carry the danger of short-circuiting those processes
that allow us to understand and care (Carr 220-221).
5. A Thought Experiment
It is only necessary to ask a few questions as to the progress of the articles
of commerce from the fields where they grow, to our houses, to become
aware that we eat and drink and wear perjury and fraud in a hundred
commodities.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Man the Reformer,” qtd. in Warnick 95
Here manual labor is drudgery and toil is slavery. The men cannot
possibly find any satisfaction in their work. They simply work to make a
living. Their sweat and dull pain are part of the price paid for the fine
cars we all run. And most of us run the cars without knowing what price
is being paid for them.
Reinhold Niebuhr 65, after a visit to a Detroit auto factory (1929)
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Three centuries ago, Enlightenment thinkers hoped that markets would bring together
citizens of the world and orient each to the needs and concerns of others. Since that time,
technological progress has re-made the planet not so much into a global village, but more
accurately into a global marketplace. Yet my relations to others through the market
remain largely invisible.
Commodity fetishism refers to the phenomenon whereby we endow inanimate objects
with metaphysical properties to the effect of concealing human relationships, so that I see
shoes and tomatoes as things and not as products of human labor. This, as Marx
recognized, is the lynchpin of our economic system. Our entire mode of life, he believed,
relied upon our failing to come to consciousness about the elemental facts of human
interconnection.
It stands to reason that if I could see past the commodity form to the human relationships
that it conceals, then the commodity might be de-mystified and lose its power over me.
The Internet offers a substantially heightened capacity to peer behind the veil and bear
witness to our interconnection, beautiful or ugly as it may be. Hypothetically, I could
behold the conditions of food and garment workers at factory farms and sweatshops,
revealing the suffering that is so often invested into the things I purchase. Theoretically,
this could cause me to change my behaviors in such a way as to reduce injustice.
Analogously, in the days following the 2015 Paris attacks, news networks depicted not
only images of carnage, but also the names and faces of victims and their loved ones. We
learned that they were college students, musicians, or fathers. We heard their stories and
instinctively empathized (Lam and Alexandra). On some level, they were us and we
were them, and we sent our prayers across the ocean.
However, as Jeremy Scahill highlights, there are daily massacres in the Middle East — at
wedding parties, funerals, hospitals, etc. — in which we are complicit and yet of which
we remain unaware. Each month, according to monitoring groups such as Airwars and
the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, American tax dollars contribute to the deaths
of scores of innocent civilians, including women and children. We fund their killing and
the weapons that kill them, and we never know their stories; they remain nameless and
invisible (see Goodman, Gonzalez, Scahill, and Greenwald; see also Rachel Roberts and
Goodman and Beckerle).
What difference might it make to know as much about “the others” as we know about
“our own”? What if, as Amy Goodman wondered in her 2014 I. F. Stone Lifetime
Achievement Award acceptance speech, our media served as “a huge kitchen table that
stretches across the globe, [where] we all sit around and debate and discuss the most
important issues of the day: war and peace, life and death? That, I believe,” concluded
Goodman, “is what will save us” (Goodman). Still, the question remains whether or not
our awareness would make any difference. Following Marx, Reinhold Niebuhr argued
that personal, embodied contact is an indispensable ingredient of human ethics. We
cannot, Niebuhr believed, treat others justly (lovingly) when we fail to connect on this
basic, eye-to-eye level.
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Writing about digital media since the 1980s, professor and psychoanalyst Sherry Turkle
of M. I. T., for decades optimistic about the direction of communications technologies,
observes a troubling correlation between digital connectivity and a coarsening of human
relationships. Turkle contends that although our 21st-century media have allowed us to
remain connected across vast geographical distances, they have also enabled us to sustain
the kind of lifestyle in which typical Americans work longer hours, increasingly feel that
they “have no time,” live away from family, belong to no religious or civic associations,
and report feeling more insecure, isolated, and lonely than ever (Turkle 157).
Although we may treasure the efficiency that digital media afford, this efficiency can
prove toxic when it encroaches upon personal relationships. Rapid communication over
physical distance has, Turkle argues, supported a growing tendency in our culture toward
psychoanalytic narcissism: not self-love, but “a personality so fragile that it ... cannot
tolerate the complex demands of other people but tries to relate to them by distorting who
they are and splitting off what it needs, what it can use” (177). Skyler Wang, a
sociologist who uses and studies online dating services, describes what he sees as
“relationshopping,” a turn toward objectification and commodification of potential mates,
away from the thrilling and arduous journey of building a relationship (Roman).
Depriving ourselves of the messiness that accompanies embodied affection, we risk
losing what we need to become mature persons in touch with our human depths.
6. Toward a Curriculum of Consciousness
In Nekhlyudov, as in all people, there were two men; one the spiritual
man, who sought his well-being in such matters only as could at the same
time do other people some good, and the other the animal man, who was
looking out only for his own well-being, ready for it to sacrifice the wellbeing of the whole world. During that period of his insanity of egotism,
induced by his Petersburgian and military life, the animal man was ruling
within him and had completely suppressed the spiritual man. But, upon
seeing Katyusha and becoming actuated by the same feeling which he had
had for her before, the spiritual man raised his head, and he began to
assert his rights.
Leo Tolstoy, Resurrection 78
Suddenly you notice, that there aren’t these separations, that we’re not on
these separate islands shouting across to someone else and trying to hear
what they’re saying and misunderstanding. You know, you used the word
yourself, ‘empathy’. This thing’s flowing underneath, we’re part of a
single continent. It meets underneath the water. And with that goes such
delight. The sober certainty of waking bliss.
Gerald Heard circa 1955
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“The young,” said Helen Mirren in her May, 2017 commencement address to graduates
at Tulane University, “carry intrinsically within them the energy and idealism that will
regenerate human life on this planet as it hurtles through time and space.” Mirren shared
that her own youthful search for meaning through the tumult of the 1970s led her to an
ancient Mayan word now tattooed on her hand: Inlakesh, meaning “you are my other self;
we are one; and we are all in this together.” These are the timeless truths of our common
humanity, she concluded, that the rising generation must somehow realize and bring to
bear upon the crises and opportunities of the 21st century (Mirren). Parallel to Huxley’s
spectrum of good and evil, inlakesh offers a useful litmus for gauging the
phenomenological quality of our society and imagining a curriculum that might assist the
young in the work of self-transcendence.
The economic, neurochemical, and technological facets of life contribute to an
ontological pharmacology of being and becoming. At present, we appear to inhabit a
toxic phenomenological ecosystem that simultaneously reflects and contributes to the
degradation of social and biological systems. Nonetheless, if these lenses prove useful in
describing our circumstances, they may also reveal signposts toward a healthier
curriculum of consciousness, a phenomenological pharmakon of political economy,
neurochemistry, and digital technology.
For many centuries, alphabetic hypomnemata — writing, the study of scripture, the
library of the Humanities, science, and the Republic of Letters, the free press and
informed public opinion — have constituted a western grounds of savoir-vivre: systems
of care, knowledge of right living, avenues to individuation, the forging of a unique self
(Stiegler, States of Shock). Still in the morning hours of the digital revolution, we find
that our educational embrace of our newfound tools has proven either minimallydiscriminate or outright addictogenic. We remain in search of a pedagogy by which to
inoculate ourselves against the behavioral control techniques of the consumer industry
and re-arrange our inherited literary hypomnemata into more democratic digital forms.
Historically, American culture has surrounded major events of adolescents’ technological
becoming with rituals and rites of passage. For example, we invest significant time in
teaching young people about the practical and ethical dimensions of using a firearm,
driving a car, or encountering drugs and alcohol. Such efforts promote what the Greeks
called melete or epimeleia — discipline, solicitude, care. We can find similar practices
related to digital technology in South Korea, for instance, where educators have wrestled
with the travails of the digital age for perhaps a decade longer than have we here in the
United States. South Korean elementary teachers counsel that the first lessons of Internet
usage must be ethical. Hallways feature signs and students recite songs intended to instill
conscientiousness regarding the humanity on the other side of the screen: “I am the
Internet guardian angel. I will be the first to protect. I want to be the first to protect.
Though faces are unknown, it's a warm neighborhood. Precious Internet friend. Friend!
Netiquette!” (Dretzin).
In recent decades, interest has grown among American educators in “mindfulness,” a
practice which, rightly interpreted, draws from Zen Buddhist practices to assist children
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and adolescents in distilling attention, clearing the mind, and opening the heart (Rempel).
Amidst rising levels of stress, anxiety, and depression among youth, studies have found
that incorporation of yoga, meditation, breathing exercises, and Tai Chi into the school
day can lead to increases in neurological activity associated with empathy, compassion,
and self-awareness, enabling students to see beyond their own frame of reference (Hölzel
et al.; see also McFadden, Sandler, and Fieldstadt, and also Meiklejohn et al.). Such
healthier states of mind promise to enhance the benefits of digital connectivity and offer
prophylaxis against its ills.
Pursued further, “mindfulness” and other spiritual practices issue variously from
millennia-old traditions of training youth to recognize and tame first and second-circuit
demons — the Mr. Hyde residing in us all. As the pupil progresses to higher levels,
learning to exercise third and fourth-circuit control over first and second-circuit impulses,
bandwidth is opened for expression of fifth-circuit awareness.
For the entirety of its existence, our species has shaped and changed itself through the use
of tools, organic and inorganic.
Anthropologists and psychologists attest that
psychedelics — which translates as “mind-manifesting” — have the capacity to assist in
revealing aspects of reality erstwhile veiled by waking consciousness. Currently, and
following a half-century inquisition, university laboratories are resurrecting
investigations into psychoactive compounds — also known as entheogens, or “plant
teachers” — such as psilocybin, ibogaine, ayahuasca, ketamine, and others, which have
variously been found to assist men and women in the work of self-revision, including
recovery from trauma or addiction, strengthening connection to nature, and preparation
for death (Wilson, “Techniques”; see also Kupferschmidt, and also Heyes and Carlander).
“There’s something at its core,” says Roland Griffiths of Johns Hopkins University,
that has to do with the core of moral and ethical behavior, about the sense
of interconnectedness of all people and things.... We’re talking about love
and caretaking for other people and for the environment. And we have the
opportunity to study that. I can’t imagine anything more important than
that. (Qtd. in Shulgin)
Mystics such as Ram Dass, formerly Dr. Richard Alpert, who pioneered psychedelic
studies at Harvard University along with Timothy Leary, claim that psychedelics are
unnecessary and potentially detrimental shortcuts to what can be achieved through
spiritual devotion and instruction from a competent practitioner. A problem with Ram
Dass’ position might be that the traditional methods of enlightenment — Ram Dass
himself traveled to the Himalayas and spent years studying with a yogi, drawing water,
cooking rice, and meditating — are highly inaccessible to the beleaguered inhabitants of
this toxic consumerscape.
Like any other tool, psychoactive drugs are pharmaka and can be used to either curative
or poisoning effects; thus they require a healthy balance of positive and negative liberty:
both the freedom and prudent wisdom to structure one’s own neurochemistry. It may on
one hand be useful to recall that entheogens have played significant contributory roles in
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a number of the 20th century’s great accomplishments: Francis Crick credited LSD with
helping him discover the structure of DNA; Paul Erdos, perhaps the most prolific
mathematician to have ever lived, insisted that amphetamines were indispensable to his
process; Carl Sagan advocated marijuana as an aid to thinking (Gonzalez). At present,
however, toxic economic and phenomenological circumstances appear to condition much
drug use, giving rise to national and global health crises. Improving our chemical and
digital pharmacology will go hand-in-hand with making basic security and leisure more
widely available in society.
Since the late-18th century, philosophers and economists have argued that an income
guaranteed to satisfy the fundamental needs of all could dramatically transform society.
In a world lifted from a fear economy, every man and woman could entertain the question
that Robert Anton Wilson attributes to Buckminster Fuller: “What was it that I was so
interested in as a child before I was told that I had to earn a living?” The answer, Wilson
suggests, coming from millions and then billions of souls liberated from drudgery, would
make the Renaissance look like a Greenwich Village art show and the Enlightenment like
a high school science fair (Wilson, “RICH” 148). This year, Finland began its first
experiments providing citizens with an income guaranteed to meet their basic needs.
Cities in the Netherlands, Italy, Scotland, and Ontario are also moving towards their own
trials with the citizen’s wage, of which almost seventy percent of European Union
residents now approve (Henley).
Currently tasked with sorting winners and losers, haves and have-nots, our schools
remain in the business of proletarianizing the young. Relieved of this loathsome burden,
one can imagine what a school or university might look like: a true institution of leisure,
where none are crippled by the urgency of debt repayment or compelled to approach their
education as preparation for a job, and all may feast on the treasures of our collective
human heritage as artistic, intellectual, and spiritual beings.
Among other things, our Promethean labor entails mastery of our economy,
neurochemistry, and digital technology. Regarding pedagogies of transcendence, Aldous
Huxley suggests that nothing short of everything will really do: spiritual devotion and
sacred mushrooms and meditation and study and leisure — no one thing alone — will all
play vital roles in maintaining a healthy phenomenological ecosystem (Huxley, Island).
Our educational tradition passes through the midwife Socrates, killed for attempting to
push others through the labor pains of digenes. Although the horizon at the precipice of
the end of history appears dark, perhaps it will prove to be the darkness not of the tomb
but of the womb (Kaur).
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Notes

1

These trends are corroborated in academic literature; cf. Farrell and Barrett.

2

As a contemporary example of the effect of this trend, federal prosecutions of
whistleblowers have surged in the digital age. See Greenberg and Mian. Also, according
to the watchdog group Mapping Media Freedom, the past decade has seen a spike in the
incidence of intimidation and murder of journalists (McChrystal).

3

This was the advice of my undergraduate academic advisor, the late Steven Rubenstein.
Programs of intercultural exchange and study abroad, which more students than ever are
taking advantage of, often contribute to the opening of worldviews and expand
appreciation for global humanity.
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Elaborating Environmental Communication within “Posthuman”
Theory
Maria Kristina Börebäck
Elias Schwieler
1. Introduction
The need to encourage affirming and sustainable ways of life, and also the courage to
dare to critique destructive ways of life, is more than a vision; it is a pedagogical
challenge which raises ideas of importance for environmental communication. We
follow Richard A. Rogers’ argument that there is a need to take environmental theory
seriously and articulate the implications of how these theoretical ideas can be put into
practice when it comes to social formation and the natural world, not to mention the
affiliations that need to be established to make these practices viable. Sometimes there is
an urgent need not only to challenge normalized and allegedly taken-for-granted ideas,
but more importantly to actively and radically problematize the anthropocentric teleology
of theoretical stances that constitute the notion of ‘understanding’ in relation to
environmental awareness in various ways. This text argues for a post-anthropocentric
turn that can provide the space for elaborating ideas that can function as the foundation
for a critical, posthumanist environmental communication theory.
Environmental communication as an academic field is relatively new, and research in this
area has sprung out of activist engagement with ideas of justice, loss of biodiversity,
environmental management, democracy, and various environmental crises, among other
concerns, and how these issues intersect (see Cox; Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson;
Monani). The field of environmental communication focuses on the actions connecting
activists and academics to help them strive for “a just and healthy Earth” (Peterson,
Peterson, and Peterson 83). This makes environmental communication a meta-field that
cuts across disciplines, and ties research and theory together by providing a topical focus
on communication and on human relations with and within the environment (Milstein,
“Environmental Communication” 344). ‘Environmental education’ and ‘Education for
sustainable development’ are examples of activities that develop learning and knowledge
formulation within environmental communication as an academic field (see Jurin, Roush,
and Danter; Kahn; Sriskandarajah and Wals; Wals).
Environmental communication thus contributes to an increased understanding of
environmental matters by focusing on human relations with the environment. This, in
turn, generates knowledge in, from, and about the world (Jurin, Roush, and Danter, 15).
However, despite the ambition to learn with and from the nonhuman world,
environmental communication often devolves into human-centered traditions that
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advance the political agenda of changing human behavior. Thus the political agenda of
environmental communication includes pedagogical objectives that aim to support a
better understanding of the interaction between the human and the nonhuman world.
Such an approach can be assumed to originate in a positivist worldview that separates the
human cultural and social world from the natural world — a tendency constructivist
theory 1 shares, since constructivists actually separate the natural world from the
scientifically constructed world through the notion that scientists look at the natural world
and construct an idea of it (Braidotti, Posthuman; Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson). An
issue underlying this concern is explicitly articulated in Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson:
“Constructivist epistemologies not only endanger conservation by denying nonhumans
citizenship, they cripple conservation initiatives by suggesting that truth is what the
powerful believe” (76).
An alternative to the constructivist approach, in which nature and culture are separated, is
formulated by Rosi Braidotti, who, following Deleuze among others, claims that nature
and culture emerge in a continuum that evolves through variations or differentiations.
Braidotti thus counters the constructivist idea of a more or less clear-cut separation
between nature and culture (Braidotti, Transpositions 205).
Within environmental communication theory, this critique of both positivism and
constructivism forms the basis for an alternative radical communication theory. In 1998,
Rogers presented ideas stemming from such critiques in his essay “Overcoming the
Objectification of Nature in Constitutive Theories: Toward a Transhuman, Materialist
Theory of Communication.” Rogers argues for the necessary human immersion in the
natural world, and for allowing the inclusion of non-essentialized nonhuman voices in
discourse (244). In this radical assertion of communication theory, by arguing for the
possibility of working with the notion of power (of which more later) through discursive
and natural forces, the importance of avoiding determinism becomes central. To enable a
deconstruction of the ideal/material distinction, Rogers highlights the following criteria:
(1) the resurrection of a place for natural forces, traits, and structures in
communication theory while avoiding a return to natural determinism; (2)
an affirmation that we humans are embodied creatures embedded in a
world that is not entirely our own making; (3) a rehearsal of ways of
listening to nondominant voices and nonhuman agents and their inclusion
in the production of meaning, policy, and material conditions; (4) the
deconstruction of common sense binaries such as subject/object,
social/natural, and ideational/material, and a reconstruction of
relationships as dialogic: recursive, interdependent, and fluid. Such a
theoretical project could enrich the scope of communication theory and
criticism while embracing the value and dynamism of the extrasocial
world. Old tools tend to reproduce old structures. The reconstruction of a
different relationship to the environment in which we live requires
radically alternative conceptions of humans, nature, material condition and
discourse. (268)
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This perspective brings us to Braidotti. The idea of a posthuman nomadic subject as
presented in her writing becomes useful when reflecting on how to bring Rogers’ criteria
into practice. The idea of the nomadic refers to the differentiation and repetition that is
understood as territorializing (Deleuze and Guattari 355). The nomadic explains physical
as well as psychological changes such as those occurring through learning, joy,
depression, love, aging, fears, broken bones, et cetera, together with constitutional
materialities such as tools (both mechanical and digital), medicine, artificial hair colors,
implants, et cetera, that ‘constitute’ posthuman nomadic subjects (singularities) (Bennett).
Simultaneously the nomadic explains changes that occur through becoming, as the
multiple merges with "the one" as (possible) alterations of emerging posthuman nomadic
subjects, such as in reproduction or bodily decay when the dew transforms leaves or a
human body returns to soil (Bennett; Haraway, When Species Meet). Further, the
nomadic posthuman subject is political (Braidotti, Posthuman). In sum, the nomadic
posthuman subject will never be; it is in a continuous process of becoming (Braidotti,
Posthuman 188). The concept of the posthuman nomadic subject, we suggest, can
provide the basis for profound arguments in support of a post-anthropocentric notion of
environmental communication. As Braidotti states:
The posthuman subject is not postmodern, because it does not rely on any
anti-foundationalist premises. Nor is it post-structuralist, because it does
not function within the linguistic turn or other forms of deconstruction.
Not being framed by the ineluctable powers of signification, it is
consequently not condemned to seek adequate representation of its
existence within a system that is constitutionally incapable of granting due
recognition.... The posthuman nomadic subject is materialist and vitalist,
embodied and embedded — it is firmly located somewhere, according to
the radical immanence of the ‘politics of location’.... It is a multifaceted
and relational subject, conceptualized within a monistic ontology, through
the lenses of Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari, plus feminist and postcolonial theories. It is a subject actualized by the relational vitality and
elemental complexity that mark posthuman thought itself. (Posthuman
188)
This quote, which articulates a path of knowledge whereby material as well as political
matters become significant, is key to a posthumanism that will enrich the idea of
existence. A posthuman nomadic subject opens up possibilities to acknowledge actions
while at the same time not compromising the necessity of thinking and writing critically.
This process of becoming posthuman has, as Braidotti intimates, the potential to change
the very idea of thinking:
Becoming-posthuman ... is a process of redefining one’s sense of
attachment and connection to a shared world, a territorial space: urban,
social, psychic, ecological, planetary as it may be. It expresses multiple
ecologies of belonging, while it enacts the transformation of one’s
sensorial and perceptual co-ordinates, in order to acknowledge the
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collective nature and outward-bound direction of what we still call the
self. (Posthuman 193)
What Braidotti wants to characterize here is a nomadic posthuman subject that becomes
in multiplicity (Posthuman). The main point here is that the notion of processuality, i.e.,
of an attention to and study of processes, becomes of prime importance for a posthuman
turn in environmental communication theory. We argue that this turn can empower postanthropocentric, multiple nomadic expressions for a situation or event. Furthermore, we
argue that posthuman/post-anthropocentric environmental communication theory has the
potential to change how the knowledge of emerging earthly matters can be understood.
Communication theory and practice, especially in environmental communication, need to
consider more than anthropocentric history. A post-anthropocentric approach in
environmental communication thus includes more than the human perspective, and so
provides the possibility of warranting nonhuman citizenship2 in environmental milieux
(Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson 76).
Communicative processes express a ‘machinic assemblage’, 3 that is, communicative
procedures of repetition and differentiation which express organizations in various ways.
As Spoelstra explains: “‘We’ are equally part of ‘organizations’ as ‘organizations’ are
part of ‘us’. ‘We’, as well as ‘organizations’, produce what it means to be a ‘we’ or ‘an
organization’ in taking part of the primary processes of formation and deformation — in
short: in organizing” (84). ‘Organizations’, moreover, offer up a multitude of
expressions for communicational processes (Massumi). This means that in a certain
space/time situation, the differentiation4 and repetition5 of movement and forces will
affect the communicative flows in various directions and express various communicative
practices.6
To develop these thoughts, we will in the following parts of this essay problematize the
two concepts that constitute ‘environmental communication’ — that is, environment and
communication — for the purpose of challenging anthropocentrism. By elaborating on
environmental communication within posthuman theory, we want to enable a radical
approach to critically studying situations that express the notion of ‘sustainable
development’ as a matter for environmental communication research. ‘Environment’ as a
spatial concept and ‘communication’ as a temporal concept for interactions and exchange
require location, or perhaps allocation, through a posthuman turn in environmental
communication theory.
2. Communication
We argue that communication is a function of and site for relational actions; in other
words, communicative actions create the space and time for meaning to emerge through
relations. Etymologically, the Latin noun communicatio and the verb communicare
imply that the concept of communication involves the action of sharing (Harper,
Communication; Peters 6-7). This notion of sharing situates communication in a liminal
space of actions and simultaneous becomings in actions as the act of communicating
itself. Taken in this sense, communication is about relations and cannot be determined as
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an essence (Hayles 91). The major theories within communication research deal with
conversation and have mainly focused on linguistic or rhetorical concepts to explain
meaning-making in actions (Littlejohn and Foss). Communication as a concept implies a
community, which means that a communion of actions can be seen as relational (Jenlink
and Banathy xi). This, moreover, implies that an action-space of some kind develops
through communication, which, in turn, lets forces and affects emerge that empower the
awareness of communicative actions. This implication follows Peters’ argument that
communication is never an exclusively human transaction, but rather a border-crossing
action: “Communication is perhaps the ultimate border crossing concept, traversing the
bounds of species, machines, even divinity” (Peters 228). This challenges notions of
communication as requiring communicative procedures with a presupposed interacting
subject that is often presumed to be human (Peters 227).
Variations within communication theory and communicative actions can be seen in the
use of concepts such as dialogue, discussion, and conversation. Discussion is a
communicative concept with a pedagogical intent that presupposes the truth and accuracy
of specific ideas in the meaning of a problem or a situation negotiated through different
perspectives or subject positions (Hayles 73-74). Discussion defined in this way is thus
never about learning, but about interpreting a certain negotiated meaning. Discussion
implies the “arrangement” of action-spaces through various arguments that are taken to
reflect what is true (Hayles 73-75). Moreover, discussion might presuppose the idea of
dialogue, but dialogue is always, as Peters writes, “the dream of identical minds in
concert” (241). Communicative dialogue demands a shared problem and often has the
purpose of reaching a decision and so degrading one idea in relation to another (Dryzek).
The dialogical design thus also disqualifies the concept of equality between the subject
positions that contribute to the dialogue (Jenlink and Banathy). Dialogue, Catherine
Ryther argues, involves a pedagogical orientation toward learning that presupposes a
desire for unity (2-3). This type of desire suggests that truth will always be the truth of
those who possess power. Conversations, on the other hand, Ryther argues,
emerge in an orientation towards interruption, an interruption which …
disrupts the stable order of the symbolic and opens up the possibility for
symbolic freedom.… Learning … is not about learning a kind of content
but about attending to the disruption that irreducible strangeness
introduces. (3)
This means that conversation, as a concept, implies actions that enable learning, and thus
becomes a way to provide possibilities for learning within communicative actions.
Taking conversations as a mode of communication means that the concept of
conversation becomes a first step in challenging communication theories grounded in
anthropocentrism. Conversation, viewed in this way, involves the movements or
interplay of actions of talking and listening, and this allows a becoming of materiality in
conversation (Deleuze and Parnet 3). Deleuze and Guattari problematize communication
as a concept by analyzing both its content and its expressive sides. In relation to analysis,
Deleuze and Guattari hold that “forms of expression and forms of content communicate
through a conjunction of their quanta of relative deterritorialization, each intervening,
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operating in the other” (Deleuze and Guattari 97). Deleuze and Guattari here clarify their
notion of communication as an event that can be explained as relating to two axes; one
axis is the ‘machinic assemblage’ of bodies, which includes actions, passions, and
intermingling bodies in reaction; the other axis is the ‘collective assemblage of
enunciation’, that is, the acts of making statements and the incorporeal transformations
that are attributed to bodies (Deleuze and Guattari 97-98). These axes are territorialized
in a situation or an event, and stabilize the idea of becoming a machinic assemblage.
Simultaneously, the assemblage also deterritorializes, destabilizes, and differentiates the
becoming assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 98). Consequently, communication, in its
process, denotes, at the same time, both its content and its expression.
To support these ideas regarding what could be called ‘material movements’ as
communicative events, we would like to develop the idea of communication and the
function of language within environmental communication, since environmental
communication considers material actions and their abstractions as being intertwined
with each other as well as mutually dependent on one another. For example, abstractions
that are articulated rhetorically through various concepts inevitably become political, or
as Claire Colebrook puts it, “Before an actualized language or law there is an affective
response, a web of relations or an ecology from which something like the system of lived
politics emerges” (Colebrook, “Calculus” 135). Seen in this way, language and law are
concepts that develop from forces that affect bodies in transformation to repress the
original system of lived politics. Bodies are both embedded in and embodied as an
environment, and are thus forced into a politics and a culture that are governed by an
anthropocentric discourse.
3. Environment
The concept of environment relates etymologically to a “‘state of being environed’...; ‘the
aggregate of the conditions in which a person or thing lives’” (Harper, Environment).
The etymology implicates that ‘environment’ is a subject-centered concept, since it
always refers to a specific subject and its surroundings, its milieu. In striving for a just
and healthy Earth, some critical questions continuously have to be asked: “Whose
surroundings?” or “Why is one subject, necessarily, the principal one?”
Anthropocentrism marks humans as the dominant subjects and situates humanity at the
top of the bio-social hierarchy. ‘Environment’ as a subject-centered concept needs to be
problematized and challenged, since anthropocentric hierarchies force us to believe that
the environment consists solely of the surroundings of human beings, and so Earth
becomes a property possessed by humans alone.
We will address this problem by paying attention to why a turn from subject-centrism is
important to how we can come to understand environment as a concept. ‘Centrism’ is an
idea that can be connected to the archaic belief that the earth was the center of the
universe. This geo-centrism expresses the belief that all planets and stars, including the
sun, were orbiting the earth. Geo-centrism was, as is well known, challenged by several
scientists, for example Nicholas Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, and Johannes Kepler, whose
discoveries turned Earth into just one planet among other planets orbiting the sun,
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defining this relationship as heliocentric. Heliocentrism refers to the star ‘sun’ and the
planets that orbit around it. This idea does not include other stars or galaxies of the
universe. The earth, consequently, was decentered in this scientific turn, meaning that
the place of observation (the earth) is no longer the center for what is observed, but the
center for observations.7 A decentered understanding of the point of observation is one
of the main arguments for a change from subject-centerdness to a post-anthropocentric
perspective on and understanding of the world. This turn allows a radical change in our
understanding of the environment as a system of relational actions.
This is what Braidotti implies when she says, “A post-anthropocentric approach allows
for a non-binary way of positing the relationship between same and other, between life
and death” (“Locating” 99). This approach, furthermore, does not entail ignoring humans
or the human body, but provides a way to challenge anthropocentrism. Postanthropocentrism constitutes a path to challenging the human subject-centerdness in
anthropocentrism by turning the idea of being(s), seen as static and determined
‘product(s)’ or ‘thing(s)’, into the idea of becoming, that is, into the processuality of
becoming, a processuality of continually becoming as change. In Erin Manning’s
writing, this processuality is defined as a conjunction of forces and affects: “The
becoming-body takes form only retrospectively in the biogrammatic conjunction of the
series. What conjugates the series is the fact that a body will emerge” (Manning 125). In
order to begin to think through and conceptualize the concept of ‘environment’, it is
important to first recognize and acknowledge that a becoming environmental body is both
human and nonhuman. The emergence of bodies is a political becoming, which is
something that Colebrook analyzes in an attempt to define and clarify political forces:
The body is neither a brute and determining pre-political given, nor is it an
effect of political or ideological representation. Rather, as an idea the
body would be the political itself; the body is a relation to what is not
itself, a movement or activity from a point of difference to other points of
difference. And so difference is neither an imposed scheme on an
otherwise uniform substance, nor is difference the relation between
already differentiated self-identical entities. What something is, is given
through its activity of differentiation. (“From Radical Representations”
87)
To develop the notion of ‘the singular body’ as well as what we call ‘relational affects’,8
the concept ‘relationscapes’, developed in Erin Manning’s thinking, is useful.
‘Relationscapes’ refers to a non-subject-oriented approach to understanding environment,
a milieu, as a multidimensional spatiality, and its temporal situation as an event. By
following forces and affects through actions, that is, by recognizing them as biograms, it
is possible to recognize and acknowledge the relationality of becoming assemblages, and
the emerging human and nonhuman bodies in relation. Relationscapes as a concept
provides a possibility for understanding events as flows and movements that express
actions of becoming (Kennedy). To recognize forces that affect emerging bodies means
to acknowledge relationscapes as relational, that is, as expressing machinic assemblage.
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‘Environment’ as a concept thus turns into the concept of ‘relationscapes’ in the shift
from a product-centered representative perspective to the notion of processuality within
various expressions. The concept ‘relationscapes’ expresses becoming as a machinic
assemblage, giving rise to new perspectives on life (and death), and also explaining the
flows and movements of forces and affects within an emerging non-subject-centered
environment (Deleuze and Guattari; Deleuze, Pure Immanence; Braidotti, ”Locating”;
Kennedy).
4. Affects: A Pedagogical Turn from Anthropocentrism to Post-Anthropocentrism
Deleuze notes that each situation is an event, and that an event is an expression (Foucault
87), and based on Deleuze’s argument, we suggest that coming to understand an event
through its movement provides the expression of actions from which meanings emerge.
Active knowing involves a situation from which learning emerges, and through which
understanding is communicated. This, we suggest, constitutes a pedagogical turn in
environmental communication that relates to situations that can be understood postanthropocentrically.
In Donna Haraway’s writing, the human body becomes a matter for post-anthropocentric
or even non-anthropocentric relations in repetition that, precisely, challenges the
embodiment of the human biological body as anthropocentric:
[H]uman genomes can be found in only 10 percent of all the cells that
occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 90 percent of the cells
are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of
which play in a symphony necessary to my being alive at all, and some of
which are hitching a ride and doing the rest of me, of us, no harm. (When
Species Meet 3-4)
What Haraway expresses here is how the human body is articulated as an assemblage
within what we call relational communication, or communication which shapes
biological practice as the assemblage of the human body. This assemblage consists of a
set of relationscapes that emerges through relational communication between genes and
genomes in a flow of movements. The relationscapes, with inherent forces, affect the
biological creature that is defined by the concept “human”; the human being is thus
nothing other than materialization in action. Moreover, we argue that biological actions
are always social actions that are relational and in relation. This relationality in process
gives rise to the fusion of matter and meaning: “Matter and meaning are not separate
elements. They are inextricably fused together, and no event, no matter how energetic,
can tear them asunder” (Barad, Meeting 3). Matter and meaning are the expression and
the content that meet in the becoming actions of and for emerging bodies. This can be
conceptualized as relationscapes, with flows of forces that affect the various processes for
understanding materialities as situations where meaning emerges. What the meaning of a
human body can be, taking into account the forces and affects of the conceptual and
material matters in communication, is what Deleuze asks about in the form of the
following question:
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[T]he question is not that of the human compound, whether conceptual or
real, perceptible or articulable. The question concerns the forces that
make up man: with what other forces do they combine, and what is the
compound that emerges? (Foucault 73)
To begin to address this question, we assume that the body is a political body, and we
furthermore argue that the political is made up of forces within pedagogical actions that
affect the emerging relationscapes. One example of these political forces is the
androcentric idea that the male human separates from the female human in a hierarchical
machinery. From a critical feminist perspective, we get the possibility of recognizing and
acknowledging various relationscapes. To understand the potentials of a feminist
critique, and to counter the problem inherent in any hierarchy, Colebrook suggests that
‘man’ and ‘woman’ should be seen as part of ´human´ differentiations in which the
significant action is to become woman and not man:
If the idea of “man” is that being who can give birth to himself, create
himself anew and be in command of his own futurity, then the idea of
“woman” is perhaps that of a being who recognizes that the self is not
owner of itself, created through a past that can never be rendered fully
self-present. (”Stratigraphic” 12)
By developing this argument, it is possible to propose a non-androcentric approach to the
idea of relationscapes. A non-androcentric approach has the potential to express the
political forces of feminist actions, since these feminist forces will enact the processuality
of becoming, which should not be confused with the existence of a determined being.
Colebrook develops a striated9 notion of time-space situations regarding man and woman,
and also provides a new explanation for the idea of situated knowledge, a concept that
Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway (”Situated”) had previously explored. However, we
follow Braidotti’s argument concerning this concept, which makes the striated notion of
space/time situations useful within environmental theory, in that a nomadic subject
becomes political through forces that affect the formation of meaning:
The feminist practice of the politics of locations, later to become situated
knowledge, provides the missing link between the theory and the practice
of a non-unitary, relational and outward-bound definition of the subject.
(Transpositions 250)
These actions, we argue, which take place in time/space situations, are the becoming of
the political, and are, furthermore, inherently communicative. Thus, becoming, as
communication, is a way of thinking that is always in process, through which knowledge
becomes the abstraction of communication. Communication, seen as a concept in
process, is always performative, and the abstraction of communication is the passage
from expression into content. As Massumi notes:
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The performative is a direct avenue for the passage of expression into
content. Deleuze and Guattari argue that every use of language carries a
certain performative force, if only because it presupposes a conventional
context of intelligibility, and that conventional girding brings pressure to
bear toward a certain manner of response. (19)
In other words, Massumi’s notion of the ‘lines of flight’10 of performance (derived from
Deleuze and Guattari) coincides with the idea of knowledge as the abstraction within
communication. To pursue this idea opens up possibilities for writing performative maps
within a liminal temporal and spatial realm of relationality, by writing lines of flight
related to various actions. This action generates a situation where learning actions
arrange understanding into meaning. Meanings differ within the actual articulation of
understanding, and are significant for the differentiated nomadic subjects within the
communicative acts. Knowledge is thus the abstraction within communication, and in
consequence understanding, or what is known, becomes the content of both matter and
meaning in communicative actions. This also relates to memory and to the remembering
of various situations as relationscapes. The relationscapes have the possibility of
articulating memories to relational members within the relationscapes. These memories
are relational and remembered through various performative archives that take on
materiality, which provides the possibility of understanding various situations and events.
5. Environmental Communication within Posthuman Theory
Barad’s thinking in “Posthuman Performativity” and Meeting the Universe Halfway gives
us some keys for enabling a “posthuman” environmental communication theory. She
questions the place of language in communication theory and highlights the significance
of interaction. She challenges the strong emphasis on language in communication theory
by focusing on the materiality of language (Meeting 132; 211). However, Barad centers
on the communicative act, which differs from the notion of becoming that we want to
develop in this essay. The focus on making or acting in Barad’s thinking turns
communication into an apparatus for engagement through intra-actions. In order to
understand communicative actions, Barad problematizes interaction as a key concept
within communication theory, because interaction as a concept articulates a priori
statements of communicators (Barad, Meeting; see also Parisi). To challenge the concept
‘interaction’ through the concept ‘intra-action’ enables us to understand becoming as
processuality within communication theory. As Barad notes, “‘intra-action’ signifies the
mutual constitution of relata11 within phenomena (in contrast to ‘interaction’, which
assumes the prior existence of distinct entities)” (Meeting 429; emphasis in original).
Interaction emphasizes the process as product, and by exchanging this concept with intraaction, processuality is emphasized. Interaction as a concept is problematic because it
presupposes entities a priori, that is, beings that might be confused with being, i.e., beings
that are static and determined. Intra-action, Barad argues, is also useful since it contests
the traditional fixation on words and things as representational instead of as expressing
the relationality between materialities (Meeting 139).12 The discrepancy between Barad’s
notion of intra-action and the way this concept is used in this text is significant, since
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communication, seen as part of the process of becoming, and not only as an activity,
relates to both content and actions. The concept of intra-action thus ties in to the idea of
‘becoming material’ (Barad, Meeting). This, in turn, challenges the hierarchy within
communication theory that poses words as representations (Barad, Meeting 139). There
are two diverging ideas in this reasoning (using Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts): 1) that
of becoming communication as the collective assemblage of enunciation, and 2) that of
becoming through and within communicative actions as the machinic assemblage of
bodies. Keeping these two ideas in mind, we suggest that words are abstractions within
communication, that is, that words are always more than simply representations of
something. Words are shapes, configurations within the communication process that
stress the assemblage of enunciation.
A posthuman/post-anthropocentric environmental communication theory becomes
possible when thinking in terms of forces and affects is actualized. Posthuman
environmental communication theory can be used as a method of analyzing ethical
consequences in various projects and actions, and aims to reinvent the insistent urge in
society to measure individuals against corporations and human survival against the
usurpation of the planet, as, for example, in UNESCO’s “Man and Biosphere programme
for sustainability.” This theory highlights the idea that human beings are incapable of
reading forces or matters that are not those of bodies: “For man, as individual, is
precisely defined as a figure of self-ownership, appropriation and survival, with the
environment always being that which environs or surrounds a proper body” (Colebrook,
”Calculus” 152). Posthuman environmental communication theory thus becomes a
function of and a tool for understanding relational actions between social machines and
desiring machines; as Colebrook notes, social machines are “the productive relation
between bodies.... Desiring machines are relations that are not yet organized according to
named bodies” (”Legal” 18). Environmental communication in this way becomes
political, and by being political, environmental communication enacts a posthuman
ethical desire.
This ethical desire changes the anthropocentric philosophical discussion by modifying the
questions “what am I?” and “why am I?” and instead opening up the capacity for infinite
thought that is found in the question “what is love?” (MacCormack 148). The following
words from MacCormack express the function of posthuman ethical thoughts quite well:
Posthuman Ethics asks not what the posthuman is, but how posthuman
theory creates new, imaginative ways of understanding relations between
lives. Ethics is a practice of activist, adaptive and creative interaction
which avoids claims to overarching moral structures.... Posthuman Ethics
examines certain kinds of bodies to think new relations that offer liberty
and a contemplation of the practices of power which have been exerted
upon bodies. (1)
This ethical shift articulates an ethical desire within environmental communication for a
posthuman turn that allows meaning within communicative actions to be understood as
forces and affects within sensible relations, in and for life.
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An environmental communication that works from within posthuman theory has the
potential to problematize the often-taken-for-granted concepts ‘environment’ and
‘communication’. Such a challenge enables a turn from anthropocentrism to postanthropocentrism, and opens up ethical desires that focus on posthuman needs. By
affirming the relational communication that becomes in repetition and deterritorialization,
in life and with life, these actions come to be understood as relationscapes for “new” or
becoming territorializations.13
Environmental communication, from a posthuman perspective, is a function that
challenges the present, when seen as a determined self-presence, by offering an open
invitation for change when it comes to content and expression. It suggests a present that
is a becoming future in process. Environmental communication thus works through the
articulation of affirmative becoming, in which various nomadic posthuman subjects come
to understand relationscapes by acknowledging posthuman relations.
What posthuman theory adds to environmental communication as a field of research and
as a practice is the development of a post-anthropocentric perspective that considers
environmental issues as relational; that is, it offers a process of desires within studied
posthuman relationscapes from which to elaborate concepts such as sustainability. From
the perspective of posthuman environmental communications, the concept ‘sustainability’
reflects the desires that can allow the earth to become a healthy and equalized spatiality
for life and about life through various temporal relationscapes.
6. A Post-Anthropocentric Turn and the Desire for Sustainability
Here is an example of how a post-anthropocentric position might inform environmental
communication. In the United Nations document Our Common Future, we see an
environmental communication that aims “to achieve a just and healthy Earth” through
activities that promote ‘sustainable development’. However, sustainable development as
a concept consists of a word combination that might be read as contradictory, namely
through the tension that emerges on the one hand from the constraints of the word
‘sustain’, which infers a conserving, protecting, and preserving of socio-physical
relationships to guard them against change, and on the other hand from an understanding
of the word ‘development’ as implying some sort of process incorporating progress that
can cause positive change. In the UN document, sustainable development is described as
follows:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts:
•

the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the
world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and
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•

the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and
social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present
and future needs. (Our Common Future)

Here, sustainable development and sustainability are expressed in terms of a balancing of
the world’s resources, grounded in the management of nature’s capacity to provide for
the poor people of the world. This process comes to a start when a political body enters
into relation with other bodies, such as, for example, in the so-called market (Colebrook,
“Calculus” 151). Within communicative activities in which relational environmental
actions matter, the concept ‘sustainability’ becomes an assemblage that participates in an
economic machinery. In this sense, the concept ‘development’, as used in the United
Nations document, treats nature in terms of an exclusively human environment that
provides necessary resources for human beings. Nature’s being seen as a resource for
human beings to exploit indicates that it is being perceived through an anthropocentric
worldview, in which ecological processes become economic issues for human society.
The human market system is an assemblage of human actors who define the activities
that emerge through agents that are both nonhuman and human. Since economy is a
matter of value, the economy becomes a method for evaluating ecological processes, and
actions concerned with evaluating ecological processes involve environmental ethics, and
are thus articulated as a moral effort. Issues involving environmental ethics are part of an
ongoing discussion in which debates over where interest should be focused, along with
notions of responsibility, are salient.14 Environmental ethics is of interest here, since the
question of what needs there are and who the needy are involves ethical considerations
within environmental communicative processes. MacCormack suggests the posthuman
perspective in the following way: “a-human posthuman ethics offer[s] the possibility of
threshold subjectivity” (119).15 The matter of being in need and the matter of needs
themselves are not necessarily only concerns for humans, a fact that is pointed out by
scholars such as Kalof and Fitzgerald; Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson; Wolfe; Kahn;
and Monani. Within anthropocentric environmental communication, the formation of
knowledge often only considers human needs and humans as being in need. This
anthropocentric idea has been articulated as ecosystem services, or nature services, where
nonhumans’ actions are recognized as a valuable part of the economic market:
“Ecosystem services are the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems,
and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life” (Daily 3). ‘Nature
services’, or ‘Ecosystem services’, frame nature and biodiversity within the human
economic society that designates ecological processes as resources (Daily; Chapin,
Kofinas, and Folke). In line with this, what is highly questionable is the apparatus by
which ecological processes are represented as ecosystem services that articulate the
actions of different agents as parts of a nonhuman assemblage, and thus as actors that are
evaluated within the human labor market, which is equivalent to the human workforce.
The apparatus is reduced to a function of machineries, which should not be confused with
the machinery, that is, the becoming movement, the flow, and the actual actions in action
(Deleuze and Guattari 559-560). Nonhuman actions, viewed as labor, will, in
consequence, never give nonhuman agents anything but an instrumental position
(Freeman), since labor is relational and has no value in itself (Peterson, Hall,
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FeldPauscher-Parker, and Peterson 116, following Marx 588). To formulate ecosystem
services is to formulate an articulation of ecological processes that recognizes and
acknowledges the agents’ actions as resources. Sometimes human actions are recognized
as resources within society, and as such they are seen as resources without agency, and as
a consequence some humans run the risk of being objectified (Taylor; Freeman). When
people are turned into resources, it leads to a human-to-human interaction that, in turn,
forms hierarchical divisions within and between human societies (Escobar, ”Culture”;
Escobar, “Ecology”; Jasanoff; Jahanbegloo and Shiva)
In ”Culture Sits in Places” and “An Ecology of Difference,” Arturo Escobar pays close
attention to the forces inherent in human societies that affect their plurality, and also to
the importance of critically acknowledging and recognizing this plurality. Feminist
scholars such as Sheila Jasanoff, Vandana Shiva, Rosi Braidotti, and Donna Haraway
raise critical arguments against the way evaluation of social machineries is affirmed and
recognized in relation to the idea of a hierarchical and androcentric ecological order.
Many scholars16 have acknowledged how nonhumans as well as dehumanized humans
are relegated into a position of slavery, and recognized as slaves by the monetary
markets. This recognition, moreover, provides an example of how relationality as an
assemblage of forces and affects becomes a political, ecological, and economic matter
that questions the androcentric forces within these social machines. But if environmental
communication subscribes to “generating and debating multiple legitimate answers to the
question of how to achieve a just and healthy Earth” (Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson
83), then “sustainability emerges … as a central concept in social theory and it raises
suitable complex questions of methodology” (Braidotti, Transpositions 206).
In line with these thoughts, sustainability becomes an anthropogenic matter for post- or
non-anthropocentric articulations exploring human and nonhuman needs. Recognizing
the needs of and behind the agents’ actions is only a first step; these needs should also be
acknowledged and affirmed as relational communicative actions for both human and
nonhuman assemblages. When this is achieved, human and nonhuman agents involved in
relational actions as partners become nomadic posthuman subjects that produce a real
post-anthropocentric possibility.
Analogous with the terms ‘ecosystem services’ and ‘nature services’, we suggest the term
‘biosphere services’, which is the articulation of biosphere processes and relational
actions that are formed and formulated within a post-human market. Furthermore, labor,
seen as consisting of intra-actions, is a function necessary for creating possible machinic
assemblages for post-human livelihood, which makes it possible to understand such
assemblages as relationscapes. The concept ‘biosphere services’ thus explores post- or
non-anthropocentric relational actions, in which biosphere services, as a concept,
articulates activities in which human and nonhuman intra-actions and biosphere processes
become processes for intra-change, by raising the value of life and the conditions for life.
Biosphere processes, articulated through biosphere services, recognize the living and
non-living material in these processes, which can then become acknowledged as having
relational communicative value within forces affecting relationscapes.
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Evaluation, as related to value, takes place when needs are articulated and conceptualized
through recognition and acknowledgement of various human and non-human
assemblages. A deterritorialized social assemblage involves participating allies in
relationscapes.
The intra-actions determine the exchange value for a postanthropocentric market. Still, as long as the market refers to a human monetary
economy, the possible gains for nonhumans can only be realized as an anthropogenic
knowledge-formulating activity, because money has no value in a post-anthropocentric
market.
Environmental communication concerning sustainable development as a concept and a
practice is a process where sustainability materializes and articulates. Processes for
sustainability involve actions in a liminal time-spatial situation where environmental
communication expresses desires for “a just and healthy Earth” that are significant for a
specific time-space situation or event.
7. Desires for a Just and Healthy Earth
A posthuman/post-anthropocentric ethics expresses a relational desire within a social
machinery simultaneously with other desires, such as desires relating to survival, greed,
and pleasure, and so connects specific bodies with a collective body to coordinate a
shared spatiality through actions. We argue that various ethical desires are transformed
within abstract machines to work through ideas relating to desirable repetitive actions that
aim toward sustainability. Various repetitive actions express communicative forces that
qualify certain possibilities or opportunities that in turn affect the communicative
practice. From this perspective, repetitive actions become the organizing forces,
generating organizations that transform desires into forces capable of communicating
different ethical expressions.
If we argue that Environmental Philosophy formulates various ideas that matter within
environmental ethics, this would be incompatible with the post-anthropocentric ideas by
which the environment becomes a matter for post-human actions. Ethics, as Massumi
writes, is about processuality, since ethics “is not about applying a critical judgment to
expression’s product. It is about evaluating where its processual self-conversions lead”
(xxvi). Ethics, as such a processual evaluation, produces, we suggest, a critical mapping
from the reading of performative archives, which means that ethics becomes the tie that
binds in relations both for and in a life that matters.
Situations that can be characterized as practices for and about sustainable development
become through and within intra- and inter-actions, and this is what we would like to call
the liminal actions in environmental communication. Inter-actions as well as intraactions shape organizations17 through the repetitive actions of communicative practices,
and the processuality of these communicative practices is the vehicle from which
understanding and meaning materialize and are verbalized. In communicative acts,
humans and nonhumans are continuously evaluated through various communicative
practices that are intended for all forms of actions. This evaluation becomes an ethical
issue that is important for pedagogical processes.
That is, posthuman/post-
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anthropocentric ethics is important because it verbalizes relational actions in relation to
political matters that formalize desire, having an impact on all forms of pedagogical
processes, such as education, teaching, or learning actions.
8. Concluding Remarks
In posthuman/post-anthropocentric terms, this text describes and develops the idea of a
research perspective concerned with processuality, in which every situation is an event
that matters. Posthuman environmental communication theory provides an answer to
Rogers’ desire to radically change the conceptions of humans, nature, material
conditions, and discourse by enabling a “reconstruction of a different relationship to the
environment in which we18 live” (268).
This perspective brings with it the recognition that a situation, an event, is an expression
in which posthuman environmental communication theory provides an opportunity to
understand the relational processes of life and in life. Moreover, the approach we have
developed proposes a potential posthuman-postanthropocentric turn within environmental
communication, which necessarily entails a consideration of a posthumanpostanthropocentric ethics.

118

JPSE: Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education III (2018)

Notes
1

Constructivist ideas are used to formulate various models for managing both humans
and nature, such as, e.g., social-ecological systems analysis and resilience theory (Chapin,
Kofinas, and Folke; Schultz, Folke, and Olsson; Cox), or environmental communication
analysis and environmental communication, as described by Jurin, Roush, and Danter.
Post-structuralist, post-colonialist, and feminist theorists such as, e.g., Mellor; Peterson,
Peterson, and Peterson; Chen, Milstein, Anguino, Sandoval, and Knudsen; Milstein
(“Nature Identification”); and Rogers have challenged these ideas.

2

As Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson write, for citizenship “to move beyond the division
between speaking social subjects (humans), and silent objects (nonhumans), we must
foreground the claim that humans and extrahumans interact by modifying each other’s
experiences and consequences.... [S]ince extrahumans are real, in that they experience
and are social, their citizenship and subjecthood hinges on their ability to participate in
political discourse.… Extrahumans, however, cannot gain citizenship in political
communities without spokespersons in the political process of decision-making” (78).

3

“Assemblage” denotes that things do not have a single, stable identity or essence; rather,
“they affirm a view in which disparate ‘sub-elements’ of the world are
combined/combinable in many different ways to constitute what we think of as things
and processes: bodily organs and persons, valleys and nations. What exists is the more or
less random and temporary collection or assemblage of affects and events, now combined
one way, then another” (Mugerauer 188).

4

Differentiation opens “thinking to powers of difference beyond the concept” (Colebrook,
Deleuze 10). “In a bifurcating world, a multiplicity is defined not by its center but by the
limits and borders where it enters into relations with other multiplicities and changes
nature, transforms itself” (Smith 203).

5

Repetition refers to the idea of ‘becoming body’, not as representational, but actually
and materially; “each repetition and re-articulation is open to new determinations and
senses” (Colebrook, Deleuze 80). “[T]rue repetition addresses something singular,
unchangeable, and different, without ‘identity’. Instead of exchanging the similar and
identifying the Same, it authenticates the different” (Deleuze, Logic 287).

6

Börebäck writes about the procedures of environmental communication in two
biosphere reserves that express organizations through the notions of agonistic pluralism
in one place and deliberative consensus in another.

7

Considering the whole universe, this is an idea that is relational rather than subjectcentered. The notion of the universe is today post-heliocentric with various competing
ideas regarding explanations, often connected to the Big Bang theory and Einstein’s
relativity theory.
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8

As Colman states, “Affect is the intensive power that propels extensive actions” (84).
“The affection-image registers a process of interval that occurs in between perception and
action; the juncture where something happens. This place, this domain, this juncture,
this encounter, are all sites where the affection-image creates a change — this may be
chemical, sensorial, structural, durational, intellectual, cognitive, perceptual — a
relational affect” (Colman 84-85).

9

‘Striated space’, write Deleuze and Guattari, “is defined by the requirements of longdistance vision: constancy of orientation, invariance of distance through an interchange of
inertial points of reference, interlinkage by immersion in an ambient milieu, constitution
of central perspective” (545).

10

Deleuze and Guattari define ‘line of flight’ [ligne de fuite] in the following way:
“Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or
deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other
multiplicities. The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities. The line
of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity
effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is
transformed by the line of flight; the possibility and necessity of flattening all of the
multiplicities on a single plane of consistency or exteriority, regardless of their number of
dimensions” (9-10).

11

As Parisi states, Barad “draws from Bohr’s distinction between the interaction of
independent entities (or relata) and intra-action of relata-within-phenomena. For Bohr,
relata are not prior to intra-active components. Rather, specific intra-actions make relata
dependent on phenomena” (Parisi 78).

12

As Barad says, the “causal relationship between the apparatuses of bodily production
and the phenomena produced is one of agential intra-action” (Meeting 139).

13

On ‘territorialization’ Deleuze and Guattari note the following: “[A] territorialized,
assembled function acquires enough independence to constitute a new assemblage, one
that is more or less deterritorialized, en route to deterritorialization” (Deleuze and
Guattari 357). And they also states, “[T]he territorial assemblage territorializes functions
and forces (sexuality, aggressiveness, gregariousness, etc.), and in the process of
territorializing them, transforms them. But these territorialized functions and forces can
suddenly take on an autonomy that makes them swing over into other assemblages,
compose other deterriorialized assemblages” (Deleuze and Guattari 358-359).

14

There are numerous scholars who write on environmental ethical thinking, such as
Aldo Leopold, whose Sand County Almanac explores ideas regarding management as a
relational action of thinking with nature. Similarly, Arne Næss argues for an ecosophy
recognizing the inherent value of all living beings (Næss and Sessions). This particular
form of ecosophy, called deep ecology, aims to shape environmental policies from
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ecosophical tenets (Næss and Sessions). Mark Rowland developed a critical alternative
to the idea of inherent value, and criticized, for example, evolution with his notion of
affordances. Rosi Braidotti (Posthuman), Jane Bennett, and Patricia MacCormack have
all developed the idea of a posthuman ethics and its consequences.
15

“Threshold(s) are the becoming that refuse the fathomless empty space between
meaning and communication, living as legal status, subject communicating
transcendentally to like subject, the space often filled by the bodies of women, animals,
the queer, diffabled, the monstrous, for symbolic and actual exchange between subjects
and their relationship with knowledge and consumption” (MacCormack 121).

16

Among these scholars can be mentioned, for example, Haraway, Benhabib,
Jahanbegloo and Shiva, and Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson.

17

This follows how Spoelstra (84) and Massumi express organization, of which
Börebäck gives an example, showing how inter- and intra-actions are significant for
organizing environmental communication and the meaning-making process.

18

By “we” Rogers refers to humans, but the authors of this essay suggest that “we”
involves both human and nonhumans.
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Epistemologies and the Formation of Modern Democratic
Individuality
Nathalie Bulle

1. Introduction: The Philosophical Premises of Models of Democracy
The analyses that follow are based on the idea that the development of institutions in any
given society is channeled through philosophical theories. These theories determine the
way we think about humankind, knowledge and values, relationships between the
individual and the collective, etc. Highlighting these philosophical premises allows us to
understand not only democratic models that have historically developed, but also the
models of humanity that are associated with them.
In this approach, two main theses are supported. The first thesis is that modern
individuality has emerged based on the recognition that the faculty of independent
thinking — or autonomy of judgment — founds humankind. From this recognition
follows the moral necessity that political power be rooted in those who are governed.
The second thesis is freely based on the work of the American epistemologist Filmer
Northrop (Meeting). Using analyses made by Northrop as support, we observe that an
epistemic duality of sources of human knowledge lies at the heart of some of the major
trends of modern epistemology. We contend that this epistemic duality opens a path that
is distinct from both the ontological dualism of classical rationalism and the radical
empiricisms derived from classical empiricism, though it includes their main teachings.
This path invites us to rethink the sources of free thinking in the knowing subject; the
epistemic duality that characterizes the major currents of modern epistemology gives real
meaning to models of participatory democracy to which schools contribute through their
cognitive role.
2. The Human Faculty for Independent Thinking and Modern Individuality
2. 1. A Critique of Pure Theoretical Reason and a Quest for Accessing Certainty
Our analysis begins with the following questions: How has modern democratic
individuality emerged historically? What is the point of rupture from the earlier period,
and what is most essentially significant about this rupture as far as teaching is concerned?
To approach the initial issues underlying the new comprehension of humankind that
opened the way for modernity, we will refer to the texts of those great thinkers who were
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the first to participate in its emergence —Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Thomas
Hobbes and Jan Amos Comenius among others — and to the works of those who
described this emergence while benefiting from its great historical proximity, as did
Nicolas Condorcet in his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human
Mind [Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain].
The first thing we note is that the same idea occupied the thoughts of these philosophers
and scientists at the dawn of modernity: they all hoped to define the yardstick by which
human knowledge should be measured, and the way it should be built. They combated in
this regard the error and superstition that had arisen from vague concepts, faulty
premises, and archaic methods that automatically produced errors because they remained
confined to a universe of postulations and logical deductions. Scholastic logic had
developed a line of thought based on premises, notions, and concepts borrowed from
authoritative books, not comparing the proposed theses with any criteria of certainty
except for the credit granted to the authors studied. Thus, the major works that marked
the emergence of this new era of human thought attacked beliefs and notions that had
been accepted without examination. Scholasticism was targeted by the thinkers of this
period because it had been unable to found human knowledge. It justified, through the
Aristotelian system, a stable, hierarchical, and teleological social order. Moreover, it was
able to accommodate religious beliefs and represented the official doctrine of the Church.
In short, it led to a confinement of human thought within limited dominant forms of
intellectual, political and religious authority, offering no external criteria of truth.
Condorcet designates Bacon, Galileo and Descartes as the three men who most marked
the period from which modernity emerged — Bacon because he recommended the
renunciation of all beliefs and concepts and a retention of only those ideas with a proven
degree of certainty, without being able to offer a clear or acceptable method; Galileo for
his discoveries and method, although these were limited to the mathematical and physical
sciences; and Descartes for imprinting on minds their own movement to seek the truth.
Bacon explains that in syllogism, everything is based on the value of manipulated
notions, and that these notions have no other foundation than the authority of the authors
who use them. As a precursor of classical empiricism, his stance is in direct opposition to
this position. Rather than taking books as the point of origin, Bacon argued, data drawn
from experience should be used. Our only hope for establishing well-founded reasoning,
he claimed, lies in “true and proper induction” (109).
The great educator of the 17th century, Comenius, also points out the scholastic tendency
to rely on abstract, unproven concepts. In search of a new teaching method, he found in
Bacon’s works a primary but incomplete source of inspiration, because, in his opinion, it
lacked solid demonstrations. His conclusion was less radical than Bacon’s, and more
inclusive. According to Comenius, a profound amendment of Aristotelian philosophy
had to be carried out, with every investigation using the three major sources of
knowledge: the senses, reason, and the Holy Scriptures.
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The fall of the Aristotelian system due to the discoveries of modern physics, with
Galileo’s and Newton's replacement of final causes with mechanic causality, made the
shortcomings of the older system stand out even more. In his Dialogue Concerning the
Two Chief World Systems, Galileo mocks the geocentric Aristotelian interpretation
maintained by the Simplicio character. Under the impact of such attacks, the system of
final causes that had formed the basis of the stable, hierarchical representation of society
in medieval theories of government started collapsing. Filmer Northrop highlights the
substantial links between Aristotle’s conception of nature as a hierarchical system
governed by final causes and the medieval world’s philosophical representation of the
universe and humankind. In the Aristotelian model, any individual thing or substance
could be understood teleologically according to its final state or goal, and it participated
via its form in a natural, hierarchical system in which species were included within the
larger classes, the genera, so that “the formal and final causes of all individual things fit
together organically into a hierarchic unity and pattern” (Northrop, Meeting 276).
Human souls, for example, were the form of their material body with no metaphysical
gulf. This representation was well reflected in the medieval organization of society and
of power in the feudal system, within which the source of sovereignty lay not in the
private opinion of the individual, but in the objective, organic, hierarchical principle
joining individuals to each other in the community (see Northrop, Meeting 173).
With Galileo and Newton, however, nature became likened to a homogeneous space, and
consequently, it could be calculated mathematically. The issue was to discover the laws
governing the movement of bodies in that space. From then on, or in connection with
these epistemological developments, conceptions of human existence could only be
profoundly redefined, as there were now two sources of knowledge that could be
distinguished — subjective sensed data on one hand, and public, physical objects in a
mathematically defined space on the other hand.
In his Sketch, Condorcet argues that Descartes is the philosopher who first was able to
convince all human beings that they possess within themselves the power of knowledge:
Descartes had “stimulated men’s minds, and this all the wisdom of his rivals had never
done. He commanded men to shake off the yoke of authority, to recognize none save that
which was avowed by reason, and he was obeyed, because he won men by his boldness
and led them by his enthusiasm. The human mind was not yet free but it knew that it was
formed to be so” (Sketch 122). According to Condorcet, with regard to this era that was
opening to democratic modernity, each man had learned that nature had not destined him
to believe in the word of others, and so each man had discovered his right to employ his
own reason to grasp the truth.
2. 2. Human Faculties of Judgment and Democratic Modernity
Modern democratic individuality thus emerged from the recognition of the independent
thinking faculties of the human mind, and, in parallel, from the rejection of all intellectual
or moral authority, and of any belief imposed on the individual in a dogmatic way. There
was no questioning of the idea of truth per se, which explains why neither relativism nor
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subjectivism follows from this recognition. But truth could not be based on any authority
or dogma, i.e., on anything that must be accepted without examination.
The recognition of this individual power to know and to judge involves the possibility of
inferring human rights “from the single truth ... that man is a sentient being, capable of
reasoning and of acquiring moral ideas” (Condorcet, Sketch 128). Such recognition
opens up the moral impossibility of dividing humanity between those who govern and
those who obey. Therefore, human faculties for independent thinking, or autonomy of
judgment, appear historically as the raisons d’être of modern democracy. But this
recognition is not just a proposed principle. Independent thinking must be real, or at least
achieved; without this, democracy would not be a viable form of government, or it would
be nothing more than autocracy in disguise.
In brief, the emergence of modernity appears to be characterized by a rejection of any
dogma or belief imposed on individuals on the basis of faith. Negatively, this rejection
expresses the profound feeling of a lack of method. Positively, it represents a striving
toward truth, a call for certainty. This striving had to be assumed by each individual;
otherwise any power over minds would be left to new dogmas and superstitions.
Alexis de Tocqueville notes that the French have generalized and highlighted the
philosophical method that consists of submitting every idea to self-examination and that,
in a very general way, this method forms part of the essence of democracy. Nevertheless,
he puts this method into perspective based on the impossibility of proving to ourselves all
the truths we make use of every day, and our inability, if need be, to conduct any
thorough examination. Tocqueville also refers to the need for beliefs that are dogmatic,
received, and therefore indisputable, so that “the minds of all the citizens should be
rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas” (Democracy 493). These
reflections reveal the problem, inherent in the foundation of a modern democratic order,
of reconciliation between individuals’ independent thinking and collective agreement. Its
resolution depends on the knowledge theories involved and is part of a historical
development of philosophical theories that the second part of this analysis aims to bring
to light.
3. Knowledge Theories and Democracies
3. 1. Towards an Analysis of the Epistemological Premises of Models of Democracy
If human faculties for independent thinking are the basis of modern democratic
individuality, knowledge theories developed by the various philosophical systems take on
a substantial share of responsibility in the definitions of models of democracy. That is
why we propose to continue our analysis of the philosophical premises underlying
models of democracy by focusing on the evolution of epistemological ideas.
If every person has faculties of judgment — faculties that underpin the demands of
democracy — we still must ascertain what lies behind the sources of truth in every
person. Whatever the truth is, the means of accessing it should be cultivated in each
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individual in order to ensure democracy’s survival. Let us keep in mind three possible
paths offered by the history of modern ideas: the path of innate ideas, which refer, with
Descartes, to a link to transcendence; the path of sensorial experience, which refers to the
sensitivity of each individual; and a third path, according to which the theoretical
constructs invented during the course of human history become individual tools used in
any search for understanding of the world and of truth. What deserves further
consideration is the specific character of these theoretical constructs, all of which
represent artificial devices that cannot be reduced to empirical data.
On this subject, we will briefly introduce the theory of knowledge presented by the
American epistemologist Filmer Northrop (Logic) and its links with advances in modern
epistemology. We then will highlight a number of strong relationships that bring together
knowledge theories and models of democracy, freely drawing support from the analyses
developed by Northrop in his work The Meeting of East and West. Finally, we will
deduce from the paths opened by modern epistemology a few important consequences for
democratic individuality.
3. 2. Epistemic Duality and Advances in Modern Epistemology
We note from the outset that Northrop's views are consistent with the conceptions of
other major epistemologists such as Emile Meyerson, Henry Margenau, Gaston
Bachelard, Karl Popper. and more recently, Nancy Cartwright. What links these
philosophers is the epistemic duality elaborated in their knowledge theories, which
distinguish two irreducible dimensions of thought, one theoretical and the other
empirical.
The title of a major work by Emile Meyerson, Identity and Reality, refers to this duality.
According to Meyerson, human understanding nourishes a need that the things being
manipulated by the mind conserve a stable identity over time. This need must be
conciliated with the fact that elements of reality appear to be indefinitely changing. The
aim of the mind is not to represent the world directly, but to account for interactions
between elements in the world. Therefore, elements manipulated by the mind can remain
the same — they are not directly induced by the observation of reality — while their
arrangement changes. From this point, with the same formal, postulated elements, it is
possible to make quite different sets appear, just as with the same alphabetic letters, to
borrow with Meyerson an image from Aristotle, we can write both a tragedy and a
comedy. The elements that remain stable over time are theoretical concepts or constructs
— concepts “by postulation” in Northrop’s view, as we will see in the next section.
In accordance with Albert Einstein’s views, the duality of the ultimate sources of human
knowledge accounts for the fact that humankind gains knowledge of an external, public
world only by speculative means (see Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology 62, and
Einstein 60). This duality justifies the notion of epistemological rupture put forward by
Bachelard, and Popper’s proposal regarding the relative independence of a “third world”
that lies at the edge of both the physical-chemical world and the world of subjectivity.
This world of productions of the human mind is relatively autonomous and self-
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developing. It also ultimately explains “how the laws of physics lie,” according to
Cartwright. This duality lies at the very heart of the epistemology of Margenau — who
proposes a conceptualization close to that of Northrop — just as, we can note, it also lies
at the heart of the psychology of intellectual development provided by the father of the
historical-cultural school of developmental psychology, Lev Vygotsky. In Vygotsky’s
work, the structured, hierarchical organization of theoretical concept systems accounts for
the potentialities of logical reflexive thought, just as in the works of Northrop, Margenau
or Meyerson, as we will see, it accounts for the possibility of distinguishing causal
reasoning from a mere record of repetitive temporal sequences.
These epistemologies conflict with older essentialist epistemologies which support a
model based on a correspondence theory of truth. They also conflict with all the
experiential theories of knowledge that are still anchored in classical empiricism. The
meaning of theoretical concepts does not refer to anything pertaining to another reality or
to anything given by the senses. This was seen by John Dewey, who emphasized the
hypothetical status of these concepts as meeting the needs of a structure marked by
formal relationships for making deductions possible (cf., for instance, Dewey, Quest,
chap. VI). But Dewey did not provide a well-defined dual theory of concepts, more
concerned as he was with assembling every concept under a whole functional or
operational conception. In order to derive some consequences for modern democratic
individuality from a dual conception of the ultimate sources of human knowledge, we
turn to Northrop’s works.
3. 3. The Epistemology of Filmer Northrop
Northrop's epistemology is based on the existence of two sets of concepts that differ in
nature. The concepts belonging to the first set get their meaning by denotative reference
to something directly sensed or immediately experienced. These are concepts gained by
intuition or by inspection. Here intuition does not mean a speculative hunch, but the
immediate empirical act of apprehension that occurs in direct inspection or pure
observation (Northrop, Logic 36). The concepts belonging to the second set — concepts
by postulation (scientific concepts or theoretical concepts) — do not refer directly to the
world. They are imageless concepts: they derive their meaning from entities and
relations that exist by means of assumption rather than as a result of immediate
apprehension. In other words, they are an integral part of systems of concepts, and their
meaning depends on the other concepts to which they are linked. If the concept of blue,
referring to the color blue as it is perceived, belongs, for example, to the first set — the
set of concepts by intuition — the color blue as a wavelength belongs to the second set —
the set of concepts by postulation. Postulated concepts are not a priori, that is, extant
prior to experience and independent from it, like axioms that might lead to our vision of
the world; nor are they discovered a posteriori, based on inductive processes essentially
born of experience. These are human creations that cannot be reduced to experience and
which present, moreover, no value in terms of obligation or categorical necessity. These
concepts, which are defined by the relationships of concepts with other concepts, refer to
virtual objects of thought; they have no direct concrete reference and, ultimately, are
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independent of any relationship to an observer. They are part of a public space of
knowledge that can be objectivized and therefore communicated and accumulated.
Finally, and this is a major point in Northrop's epistemology, scientific theories can only
have explanatory and predictive scope if the virtual entities they are handling, based on
what are known as postulated concepts, are appropriately linked to the directly
observable data denoted by intuitive concepts, knowing that such links do not always
exist. The relationships between concepts formed by postulation and concepts formed by
intuition or by inspection are said to be “epistemic correlations” because they link entities
in different worlds of discourse. Therefore, according to these views, truth is neither
unique nor purely relative; it is a question of a good match between theoretical models
and empirical observations.
3. 4. Ontological Dualism and the Birth of the Modern Democratic Subject
Modern knowledge theories did not immediately identify these two epistemic
components of human knowledge.1 The first error in such theories was their attribution
of these components to the properties of different substances, one mental and the other
material. Theoretical concepts — and some specific intellectual faculty that their
manipulation supposes — were associated with the human mind's link to the divine,
while empirical concepts were associated with its relationship with phenomenal reality.
But this error is the bearer of a major intuition, that of the irreducibility of the two
ultimate sources of knowledge.2 It can therefore be considered that the dualism of
substances finds a contemporary form in the duality of epistemic components, theoretical
and sensible, that we find in the knowledge process. This dualism, Northrop shows, is of
fundamental importance to our modern democracies.
The individual, defined as a mental substance, is basically free and equal to others.
Therefore, it is not subject to the laws of the physical, material world. This conception
led to freedom and equality becoming axioms that identify democratic individuality. It
cannot be inferred from experience alone. Today, it is postulated as a founding principle
of our democracies and rests on concepts that are theoretical in nature. These concepts
are defined only by relationships between concepts, which allows a meaning that is
independent of the variability of particular real-life situations to be conferred on both the
idea of equal rights for all individuals in the eyes of the law, and the idea of universal
human rights. The meanings extant in the founding proposals of liberal democracies thus
refer to intellectual constructs applied to experience, but not directly deduced from it
(Northrop, Meeting, chap. XVII).
The role of the dualism of substances, which, in a sense, is played by the duality of
epistemic components of knowledge, is, according to Northrop, the foundation upon
which our modern democracies are built. This foundation constitutes the early basis not
only of continental rationalism, which is developed in the philosophy of Descartes, but
also of British empiricism, which is developed in the philosophy of Locke.
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Locke relies, like Descartes, on the idea of a dualism of substances, which not only
accounts for human faculties of thought on the fringes of the natural laws that regulate
relationships between objects of the physical world, but also introduces intrinsic equality
between spiritual substances. This metaphysical condition is reflected by the normative
postulates of our modern democracies. The two basic premises of Locke's theory of
government and the American Declaration of Independence derive from the dualism of
substances: first, that all men are created free and equal, and second, that governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.
3. 5. From the Individualism of Classical Epistemology to the Positivist Premises of
Modern Epistemology
We know, however, that Descartes and Locke developed knowledge theories that were
radically opposed.
Descartes (Méditations) proposed to make progress in the discovery of truth through
reasoning — deductive reasoning in the main — based on ideas called innate because
they come from our faculty of thought itself, and this faculty, he assumed, comes from
our link to God. This common link should therefore have ensured an agreement of minds
by opening up access to the truth on the basis of rational inferences. Forms of education
that can be traced back to the Cartesian doctrine of knowledge are necessarily centered on
intellectual development leading to freedom and truth, and on the agreement of minds, as
was the case, we could say, with intellectual education in Plato, whose curriculum is set
forth in The Republic (Book VII). Belief in reminiscence in Plato can be compared, as far
as human intellectual powers are concerned, to the assumed existence of “innate ideas.”3
More specifically, Descartes (Discours) recognizes three sources of knowledge:
sensation, imagination (which is comparable to reflection in Locke), and the soul’s
capacity to find within itself ideas that are independent of sensation and reflection.4
These ideas, that is to say innate ideas, account for the existence of a faculty of thought
that is capable of imagining and manipulating objects whose meaning cannot be
“abstracted” from the data of sensory experience: the theoretical faculty. With Descartes,
modern philosophy therefore distinguishes two irreducible sources of knowledge: the
theoretical and the sensible. According to Descartes, the ultimate foundation of
knowledge is not experience, because no certainty can be founded on that, but reason.
Moreover, Descartes is radically skeptical of constituted knowledge. He aims to replace
it with a science founded on reason and based on the model offered by mathematics.5
Hence, contrary to Locke, who centers his philosophy of knowledge on empirical
sources, ignoring the sui generis nature of theoretical conceptualizations, Descartes
centers his philosophy on the rational faculties. But he views culture as a distortion of
human nature, and rejects what we today know represents the very source of human
theoretical capacities of thought. In this respect, he was mistaken. His individualism
paved the way for Locke’s error, which anchors all objects of thought in the individual’s
experience, while Locke himself paved the way for sensualist reduction.
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Locke's theory of knowledge denies innatism and bases itself on processes that are
essentially individual and subjective, rooting human ideas in sensory experience. This
approach separates the mental faculties of the mind, which are associated with the soul,
from knowledge content, which is derived from the impact of material objects on the
mind and the development of ideas by reflection. For reasons linked to the dualism of
substances, certain theoretical teaching programs — mathematics in particular — take on
an intrinsic educational value that is associated with their impact in terms of mental
discipline (even if Locke does not use this notion).6
In fact, Locke’s hypothesis of an entrenchment of ideas in sensation condemned the
dualism of substances to failure, just as it is incompatible with the modern duality of
epistemic components of knowledge. This assumption led to radical empiricism, as the
epistemologies of George Berkeley and David Hume (Inquiry) have each shown in their
own way. The Lockean theory of ideas does not hold, and as such offers an incomplete
interpretation of the philosophical consequences of Galileo’s and Newton’s physics. As
Northrop (Meeting 113-114) notes, this inadequacy gave rise to the unsuccessful attempts
of philosophical reconstruction by Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx and
Dewey.
Berkeley notes that the being of things is to be perceived or known, and so the idea of
material substance is useless: there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of ideas
perceived by sense. There is no material substance but simply combinations of sensible
qualities existing only for perceiving substances. Matter is a mere appearance for the
mind. This point of view can also be turned around, as it is by Hume. For Hume,
nothing exists apart from sense data and their associations, and so the mind is an
association of sensory information.7 Hence the substitution of association psychology for
the psychology of faculties, and the development of positivism in philosophy, which is
based on the idea that nothing exists beyond the immediately apprehended (Northrop,
Meeting 116).
The importance of the positivist premises of classical empiricism for modern theories of
knowledge can be highlighted by a number of reflections by Ernst Cassirer concerning
the Age of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, he tells us, was structured around two
intellectual trends: the classical Cartesian form of analysis and a new philosophical
synthesis, according to which the criterion of science is entirely contained within the
method itself. The period thus made possible the transition from substantialist thinking to
relational thinking, which establishes truth’s place as being not in the hidden essence of
things, but in relationships with those things. Whereas for the major metaphysical
systems of the 17th century, reason was the region of “eternal truths” — truths which are
common to both the human mind and the divine spirit — in the 18th century truth was
defined much less as a possession and more as a mode of acquisition. But the exclusion
of all transcendent mediation in understanding the relationships between thought and its
objects led the empiricist thinkers of the 18th century to neglect any other possible form
of mediation8 and to hold human physiology as the starting point for knowledge and also
as the key to knowledge of the natural world.
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As Popper (184) explains, by relying on sensorial experience, the traditional
epistemologies of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and even Russell, along with a substantial part
of modern and contemporary epistemology, has systematically studied knowledge or
thought through the involvement of an observer facing reality. This type of epistemology
finds itself to be missing the point, because while aiming to study scientific knowledge
— which is part of the third world of theories, problems and objective arguments — the
epistemologists were in fact studying something else.
A theory of knowledge rooted in Lockean empiricism was therefore elaborated. It
asserted that individuals are born with no innate ideas or dispositions. These individuals,
born free of any predisposition, could be thought of as shaped by their environment. This
idea found scientific justification in the biological model of evolution. From this follows
a specific conception of humanity that anchors the formation of human reason in concrete
experience.9
3. 6. Rationalist Versus Empiricist Individualisms and Education
Epistemologies derived from classical empiricism thus offer conceptions of knowledge
and of the good that are rooted in individual experience. Following almost directly from
sensualist empiricism is the concept of the immanence of moral values. Hobbes, as a
forerunner to this concern, likened human life to a race in which each person always has
to be ahead of his or her competitors from the moment when no objective conception of
the good and no absolute set of rules is supposed to regulate it. The “market” that is fed
by interpersonal comparisons represents the natural driving force behind the justification
of values. Following from the subjectivism of these epistemological premises is the need
for social forms that seek an agreement of minds through the imposition of an external
norm, that is, through conformist pressures, a dictatorial regime, or some other means.
Nevertheless, the social and political consequences of Locke's dualist philosophy differ
from those of his empiricist successors. In Locke's theory, the mind is substantially
separated from the body, but ideas ultimately refer to sensory information. In other
words, relationships between individuals concern their bodies and have no connection
with any principle or relationship derived from the nature of mental substances. Hence,
we have a democratic theory of social organization as a lesser evil, based essentially on
the preservation of private property and the consent of the majority as determinants of
right and good (Northrop, Meeting 95).
Among Locke's successors in Great Britain, the abandonment of the dualism of
substances allowed the justification of a positive conception of government and of criteria
for the good. As nothing exists outside of sensory information, the good is relative to the
well-being of the individual. It is identified with pleasure, or the amount of pleasure, by
Jeremy Bentham, and is extended to the possibilities of human perfection by John Stuart
Mill.10 Because he identified individuals with their metaphysical being, Locke had
placed emphasis on the equality of all individuals. He had no other criterion of the good
for the individual than the freedom of the mental substance, and no criterion of good for
the state but the “consent” of a majority. Because the orientations of the majority needed
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to be under control, Locke’s conceptions tended to produce a democratic culture in which
conformity and similarity between people were regarded as a good thing. But, Northrop
explains, because Mill equated individuals with their sensitive being, identifying “the
personal with the private, immediately sensed experiences and individual preferences”
(Meeting 123), he located the good in the quantity of pleasure experienced by the
individual, which could then be associated positively with a criterion of the good for the
state. Therefore, Mill could place emphasis on how unique each person is, viewing
individual differences as a good thing. This tended to produce a democratic culture in
which singularity and the greatest amount of pleasurable content are the determinants of
the good (Northrop, Meeting 122-123).
We can now outline the major axes that underpin modern models of democracy and the
pedagogical ideas associated with them. According to our first thesis, modern
democracies are morally justified by the recognition that human faculties for independent
thought lie at the foundation of humanity, and thus must invest in the development of
these faculties. From there, the question of sources of human knowledge that oppose
rationalist philosophies and classical empiricist philosophies can account for two major
and almost antithetical educational trends. Both these trends tend to confine the
knowledge process to a single space that is accessed subjectively, one of which is
theoretical, and the other of which is empirical. On the one hand, priority is given to
access to the truth via knowledge that is best placed for mental discipline and reasoning.
On the other hand, priority is given to education for practical life. On a moral level, the
differences are just as pronounced. On the one hand, both the axiological development of
individuals and the agreement of minds are ensured by the exercise of reason as based in
common rational intuitions. On the other hand, taking into account the relativism that
emerged from sensualist premises, axiological development and agreement of minds
must be fostered by an educational program that — beyond individual singularities —
specifically aims to develop shared values and practices.11
3. 7. Towards a Third Direction: The Kantian Solution and Its Limits
We have seen that, in order to develop, modern physics needed a space with virtual
constructs that do not directly refer to the world of experience. The inadequate nature of
classical empiricist epistemology in this respect was approached by Immanuel Kant after
he awoke from his “dogmatic slumber” (Prolegomena 5) the day he read Hume. Purely
inductive judgments proved unfit for establishing necessary connections between
phenomena. Kant therefore committed himself to developing a theory of knowledge that
was meant to account for the objectivity of human knowledge. He therefore attempted to
synthesize the results of the British empiricists and those of the continental rationalists,
admitting both the sensory foundations of knowledge and the more formal, rational and
systematic type of knowledge found in mathematics and mathematical physics. In such a
theory, the notion of causality would not be subjective and would not simply express a
relationship of statistical co-occurrence, but would present a necessary connection
between two systemic states. There was no other alternative, explains Northrop (Meeting
196), but to conclude that our knowledge, derived from both common sense and scientific
objects, is composed of two parts, one empirically given through the senses, as Hume
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states, and the other given theoretically, on the basis of postulated, unperceived elements.
This is Kant's “great insight” (Northrop, Meeting 194). Kant states that it is because each
one of us, by observing and knowing ourselves and the world, brings non-sensory
meaning to sensory information, that beliefs accepted by common sense and theories
verified by mathematical physics experiments are possible. But Kant saw this theoretical
component of knowledge as categorical and necessary rather than, as is the case, simply
hypothetical and confirmed indirectly by deductive consequences (Northrop, Meeting
194). In this regard, we know that the Kantian solution invokes two kinds of a priori
categories of knowledge; the first, called “forms of sensibility” (Kant, Critique 121; see
also Janiak), involves space and time; the second, called “categories [or] concepts of the
understanding” (Kant, Critique 121; see also Thomasson), involves concepts of
substance, relation, causality, etc.
These a priori and regulative tools of human thought are conceived by Kant as universal
and necessary; they are the same for everybody. Given their a priori status, such
uniformity is required; otherwise we would not all know the same public world. We will
see, continuing with Northrop’s analysis, that, as a consequence, Kantian democratic
individuality divorces itself from theoretical reason, and involves the concrete, individual
moral agent. We should note, though, that with Kant we move on to a third major
conception of democratic individuality. According to Descartes, and to a part of ancient
philosophy that is derived from Plato, people have the foundations of what is true and
good within themselves, and can develop these foundations through intellectual education
and reflection. It is this prescience which, in fact, legitimates the Socratic method of
bringing forth the truth from within, or maïeutics. But what is true and what is good are
given a priori as absolutes that can be accessed by individuals, as long as these people
are released from the illusions of the common world by adequate intellectual training.
Through their power of knowing, individuals are therefore rendered active beings, but as
discoverers rather than as inventors. According to Locke, and then Hume, individuals, as
induction machines on the basis of their own sensory experiences, are also discoverers
rather than inventors. They develop a kind of activity, but this activity is mechanical, the
fruit of the accumulation of information received passively during life experiences and
linked together by comparison and the association of ideas.
In the Kantian approach, however, individuals are no longer seen as passive receivers,
because they apprehend information from experience with a priori tools of thinking.
Kant gives meaning to the notion of objective knowledge within the limits of human
faculties for thought, and this relative objectivity creates a public space of knowledge.
Thanks to this public space, knowledge can be objectivized and accumulated. The
human mind is, in a genuinely true human sense, creative; the sources of objective
knowledge are in the knower rather than in the object known. But this creativity is
limited to these general conditions of thought and do not refer to individual qualities. A
priori forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding which represent the human
contribution to the apprehension of information from experience are purely formal and
functional, and they are the same for everyone. The horizon of human objectivity they
open up leaves no room for individuality on the part of the knowing subject: Nature and
knower are both governed by necessity. Besides, there is only one knowing subject, the
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transcendental ego, a universal identity common to singular persons. Northrop (Meeting
200-219) explains that it is only through his moral philosophy that Kant can obtain
meaning for the human self. The lack of freedom of the knowing subject led Kant to
dissociate theoretical reason and practical reason. It is therefore to the field of practical
reason, morals, and religion, each thought of as independent from theoretical reason, that
Kant has confined human freedom.
Kantian democratic individuality divorces from theoretical reason, and involves the
concrete, individual moral agent. But the undertaking does not lead very far. This is
because, in order to account for the agreement of minds regarding moral or social life,
Kant turns to moral law. But a morality that implies a free act can only be reconciled
with a morality defined by the necessity of the law by identifying, as Kant and his
followers did, positive freedom with obedience to the necessity of moral law.
In Fichte (Vocation), the freedom is made more radical, as it is rooted in pure,
unconditional will, and the moral centers itself in the will itself, the “true final end” of the
individual being obedience to the “law of conscience” (136). This fusion of free will and
moral necessity sheds light on the apparent paradox of Fichtean education. The “new
education,” according to Fichte (“Second Address” and “Third Address,” Addresses 1951), combines the principles of pleasure and freedom — which place it on the side of socalled modern educational trends — with a highly standardizing finality: “you must
fashion [the student], and fashion him in such a way that he simply cannot will otherwise
than you wish him to will” (21).
These developments in German philosophy, placing all the weight of human freedom on
the will as primary, found the agreement of minds within necessity itself. They opened
up to the positioning of the foundation of the good within historical development, with
freedom and determinism tending to come together. Hegelian philosophy brought the
concept of development to the forefront and led, even before evolutionary doctrines, to
thinking of everything in terms of temporal evolutionary processes. Northrop stresses
that Hegel did not conceive of a set of two types of concepts of a differing nature,
theoretical and empirical, epistemically correlated in the knowledge process, but only of
one concept, “the concrete universal,” mixing two distinct worlds of discourse (Logic
259). He suggests that the development of philosophical thought through Fichte, Hegel
and Marx, by ignoring the creative duality of theoretical reason and experience, may have
sowed the seeds of the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century.
3. 8. Theoretical Reason Reconciling Human Creativity with Objectivity
Kant thought that the basic structures of the knowing thought were posed a priori as the
necessary conditions of human knowledge. This belief was developed in psychology by
Piaget in particular, who tried to show that general “logico-mathematical structures” (305
ff.) were developed during childhood and exercised an a priori logical role in thought.
But, as Vygotsky stressed in Thought and Language, our logical faculties depend on the
conceptual structures we master in a specific domain, so we cannot dissociate the
structure of thought from its content.12
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The problems caused by the Kantian solution’s imposing of purely formal and necessary
theoretical reason have been overcome by modern epistemology. The epistemic duality
of the modern knowledge theories mentioned previously offers a simple response to the
problem of causality, which Kant thought he had resolved with an a priori category of
understanding. This response allows us to understand the shortcoming of the Kantian
solution when separating the form of thought from its content. Let us look into this a
little further.
Margenau (esp. chap. 19) and Meyerson (34-36) evoke the distinction between partial
causes and total cause. The slow watch appears to be the cause of missing the train. But
in reality, the reasoning goes as follows: if the watch had not been slow, the train would
not have been missed. Through such reasoning we move forward along the path of
explanation, but we do not reach the entire or generative cause, which involves the
totality of antecedents and, according to Meyerson, the identity over time of the elements
in play. Besides, the search for a law, although it contributes to the explanation, does not
fully satisfy the demands of causality. The solution to the problem of explanation,
Margenau contends, lies in the creation of closed theoretical systems. These systems
alone make it possible to offer a comprehensive theoretical model of the postulated
antecedents; and, as we have seen, the specific composition of these antecedents makes it
possible to account for different phenomena — not what things in nature “are,” but the
way in which they interact with one another. Therefore, in order to be applied and to
have genuine explanatory power, the principle of causality requires systems that are
completely closed and finished. Such systems do not exist in nature. The systems upon
which logical analysis can be developed are intellectual constructions — i.e., theoretical
models. The systems constructed from theoretical concepts allow the simulation of
causal mechanisms that aim to account for observable phenomena, whereas, as Hume
noted, thought that refers directly to the empirical world can only establish relationships
of concomitance between empirical facts. Causality is not a pure “a priori category” of
understanding. It is made possible by a constructed theoretical space that maintains
indirect relationships with the real world; theoretical concepts thus are not mere contents
of thought but underlie its logical inferences. We, therefore, cannot separate the structure
and the contents of thought, but must distinguish its theoretical and empirical dimensions,
with no metaphysical precedence, so that the theoretical factors are hypothetical, rather
than necessary.
4. Epistemic Duality and Democratic Individuality
4. 1. The Social Origin of the Theoretical Dimension of Thought
The two major classical approaches to true knowledge tend to confine knowledge in one
single — theoretical or empirical — space. Since Kant, a third perspective has emerged
that views knowledge as the bringing into relation, by the knowing subject, of two
irreducible types of components — the theoretical and the sensible. But Kant assumed
that the theoretical components at the root of the relative objectivity of human knowledge
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are essentially necessary and a priori, and a formal limit on the thinking of all human
beings.
Note also the solution offered by Pragmatism, which, according to James, represents a
method of renewing the old empiricist attitude in a “more radical and less objectionable
form” (51). Pragmatism is characterized negatively by its rejection of static objects of
thought — abstraction, verbal solutions, fixed principles, and closed systems — and
positively by its call for “concreteness and adequacy,” “facts,” “action,” and “power”
(James 51). That is why concepts in it appear to be meaningless verbalisms unless they
have a functional or active role — i.e., that of being apprehended through the activity that
is supposed to constitute them (cf. Dewey, “How Do Concepts Arise”; Quest). With
philosophical pragmatism, and in conflict on this point with classical empiricism,
knowing subjects are no longer passive receivers taking in impressions from outside and
digesting them. They only create their knowledge by their own activity. They place
themselves, as knowing subjects, ahead of experience in order to apprehend it and adjust
to it. Objectivity and creativity are then part and parcel of the same process and are
evaluated by what works. Thought and experience are inextricably linked in such a way
that the concepts get meaning through their operational function. Following these views,
instruction should be “a continuous reconstruction, moving from the child’s present
experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies”
(Dewey, Child 11). Access to concepts elaborated by modern science demands, for
instance, the reconstruction, through education, of the types of experience that led
humankind to contemporary forms of knowledge.13
What classical empiricism and a great part of modern epistemology ignored, by
involving, as noticed by Popper, only an observer facing reality, is the new path of human
development opened by the very particular capacities of the human mind. These
capacities have allowed humankind to develop cognitive thinking tools and to build a
public space for knowledge and exchange.14 Humankind thus appears to have emerged
from the formation of social relationships and socially constituted tools of thought. The
correlative question of communication allows us to go beyond the epistemological
problematic that essentially brings subject and object into confrontation. Communication
is dotted with concepts that do not generally refer to the immediately perceived and
experienced world, but whose meaning depends on the relationships they maintain with
one another. Science takes this logic further by creating theoretical systems with links to
reality that are essentially indirect.
Human knowledge develops by bringing conceptual structures into contact with
experience. In this respect, it represents a form of induction involving socially
constituted cognitive tools, such as, for instance, language, the numerical system,
conceptual and symbolic systems, etc. Rationalist individualisms and classical
empiricisms remain unaware of this specific social dimension of the human capacities for
knowledge, and the resulting epistemic duality was not understood by either post-Kantian
German monisms or philosophies anchored in evolutionism.
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4. 2. Epistemic Duality and Democratic Individuality
Acknowledging the genuine duality of the epistemic components of knowledge may help
us to rethink the foundations of modern democratic individuality.
First, the theoretical and experiential duality of the epistemic sources of knowledge
reveals a fundamentally active and creative knowing subject. The subject’s theoretical
knowledge instigates actions by individuals upon their own mind (Vygotsky, Mind 39).
In other words, the mind is a tool for thinking, that is, for manipulating objects of
thought, and through the logical inferences it allows, it is a dispenser of meaning.
Secondly, we no longer have the conception, as derived from the Lockean mental
substance, of a person as being independent from and having nothing in common with all
other persons and things. Especially, the intrinsic equality between members of the
political community is a basic postulate of our modern democracies which moves from
the metaphysical plane to the theoretic plane. The theoretical dimension of thought
underpins the participation of the members of society within the public space and is
epistemically linked with the experienced dimension of their own life. Human
individualities are thus no longer unconnected; the relationships between individuals are
secured by collectively constructed and validated social and institutional principles.
Finally, this epistemic duality secures the compatibility of the knowing subject’s freedom
with collective agreement. It refers problems of truth and the good to the links between
postulated and referential forms of knowledge, so that they appear neither as absolute,
nor as essentially relative to the subjective world of experience. They can be the object
of rational reflection involving the public objectivity of theoretical constructs as well as
the subjectivity and diversity of private experience. According to Northrop (Meeting
470), this reconciliation of theoretical with practical reason prevents us from making the
same culturalist error as did the German Hegelian Idealists, the Russian Communists, and
to a lesser degree the American Pragmatists. All of them identify the good of society
with its present or future “is,” based on either a historical or a functional conception of
social and historical evolution.15
Our conclusions move away somewhat from those of Northrop here.
The
appropriateness of normative beliefs is not only the result of their being tempered by
scientific reason, as Northrop thinks — that is, by the moral use of our positive
knowledge of the natural and human world. Northrop appears to underestimate the sui
generis dimension of human morals. We would rather suggest that like science, but not
only on the basis of science, morals bring into confrontation postulated meanings and
experiential ones.16
4. 3. The Cognitive Role of Formal Education
The epistemic duality of knowledge sources leads to important consequences for formal
education. The development of the theoretical dimension of thought is the basic function
of school (see Vygotsky, Thought and Language). Knowledge can only serve the
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individual and be developed if the latter appropriates the conceptual structures it is made
of. These intellectual constructs draw their meaning from the relationships they maintain
between themselves, so they can, for the most part, be objectivized and therefore passed
on. Moreover, it is necessary that the teacher highlight their particular relationships in
each field of study, paying attention to the structure of knowledge.17 These are tools for
thinking, and as such, they do not develop any mechanical link with thought. Therefore,
passing them on is not only possible, but is also not, in itself, dogmatic.
From this point, all the confusion surrounding quarrels about teaching that have been
recurrent since the beginning of the 20th century, opposing individuals and knowledge,
can be reabsorbed fairly simply if we understand that it is neither the importance given to
knowledge nor the importance accorded to the individual that is at stake. Indeed, that
which implicitly divides the points of view and standpoints is linked to the foundations of
knowledge. When we assume that our concepts take on meaning in the course of
concrete experience and not as abstract, mediating tools of thought, we in fact deny
epistemic duality. By denying it — as Dewey (Child 11) did by unifying theoretical and
empirical concepts under a functional conception centered on operational meanings (see
Dewey, Quest; Logic) — we undermine the specific role of theoretical constructs in
individual understanding and public participation.
On the contrary, if we accept that the specific capacities of human thought lie in the
development of mediating tools for thinking and the linking up of these cognitive tools
with elements drawn from experience, then epistemological duality is fully recognized
and the conflict of knowledge versus the individual no longer stands. Instead of relying
on the individual’s experience as linked to practical activity, the learning of complex
forms of knowledge should rely on their intellectual reconstruction, knowledge being
neither a content to learn nor a tool to act with, but a dynamic tool supporting
understanding.
Given the nature of theoretical concepts, such an intellectual
reconstruction needs to rely on a progressive, reflective and structured development.
5. Conclusion: Epistemic Duality and Participatory Democracy
We have maintained that modern democratic individuality emerged from the recognition
of human faculties of independent thinking and the correlative rejection of any
intellectual or moral authority imposed on individuals. On these foundations, the
epistemological conceptions that define humankind’s relationship to the truth shed light
on the models of democracy that have developed historically. Northrop’s insights reveal
the shortcomings of classical rationalist and empiricist epistemologies, as well as those of
the Kantian solution and the false restoration of human freedom within German idealisms
and evolutionist (historical or biological) types of thought. Neither theoretical reason
alone, nor experience alone, nor any primacy of one over the other, could define the
individual’s link to the idea of truth or account for human freedom.
The theoretical dimension of knowledge, which Kant reintroduced in a minimalist way,
appears here in all its creative richness as linked to the social dimension of human
existence. It appears to be the fruit of the human use of artificial signs for thinking and
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the correlative development of a space of mediation that supports reflective thought and
communication. Human cognitive constructs that individuals appropriate, especially
through formal education, are the instruments by which they develop their independence
of thought and exchange the ideas that can be objectivized within a public space for
debate. The social construction of theoretical reason postulates (scientific, ethical, or
moral) that are indirectly controlled by experience underpins a rational, creative evolution
of positive and normative beliefs. Thus, this duality underpins collaborative reflection
regarding the purpose of joint action and appears to be the conception of knowledge most
suitable for founding the basis of agreement between members of a society on types of
participatory democracy.
Political and social participation assume that education might allow the progressive
construction by individuals of conceptual systems conceived of as symbolic mediatory
tools for reflective thinking. This must be done by progressively shedding light on the
links between theoretical concepts, on one hand, and their (indirect) links to experience
on the other. From this perspective, education should not focus either on knowledge or
on competencies as such that do not necessarily involve reflective thinking and, therefore,
intellectual contribution. Education should aim, firstly and on these bases, at fostering
understanding. Other consequences for education of the dual conception of knowledge
sources that cannot be developed here include the development of human sensibility,
through literary and artistic expression in particular, and the recognition that the diversity
of personalities and experiences represents an asset for democracy.
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Notes
1

Northrop calls them the “theoretic component,” or the component “designated by
verified scientific theory” (Logic 199), and the “aesthetic component,” or “the
immediately apprehended factor in knowledge and reality” (Logic 377).

2

Nevertheless, we note, truth belongs to the space of intelligible Forms — in Plato, for
instance.

3

Plato’s curriculum, designed for a would-be philosopher-king, unites the studies of
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music (see The Republic, Book VII). It aims at
preparing the student to engage in dialectic, considered as the science of intelligible
Forms and thus as a method of searching for truth, which in turn opens up access to
knowledge of the Good.

4

Locke (Essay II, ch.1, § 2-5) distinguishes essentially two original sources of human
knowledge: the objects of sensation — that is to say, external material things — and the
objects of reflection, which he identifies as the operations of our own mind concerning
the impressions rooted in sensorial experience.

5

Mathematics is here understood as a theoretical science; in the Discours de la méthode
Descartes criticizes the teaching he knew, which was only applied to the resolution of
practical problems posed by the mechanical arts.

6

Locke thought that “the Souls of Men” do not bring into the world with them any ideas,
but rather “inherent Faculties” (Essay I, ch. 1, § 2: 49) that could be strengthened by
education. Locke especially mentioned mathematics as “a way to settle in the mind the
habit of reasoning closely and in train” (“Conduct” 198). See also Kolesnik, esp. ch. V.

7

Consequently, Hume (Treatise I, pt. 3, sect. 9: 80-81), we note, considers that the
opinions and notions transmitted by education are transformed into beliefs by habits of
the mind; education appears then as mere indoctrination, while Hume’s idea of truth
involves a “harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas”
(Inquiry V, ch. II, § 44: 54).

8

This was not the case, however, with Condillac, who understood the crucial role of the
mediation of signs in human thought, and with the French intellectuals grouped under the
banner “les idéologues,” who followed Condillac’s main ideas.

9

The impact of these developments on dominant educational models is studied in Bulle.

10

See in Donatelli (“Mill’s Perfectionism”) how Mill links his perfectionism to the
utilitarian doctrine by considering the issue of inner experience.
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11

The tension between freedom and control in Mill's thought is analyzed, for instance, in
Carbone.

12

We observe that children’s and adults’ reasoning capacities vary according to whether
they have acquired adequate conceptual structures in the areas of knowledge involved.
Since every concept is in some way linked to others, the total body of concepts acquired
during a lifetime influences the acquisition and use of other concepts, and this also
explains why most children are unable to engage in general abstract reasoning before the
age of eleven or twelve (Novak 122).

13

Cf. on this subject Alix. This article is an expanded version in French of “The
Continuity of Experience Principle: a Deweyan Interpretation of the Recapitulation
Theory,” a paper presented at the 2013 Meeting of the Society for the Philosophical
Study of Education, Chicago.

14

On this subject, see for instance Corballis for an evolutionary overview of the human
mind’s development.

15

In the case of pragmatism, Northrop, as well as Max Horkheimer (chap. 1), emphasizes
here the impossibility of having the instrumental conception of theoretical reason doubt a
society’s basic principles: a situation only becomes problematic in a predefined cultural
setting that is not called into question.

16

For instance, Northrop (Complexity) maintains that “ethical norms are empirically
testable and therefore cognitive … through their epistemological, and other philosophical,
antecedents with respect to nature” (203).

17

This is a consequence deduced by Jan Derry from Robert Brandom's philosophy,
which is consistent with the theory of concepts upheld here.
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Politics, Education, and Understanding: Anglo-American
Readings and Misreadings of Rousseau in the 19th to 21st
Centuries
Guillemette Johnston

In Anglo-American academia and culture generally, there is often a tendency to support
and reflect extant ideological positions, to maintain a brand of conformism across the
board. As might be expected in any ideological model that tries to justify the status quo,
controversial figures and ideas are portrayed according to dominant ideological
conceptions — conceptions that aim to support and promote the dominant social order.
We can see a prime example of this happening with readings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
that appear in America in the late-19th through the 20th centuries, particularly in the postWorld War Two era, as America emerged as a dominant world force standing in
opposition to the Soviet Union in the Cold War period. After reviewing Rousseau’s
reception in America in the 19th century, we will look at various twentieth-century
Anglo-American readings of Rousseau, with much focus on the period following the
Second World War. In doing so we will examine the reasons Rousseau’s philosophy
came to be viewed as a source for the extinction of traditional Judeo-Christian moral
values, leading to the creation of twentieth-century totalitarian regimes. To this end we
will provide commentary on the misperception of key concepts in Rousseau’s writings in
the ideological readings provided by Babbitt, Talmon, and Crocker. After this survey we
will look at contemporary writers whose misconceptions regarding Rousseau’s
philosophy demonstrate a limited understanding of Rousseau’s works, or whose
comments point to propagandistic usurpations of Rousseau’s intentions, as for instance in
the work of the contemporary Christian conservative Michael Coffman. We will thus
show how Rousseau has been received in the Anglo-American world, and how his
writings, particularly those concerning politics but also those that address the relationship
of politics to education, have served as a lightning rod for ideological positions and
causes. This approach will highlight deficiencies in academic readings of the period due
to the hard-core political positions taken by some, but not all, of the scholars and
academics of the time, and point to incapacities on behalf of some scholars and critics to
read Rousseau with a genuine empathy for the stylistic flourishes and idiosyncrasies
displayed by this idealistic autodidact. Thus we will demonstrate how for the academic
reader and in academic circles in general, Rousseau’s texts often serve as a canvas or
screen for the portrayal and projection of ideological fantasies. Let it be said that often,
as a result of these projections, Rousseau is read not for what he says but for what the
particular critic reading him wishes to prove with respect to Anglo-American or
contemporary society, sometimes at the cost of accuracy. At base this study then
questions systems of reading, pointing toward ways ideology impacts interpretation of
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important philosophical thinkers and figures, a fact that in turn has a profound effect on
the presentation of these philosophers and their ideas in culture and in the educational
system.
Rousseau was held in relatively high esteem in 18th and 19th century America, according
to Frederick William Dame.1 Dame argues that Rousseau had a significant effect on
American literature and thought, either directly (for example, the poet Philip Freneau,
one of the Connecticut Wits of the late 18th century, translated Rousseau) or indirectly,
through the German Idealism of Kant or other writers and philosophers whose work was
influenced by Rousseau. Thus in much of American intellectual life before the twentieth
century we find profound appreciation for and acceptance of Rousseauist ideas. As
Dame points out, depictions of nature were essentially benevolent (Emerson and Thoreau
stand out here), the « homme de la nature » was presented in idealized portraits like those
of native Americans or frontiersmen found in the novels of James Fenimore Cooper, and
general Romanticist tendencies led many to believe that humanity was inherently good.
While it would be inaccurate to say that these perceptions dominated all of American
cultural life, Dame at least sees behind them the philosophical possibilities raised by
Rousseau’s works. Here are his comments regarding the importance of Rousseau as a
force in American society:
The Romantic vision of Rousseau persevered not only in regard to the
themes of literature, such as portrayals of the “noble savage” and man
progressing and developing through his physical experiences and the
senses, but also in the concept of the individual who must prove himself to
himself before seeking to enter or re-enter the social state. He provided
the foundation upon which the American Transcendentalists would build a
philosophical as well as a literary movement. In the vision of man as
innately good and reasonable, or man as morally right, Rousseau presented
an optimistic view of humanity. This optimism in the human condition
and the inner strength which it further implies provided American writers
with a suitable subject with which to explore the concept of a tabula rasa
of this new nation. If man in his primitive state is the raw material from
which a morally good and just citizen might emerge, then a logical literary
extension of this idea was the association of this new nation, the United
States of America, with the same state.
The philosophy of Rousseau exhibits a social idealism which encourages
man to actively regenerate society and renovate social institutions. Rather
than accept the prevailing socio-political philosophy, Rousseau, who
places man’s natural freedom at the core of his political philosophy,
proposes that man retreat from entrenched ideology and turn, instead,
toward the creation of a social system which will foster equality among all
men.
Viewing the social system as composed of artificial convention which
requires individual men to assume masks and to interact in ways which are
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artificial to the true human nature, Rousseau calls for a return to natural
action founded on reason of mind and heart.
Instinct, feeling,
subjectiveness, and imagination are of paramount importance to his
thinking and they are to be employed to lead enlightened men from the
state of nature to the social state, which is the appropriate state. (54)
With regard to developments in education during the 19th century, Rousseauist ideas
came into the American educational system in much the same way that they were
introduced throughout Europe during this time: via the influence of predominating
European educational reformers such as the Swiss Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and the
Germans Friedrich Fröbel and Johann Friedrich Herbart. The educational practices of
Pestalozzi, whose impact was largely felt in the area of elementary education with his
development of the idea of “organic” education, were brought to America through the
work of William Maclure at New Harmony in Indiana and by Joseph Neef in
Pennsylvania. Fröbel was responsible for the development of the concept of
Kindergarten and the “self activity” or self development of the child; his student
Margarethe Schurz established a German-speaking kindergarten in the United States in
1856 in Wisconsin, which inspired Elizabeth Peabody to create an English language
kindergarten in Boston in 1860 (Wisconsin). The work of Herbart brought a
psychological edge to the field of education, and his ideas spread through articles
published in the 1880s in the Illinois School Journal (Somr and Hrušková) and later
through meetings of the Philosophy Club and the National Herbart Society for the
Scientific Study of Education (1895-1901).
John Dewey criticized Herbart’s
instructional methods and emphasis on the continuity of the educational process (English
105-106), but recent studies have tended to reconcile Herbart and Dewey with regard to
discontinuity and rupture in education (English xix; xxiv). Particularly after 1860, then,
Pestolezzi’s and Fröbel’s ideas and experiments “combined with widespread socialdemocratic influences on education and advances in psychologic thought to change
schooling. This confluence, which was most noticeable in elementary education, resulted
in the appearance of the kindergarten and in methods proceeding from the nature of the
child and including content representing more of the present society.... [T]he ideas of
preparing teachers to use techniques derived from the new concepts, including the greater
systematization introduced by Herbart, and the necessity for teachers to learn specifically
about the child would substantially augment teacher-training programs and lay the
groundwork for immense institutional expansion in the first half of the 20th century”
(Meyer and Lawson). Thus the impact of Rousseauist ideas on American education in
the 19th century was significant.2
Rousseau’s reputation as a positive force, a harbinger of Romanticism, began to slide in
the late 19th century, first as the Romantic values started to be called into doubt, then as
the emergence of Socialist, Communist, and Fascist ideologies illustrated (to some) the
dangers involved in such political concepts as the general will and the social contract.3
An early European example of this shift away from appreciation of Rousseau appears in
Nietzsche’s critiques, which from some angles could be seen as almost expressions of
vituperation toward the Rousseauist position. In America, on the other hand, extensive
criticism of Rousseau and his impact on society appears at this time in the works of
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Irving Babbitt, especially in his book Rousseau and Romanticism. By the end of World
War Two and with the beginning of the Cold War, American studies on Rousseau had
moved toward the problematic, particularly as regards the political sphere and
Rousseauist ideas on education and the role of reason. On one hand, critics in this period
found Rousseau’s writings polarized or contradictory at best, and sometimes even
irrelevant to the contemporary world. On the other hand, some found in Rousseau’s
writings foundations for political systems and beliefs about the individual that
increasingly threatened Anglo-American democracy and the vision of democratic
righteousness expressed in the concept of the “free world.” These latter, negative
readings of Rousseau were supported in the 1960s with covert though then-stylish
psychoanalytical incursions into the life of the Citizen of Geneva and counteracted by the
more positive readings of Rousseau offered by countercultural figures such as Arnold
Kaufman (Mattson 211-212) and Huey P. Newton (Jeffries). Since then, ideological
attacks on Rousseau’s philosophy have continued in the critical commentaries of
Jonathan Israel and (more crudely) in the manifestos of Christian conservative Michael
Coffman.
An early Cold-War reading that emphasized the fundamental duality in Rousseau’s
writings was Leo Strauss’ 1947 essay “On the Intentions of Rousseau,” a study of
Rousseau’s Discours sur les sciences et les arts (first Discours) that saw this work as key
to understanding Rousseau’s philosophy. Strauss, whom J. David Hoeveler associates
with Irving Babbitt (Hoeveler 182), begins his study by claiming that “The antiquarian
controversy about the intention of Rousseau conceals a political controversy about the
nature of democracy” (Strauss 455), and that Rousseau “considered himself the first
theoretician of democracy” (455), “attack[ing] the Enlightenment as a pillar of despotism
or of absolute monarchy” (457), largely because of its hostility to religion and because of
the suggestion (derived from Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois) that modern societies
substitute commerce for virtue. This attack did not prevent Rousseau from covertly
acknowledging the value of Enlightenment; it in fact led him to emphasize the distinction
between “society” and the intelligentsia, and to turn his argument in the first Discours
regarding the dangers of science into a reading of how these dangers apply to the
common man. As Strauss puts it, “[i]n opposition to the Enlightenment, [Rousseau]
reasserts the crucial importance of the natural inequality of men with regard to
intellectual gifts” (486). Thus Strauss argues that “when Rousseau rejects science as
superfluous or harmful, he speaks in the character of a common man addressing common
men, and when speaking in that character, he does not exaggerate at all by rejecting
science absolutely. But far from being a common man, [Rousseau] is a philosopher who
merely appears in the guise of a common man: as a philosopher addressing philosophers
he naturally takes the side of science” (464). Therefore the Discours presents two
Rousseaus, Rousseau the commoner and Rousseau the philosopher. It also aims at two
audiences, the audience of commoners and the audience of philosophers, and provides
different messages for each. The dangers of science exist for the commoner, not for the
“great minds,” among whom Rousseau includes himself. As Strauss puts it, “science is
permissible or salutary only in so far as it is not, as such, a social factor. Its social effect
is necessarily disastrous: enlightenment paves the way for despotism…. [I]n rejecting
popularized science Rousseau … expressed directly and adequately what he seriously
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thought” (467). It is for this reason, Strauss maintains, that Rousseau finds his ideal
classical model in Sparta instead of in Athens (467), and perhaps this sort of
understanding lies behind his support of civil religion in the Contrat social.
One consequence of this dualistic perspective is that it questions the viability or value of
comprehensive education for the masses, a point that could be supported (though Strauss
does not do so) in light of the attention to individualized education that is highlighted in
Rousseau’s Emile. Another consequence is that Strauss’ approach realigns the standpoint
many critics take on Rousseau’s frankness or sincerity. For Strauss, Rousseau’s
insistence on “the obligation to speak the truth is founded exclusively on the utility of
truth…. [O]ne may not only suppress or disguise truths devoid of all possible utility, but
may even be positively deceitful about them by asserting their contraries, without thus
committing the sin of lying” (470). “The Discours is so far from siding with truth as such
that it attacks science precisely because it is concerned with truth as such, regardless of
its utility, and hence is not, by its intention, protected against the danger of leading to
useless or even harmful truths” (471). Rousseau’s emphasis on a faith based on senses
and feelings and his upholding of local social values (as opposed to universal scientific or
philosophical truths) is explained by this sense of duality. Indeed, “one misunderstands
Rousseau’s notion of natural goodness if one does not bear in mind the fact that it refers
to two different types, who stand at the opposite poles of humanity (the primitive man
and the wise) and who yet belong together as natural men, as self-sufficient beings, or
‘numerical units’, in contradistinction to ... the citizen or social man, that is, the man who
is bound by duties or obligations and who is only a ‘fractionary unit’” (476-477).
“Society has to do everything possible to make the citizens oblivious of the very facts
that are brought to the center of their attention, as the foundations of society, by political
philosophy” (482). In educational terms, this pertains to Strauss’ assertion that “Modern
democracy might seem to stand or fall by the claim that ‘the method of democracy’ and
‘the method of intelligence’ are the same” (455), an assertion that might be used to call
into question the value of extensive intellectual emphasis in education, and that Timothy
Fuller suggests might refer to positions on education advocated by John Dewey (Fuller
241, note 2).
Strauss’ reading implicates Rousseau in a sense of political duplicity that might have
matched the expectations of some egregious Cold Warriors of his time in the way they
would judge the enemy, but the connection is never spelled out, only implied in the
suggestion that Rousseau supports a split between philosophy, science, or intelligentsia
on the one hand, and the common man on the other. What is more reflective of other
perspectives in this approach is the suggestion of some sort of contradictory force at work
in Rousseau’s writings. Other critics also point to this sense, though not in ways that
necessarily imply manipulation. Judith Shklar, for instance, studies Rousseau’s writings
in their relation to the utopian dreams of Spartan society and the autonomous family
found in La Nouvelle Héloïse. Reminding us that “Rousseau is not ‘rousseauisme’” (Men
216), and that the “the Social Contract was less a utopia than a book of warnings” (Men
211), Shklar suggests that the application of Rousseau’s writings to any political or social
model is fraught with danger:
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The combination of a psychology and a moral outlook exclusively
concerned with the needs of the individual, an extreme hatred for
inequality, and an intense dislike for change make it particularly useless to
impose the conventional classifications of later political theory upon
Rousseau. He was neither a traditionalist nor a revolutionary of any sort.
So deep a hatred of inequality is a perpetual challenge to any known
society. (Men 30)
The problem with the model lies in part in its pitting of the need for personal fulfillment
(the Clarens model) against the needs of self-abnegation in the idealized classical Spartan
model. We see the conflict explored, for example, in Rousseau’s concerns about
happiness, a “public” good that is as deeply intimate and personal as any feeling can be.
Shklar writes, “[s]ince happiness is the sole object of men’s striving, the legitimate
society, like any other human enterprise must be judged in terms of its ability to satisfy
the most universal aspiration. Rousseau did not forget it. The sovereign people must feel
a ‘public happiness’. Like the general will it is a metaphor of personification. For
happiness is the most individual and personal of feelings, as Rousseau realized very well.
This evidently made it difficult to speak of it as something ‘public’, and after worrying
the notion of ‘le bonheur publique’ in several fragments, he used it rather sparingly in his
finished political writings” (Men 193). Behind these difficulties, Shklar suggests, lie
Rousseau’s concerns with “his own inner life, the needs of his own self” (Men 121), and
a bevy of conflicting forces that work behind the scenes of his political, literary,
educational, and other writings: a hatred of inequality matched by an uneasiness with
equality, and an ongoing conflict between “an urge for perfect freedom and a longing for
submission” (Men 130). In this context, one could argue (though here Shklar does not)
that Emile represents an exploration of educational strategies that direct the pupil toward
self-sufficiency in an effort to approximate happiness by teaching the pupil to live
according to his basic needs, qualities, and moral code, within realistic boundaries set by
the human condition.
A position Shklar does maintain, though, is that if “[b]y nature men are free ... left to their
own devices they will inevitably enslave each other” (“Rousseau’s Images” 919). This
example of the “bipolarities” in Rousseau’s thought underlies Rousseau’s constant
assertion of the need for a master, be it tutor or prince, to direct human behavior, since
“amour-propre ... reinforces the actuality of weakness, though it hides it as each person
comes to think of himself only in competitive comparison with others” (“Rousseau’s
Images” 919). However, Rousseau knew too well that too often in society, “authority
was exercised only to maintain a destructive and false order” (“Rousseau’s Images” 921),
creating societies that are marked by “pride and cruelty at the top, servility and
dishonesty at the bottom” (“Rousseau’s Images” 921). In light of these tendencies, at the
individual level, Rousseau required “tutorial vigilance” (“Rousseau’s Images” 923) to
protect the “God-given self which forms the core of ... character. This personal self is not
inherently hostile to other selves, nor does it thrive in permanent solitude” (“Rousseau’s
Images” 923). Because of the contrast between the requirements of the social order and
the wish to free the individual from subservience to this unavoidable order, “[C]ivic
education and the education of the individual have nothing in common” (“Rousseau’s
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Images” 924). On the one hand, in Emile, the master’s goal is to “fulfill [a] task of
prevention. The child is to be educated against society and he must be protected against
parents, neighbors and servants who would press their false values upon him”
(“Rousseau’s Images” 930). On the other hand, “The conflict between the ideals of
personal authority and of impersonal law [is] resolved in Rousseau’s mind by making law
... subordinate” since “ultimately the rule of law also depends upon a single human voice
and hand to give it life” (“Rousseau’s Images” 922). Systems of national encouragement
of obedience to the law through education, such as Rousseau explores in “Political
Economy” (20-23), require vigilance, but even more, they require the weight of the
authoritative leader who can convince the public of the virtues of law:
The great problem of politics is to make governments the guardians, rather
than the enemies of law. [But] law is psychologically ineffective. It can
condition only external behavior. Public opinion and mores alone can
touch the heart. To be truly effective public authority must penetrate to
the very heart. To do this requires more than law, it depends on
continuing education.... Law ultimately is what personal authority can
give society for a while.... That was the way of those ancient political
paragons Moses, Lycurgus, Numa and Solon. (“Rousseau’s Images” 922)
If education here “replaces not only the father, but the entire family” (929), it does so in
order to ensure that the pupil become “a self-sufficient adult who lives at peace with
himself” (“Rousseau’s Images” 930), removed from the forces of amour-propre that
drive and, too often, destroy or corrupt society. Rousseau’s famous proposal of negative
education comes into play here, since negative education “prevents the imposition of an
artificial, socially devised and socially oriented self upon the child” (“Rousseau’s
Images” 930). Beneath this freedom, or at least directing it, is the constant presence of
“an educative, preventive, curative and ordering authority. Authentic authority liberates.
It gives liberty to those who are incapable of creating it for themselves” (“Rousseau’s
Images” 931).
As we have suggested above, Shklar’s Rousseau is confronted with conflicts internal and
external that often seem to be only tenuously resolved. Patrick Riley’s Rousseau also
confronts contradictions, but these contradictions concern his allegiances to the modern
state and to the classical model of democracy. Riley’s interest in explaining the concept
of the general will in Rousseau revolves around his insight that the general will “is an
attempted (though not explicit) amalgam of two extremely important traditions of
political thought, which may be called, roughly, ancient ‘cohesiveness’ and modern
‘voluntarism’” (“Possible Explanation” 86). The problem Rousseau faced in the concept
of the general will, in other words, was to reconcile modern individualist and even
commercialized models of society with the greater cohesiveness he perceived in ancient
societies. By attempting to join an individual willingness to participate in society with an
overall social good, Rousseau hoped to assure the legitimacy of power in society. But
“while voluntarism took care of legitimacy, it could say nothing about the intrinsic
goodness of what is willed” (“Possible Explanation” 87). In modern societies, as
compared to classical societies, “imperfect socialization … allowed private persons and

158

JPSE: Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education III (2018)
corporate interests to control other private persons, leading to extreme inequality”
(“Possible Explanation” 88). The idea of the general will emerges from these conflicts:
the “transformed society must be governed on the basis of common interest … only
general laws, the creation of a general will (sovereignty), can govern the common
interest” (“Possible Explanation” 92). The uniting of particular wills with the general
will depends upon the efforts of a “great legislator” (“Possible Explanation” 94) who
obliges individuals to conform their particular wills to reason. Riley sums up his
argument as follows:
1) a perfect state (that is, a perfectly socialized, united, and communal
state) would have perfectly general laws (that is, laws dealing only with
Rousseau’s vision of a common good); 2) but laws, especially the most
general laws, must be willed by everyone subject to those laws, in order to
be obligatory — and they must be made obligatory, for society is merely
conventional; 3) therefore, will must take the form of general laws; 4) but
will tends to the particular, and law, though the creation of will, must
somehow be general; 5) moreover, for particular wills to appreciate the
necessity of general laws, effect would have to become cause; 6)
therefore, a great legislator, whose instruction can supply the defect of a
morality of the common good — the only morality which would naturally
produce general laws — is necessary; 7) but this legislator is impossibly
rare, and, in addition, he cannot create laws, however general and good,
for sovereignty is inalienable; 8) thus the legislator must have recourse to
religion, and use it to gain the consent of individuals to the general will; 9)
but now “consent” is something less than real consent, since an irrational
device has been used; 10) finally, the whole system is saved for individual
will by the fact that “a people always has a right to change its laws, even
the best,” that legislative will, rather than law itself, is supreme, and that
the entire social system can be abolished by will, for “there is not, and
cannot be, any sort of fundamental law binding on the body of the people,
not even the social contract.” (“Possible Explanation” 95)
Riley would later describe the legislator as a “civic educator” who brings about a
transformation of natural, egoistic individuals into a citizenry that freely conjoins with
the general will. The linking of politics and education means that the function of
education is to transform “naturally self-loving egoists animated only by their own
‘private wills’ into polis-loving citizens with a civic ‘general will’” (“Rousseau’s
Philosophy” 573). This “radically transformative education” aims to make people “what
they ought to be” (“Rousseau’s Philosophy” 573).
At the same time, this
“transformative” and “denaturing” education must “produce autonomous adults who can
say to their teachers (with Emile), ‘What course have I chosen! To remain what you have
made me’” (“Rousseau’s Philosophy” 574). The “rigorous civic education” Riley here
describes Rousseau as presenting draws “natural beings out of their (equally natural) egocentrism, bringing them to think of themselves (finally) as ‘parts of a greater whole’ — a
whole less extensive, but more realisable, than a ‘Christian republic’ or a kingdom of
ends” (“Rousseau’s Philosophy” 579). Rousseau’s aim, for Riley, is thus to “‘generalise’
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will — either through civic education, as in the Social contract or the Considerations on
the government of Poland, or through private education, as in Emile” (“Rousseau’s
Philosophy” 582). If there is paradox in this consideration of educational strategy, Riley
suggests, this is inevitable, since Rousseau’s theories work via progression through
paradox:
For Rousseau there are unavoidable stages in all education, whether
private or public. The child, he says in Emile, must first learn necessity,
then utility, and finally morality, in that inescapable order. If one says
‘ought’ to an infant he simply reveals his own ignorance and folly. The
notion of necessary educational time, or becoming what one was not, is
revealed perfectly in Emile’s utterance, when he chooses ‘to remain what
you have made me’. That is deliberately paradoxical — many of
Rousseau’s central moral / political beliefs are cast in the form of
paradoxes. However, it does show that the capacity to ‘decide’ is indeed
‘made’. It is education that ‘forces one to be free’ — by slowly
‘generalising’ the will. Similarly, Rousseau’s ‘nations’ are at first
ignorant.... [A]utonomy arrives at the end of a process, and the general
will is at last as enlightened as it was (always) right. (“Rousseau’s
Philosophy” 584)
Patrick Riley thus supplies us with a summation of Rousseau’s concept of the general
will, and sees this force as ultimately enlightening and formative. Roger D. Masters, in
The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, provides us with another view in what he describes
as an exegesis of Rousseau’s political thought. Quoting Bertrand de Jouvenel, Masters
suggests that “[a]ll social evolution of the past two centuries has been contrary to the
preferences of Jean-Jacques” (420). He contrasts the laws of science with the laws of
human society that Rousseau had linked together, and argues in his concluding chapter
that this linkage is what makes Rousseau’s political philosophy challenging in modern
society. Masters points to Leo Strauss’ discussion of the distinction between the
teleological aspects of the human science of natural rights and the non-teleological
aspects of the science of nature as problematic for Rousseau’s perspectives. As he puts
it, “Rousseau was fully aware ... of the gap between scientific propositions and the
assumptions or prejudices governing civil society. But his principles of right ... appear
impotent as a means of inhibiting the most enormous social experiments conducted in the
name of scientific or pseudo-scientific theories of human nature; the most obvious of
these theories — that of Karl Marx — has produced totalitarian political systems that
sharply contradict Rousseau’s own preferences, but could conceivably be justified in
terms of the enlightened or true self-interest of a citizen body which has absolute
sovereignty” (423). Considering this angle, Rousseau’s “principles are open to a
subversion,” or in other words can be used in a way that makes them appear responsible
for totalitarian impulses.
A part of this tendency in Rousseau for Masters pertains to the nature and processes of
education as Rousseau sees them. Masters points out that Rousseau’s treatise on
education, Emile, is “written on at least two levels: while Rousseau describes the proper
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education for the ‘natural man’, he also analyzes the nature of man” (3). A problem with
this approach, according to Masters, is that it must start from a level that exists before the
human exists; “Rousseau ... defines education broadly as that which provides ‘everything
that we do not have at our birth and which we need when grown’” (5). Education, that is,
involves a “denaturing” of the human, which perhaps prepares the individual for the
public education described in Political Economy, by which prescribed public education
becomes central to popular and legitimate governance (384). Such an education should
be at the hands of authorities such as “‘famous warriors’ and ‘upright judges’ who have
‘worthily fulfilled’ official functions” (384), lest public confidence in the belief that
education is “the most important business of the state” (384) be eroded. Rousseau’s
system would then, in this view, be designed to create the ideal citizen, one who is in
agreement with the “popularly accepted moral standards” (385) that underlie the general
will.
In his criticism of Rousseau’s political position, Masters suggests that Rousseau’s
political philosophies and assumptions about human development are largely irrelevant in
the modern world. For example, Rousseau’s beliefs regarding the solitary nature of early
humans, the state of freedom enjoyed in nature, the lateness of the evolution of the social
contract, and so on, seem disproved by contemporary research into human evolution and
social development. From Masters’ perspective, then, the Discours sur les sciences et les
arts (first Discours) is the main work that continues to bear social relevance. As Masters
puts it, “in some countries this epoch [at the time he was writing, the 1960s] has produced
a despotism based on advanced technology, permitting total control and mobilization of
huge populations to a degree apparently never before obtained” (440). “[A]n objective
consideration of our own era confirms Rousseau’s claim that the pursuit of luxury and
wealth based on scientific and technical progress coincided with grave social and moral
problems” (441). Masters traces the significance of the Discours to the “general pattern
of historical development in the mid-twentieth century”:
Rousseau reminded his readers of the conquest of wealthy empires by
poorer rivals, and it requires particular obtuseness to fail to see, in the
process of decolonization, the successful challenge to western
democracies by underdeveloped or backward peoples with but a fraction
of the economic and military power of their former colonial conquerors.
Increasingly, present world affairs are being seen as a contest between the
developed countries of the Northern hemisphere and the poorer peoples of
the Southern hemisphere.... (442)
Thus, according to Masters, what Rousseau wrote regarding the general form of social
organization, human development, the evolution of inequality, and so on bears little
relevance in our modern world; it is only in the area of the challenge the developing
world brings to the developed world, the conflict between north and south, that
Rousseau’s writing has contemporary relevance. In this way, Rousseau’s œuvre seems
entirely beside the point as regards such social issues of Masters’ time as the conflict
between western societies and the Soviet bloc. More relevance might arguably be found
in the evolving face-off between developed and developing countries, such as might be
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expressed in the events following the Arab Spring. Even in education, Masters states,
Rousseau is misguided, for he “attempted to determine the natural limits on human
freedom in order that the end or good life for man, as an individual, could be defined
without ambiguity” and “was therefore forced to ascertain certain natural characteristics
or impulses which are not subject to modification or destruction within society” (425). In
this process, Masters claims, Rousseau was forced to elevate conscience over reason. But
for Masters, “As the experience of Nazi Germany graphically illustrates, Rousseau’s
premise that the conscience of pity is a more fundamental human attribute than reason
can — to say the least — be opened to scientific doubt” (426).
However, Masters raises a caveat in his discussion of readings of Rousseau: “all too often
it is hard to know where Rousseau is being analyzed and where the commentator is
introducing his own attitudes and ideas” (418). We can see this conflict in the
perspectives on Rousseau introduced by Irving Babbitt, who played a crucial role in
founding the conservative movement known as the New Humanism. Though this
movement subsided in the 1930s, only to be reassessed in the 1980s (Hoeveler), Cold
War academics such as J. L. Talmon and Lester G. Crocker provide a reading of
Rousseau that demonstrates a perspective reminiscent of Babbitt’s cultural conservatism.
These ideological readings perhaps offers grist to the mill of Rousseau criticism
introduced by later writers such as Jonathan Israel and Michael Coffman.
Writing in the early twentieth century, Babbitt follows his own agenda by electing to
place Rousseau at the core of his main argument regarding the negative side effects of
what he calls “Romanticism.” In an attack on an aspect of Romanticism that he sees as
causing the dissolution of reliable concepts and values, Babbitt endeavors to retrace the
origin of the disintegration of classical values by looking closely at the Romantic
movement as a whole. Though he acknowledges that the terms ‘Classic’ and ‘Romantic’
are hard to define, he believes it necessary to take the trouble to come up with definitions
that throw light on what he singles out as a type of “[Romantic] movement that from
Rousseau to Bergson has sought to discredit the analytical intellect” (1). Using a
distinctly critical tone towards the writers he identifies as followers of Rousseau, Babbitt
makes it clear that he is blatantly taking sides against Romanticism in support of what he
considers ‘Classical’ values. He identifies Rousseau with an essentially ungrounded
movement followed by “those who are with [Rousseau or Wordsworth] rather than with
[Socrates]” (1). For Babbitt, this movement is ungrounded because it is based on
abstract, imaginative, and metaphysical foundations, or in other words because it shows
in its writings, according to Babbitt’s own pseudo-positivistic scientific perspective,
unworthiness as regards its living up to the intellectual and ethical standards put forward
by Socrates. Thus Babbitt focuses his attack on Romanticism, and on Rousseau in
particular, because he establishes Rousseau as both the precursor to and the culprit behind
the Romantic movement. Rousseau’s inclination, according to Babbitt, is towards the
metaphysical and sentimental as opposed to the intellectual, and Babbitt declares that to
“measure up to the Socratic standard, a definition must not be abstract and metaphysical,
but experimental” (1). Paradoxically, this analysis even provides the key to an
interpretation of educational practices that contrasts Babbitt’s ‘classical’ or ‘Socratic’
model of education with a Rousseauist ‘Romantic’ or ‘utilitarian’ approach, with a
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decided favoring of the classical. One result is a collapse of practicality in any potential
approach to education that follows Babbitt’s inclination; as Joseph Aldo Barney puts it,
Babbitt saw in the confrontation between these educational models “a life and death
struggle between the apostles of utility and the advocates of tradition” (150) and “held
that the naturalistic education espoused by Rousseau ... was undermining the traditional
liberal arts education in the schools.... [Babbitt] feared, therefore, that attempts at
humanitarian education would eventuate ... ultimately in a decline of the civilized world”
(153).4
Reading Babbitt, it becomes clear that his approach to Rousseau and the so-called
Romantic movement is deeply flawed, largely because it presumes to stem from a
polarized analysis that favors a critical position based on science and experience. By
interpreting Rousseau in a sweeping fashion, and by pretending that critical approaches
that are founded on history and pseudo-scientific methods allow for accurate
comprehension of texts, Babbitt reveals the lack of nuance inherent in his understanding
of the mechanisms of the text and its various expressions. Indeed, one of Babbitt’s
criticisms is that Romanticism relies on an irrelevant adoption of an 18th century ideal
that bases its views on truth and the world on “the law for things” as opposed to the “laws
for man” that have come into being through the development of civilization. This
perspective presumably underlies the critique of utilitarian educational approaches that by
nature must address themselves to aspects of physical reality. Another criticism Babbitt
makes, this time expressly of Rousseau even though it extends to the 18th century at large,
is that not only Romanticism, as he defines it, but also Deism, which enables man to find
harmony not in the rules of Christian dogma but in oneself and in nature, has caused a
break with the Christian tradition and led to a finding of the powers of virtue in “sense,”
in an instinct that directs morality itself into “an aesthetic or sentimental morality” (44).
Says Babbitt, “Man begins to discover harmonies instead of discords in himself and [in]
outer nature. He not only sees virtue in instinct but inclines to turn virtue itself into a
‘sense’ or ‘instinct’. And this means in practice to put emotional expansion in the place
of spiritual concentration at the basis of life and morals” (44).
It is true that Emile does seem to reject history and the subjective laws of Man, and that it
relies essentially on the needs and necessities of nature as opposed to systematic
ideologies. But it is also important to remember that Rousseau’s philosophy does not do
away with the values of experience. It in fact advocates control of the imagination
whenever imagination threatens to go astray at the expense of judgment, acknowledges
history whenever it discloses the recognition of behaviors that are universally worthy of
our morals as opposed to being the object of propaganda for any given regime, and above
all incorporates into the educational process that has been developed for the child the use
of reason, starting with the encouragement of common sense, or with the development in
Emile of what Rousseau calls « la raison sensitive » before presenting to the child’s
intellect the many complex aspects that interfere with the use of intellectual reason. Thus
when Babbitt pretends not to reject a naturalism that serves a utilitarian and scientific
purpose, but only to reject that type of naturalism that reflects the unsound aspects of a
Rousseauistic philosophy of life — “if I am right in my conviction as to the unsoundness
of a Rousseauistic philosophy of life, it follows that the total tendency of the occident at
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present is away rather than towards civilization” (x) — we can only assume that he has
misunderstood Rousseau’s intent as well as Rousseau’s writings. The misunderstanding
is revealed by the fact that Babbitt identifies the Romanticism associated with Rousseau
with an “emotional naturalism” that leads to excesses through the adoption of unreliable
and relativistic values. As Babbitt puts it, “my argument on the positive side aims to
reassert the ‘law for man’, and its special discipline against the various forms of
naturalistic excess” (x). ‘Naturalistic excess’ for Babbitt is tantamount to using
imagination to let sentiment prevail over intellect and reason, creating an ungrounded,
utopian, unrealistic world that is reflected in the unleashing of the ethically questionable
Romantic genius.
We see an example of this confusion when Babbitt accuses Schiller of looking for a
driving power in emotion, not in “supersensuous reality, not [in] insight,” because
Schiller chose as a motto for his “Aesthetic Letters from Rousseau” the phrase « Si c’est
la raison qui fait l’homme, c’est le sentiment qui le conduit » (43). Babbitt here
demonstrates just how much he misunderstands Rousseau’s use of the words ‘sentiment’
and ‘nature’. Far from referring to relative expressions in humanity that are subject to
outside stimuli, these terms signify for Rousseau sensible, evaluative measures that
represent universal components of human nature, both at large and in practice. The terms
also point to subjective components, but in doing so they are not just indicating
superficial adoptions of an anarchistic credo that will lead 20th century man, for lack of
accepting the conventions that have been an unquestionable gift of civilization, to social
chaos and political absolutism. Indeed, a focus on the contrast between convention and
nature sums up what Babbitt sees as much of the legacy of Rousseauism:
In permitting his expansive impulses to be disciplined by either humanism
or religion man has fallen away from nature much as in the old theology
he has fallen from God, and the famous ‘return to nature’ means in
practice the emancipation of the ordinary or temperamental self that had
been thus artificially controlled. This throwing off of the yoke of both
Christian and classical discipline in the name of temperament is the
essential aspect of the movement in favor of the original genius. The
genius does not look to any pattern that is set above his ordinary
spontaneous ego and imitate it. On the contrary, he attains to the self
expression that other men, intimidated by convention, weakly forego.
In thus taking a stand for self-expression, the original genius is in a sense
on firm ground — at least so far as the mere rationalist or the late and
degenerate classicist is concerned. No conventions are final, no rules can
set arbitrary limits to creation. Reality cannot be locked up in any set of
formulae [except] abysmal, unsearchable and infinite multiplicity. (45-46)
If Babbitt recognizes that what has happened to Rousseauism in the 19th and 20th
centuries is no longer absolutely a reflection of Rousseau’s philosophy, one can say that
he surely uses some of Rousseau’s terminology to establish Rousseau as the very initiator
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and cause of the forces that have created a series of social and political upheavals in the
19th and the 20th centuries.
One may wonder if Babbitt is victim of his own strong desire to see himself as a scientist
of literature, as someone who has adopted the criteria of the author’s life and his work as
an absolute mode of interpretation. Yet it goes without saying that this single-minded
interpretation, narrowed down to a rejection of Classicism and Christianity, and his desire
to depict Rousseau’s endeavor as essentially narcissistic, as reflecting a project that has
led to an anarchic free-for-all in the adoption of values that infect other realms of human
science via the bias of literature, paradoxically demonstrates the birth of deconstruction.
In fact the position that Babbitt takes assumes the pretense that one can understand an
author without acknowledging his voice, so that one feels perfectly legitimatized in
attaching all kinds of unforeseen interpretations to the text in the name of its syntactic
and semantic distributions.5 But one cannot limit oneself solely to reading Rousseau in
light of the idiosyncrasies of his style or his bewitching lyricism; one owes it to him to
read him not only in light of his intentions as they are translated in the gesture of writing,
but also in light of all his other texts, most written within a decade. An expanded reading
such as this reveals how Rousseau’s views do not rely on an egocentric understanding of
humanity, which he would have seen as based on an understanding of society anchored in
amour-propre rather than one based in a community founded on amour de soi. This
latter type of community would feature a concept of individuality that requires a
recognition of the interweaving of the individual and his original, pure make-up (the
source of humanity) with the a priori expression of a society in which conscience relies
on a universal compassion that is demonstrated via humanity’s innate amour de soi and
translated into the power of the general will. If one wishes to lend to Rousseau’s
philosophy an egotistic slant, then, one can only do so on behalf of a reader who
interprets Rousseau’s theories as duplicitous and dangerous, because this same reader is
subject to an agenda and to some kind of projection.
Even though after the late 1930s Modernist, Progressivist, and other movements
diminished some of the authority attributed to Babbitt’s New Humanism, it is hard not to
see the influence Babbitt’s ideas had on the investigations of later academics. In a vein
of interpretation that recalls aspects of Babbitt’s approach, for instance, J. L. Talmon
identifies in Rousseau’s ideas part of an encapsulation of perspectives that led to the birth
of democratic totalitarianism.6 According to Talmon, it is no longer a question of the
relativistic interpretation of values that Babbitt saw as the cause of the collapse of good
Classical teachings in mankind, but in fact a question of the pretentious absolutism of a
bunch of so-called doctrinarian thinkers, “prophets of liberty and the rights of man” (4),
who saw “the idea of man as an abstraction” and evaluated the condition of humanity no
longer in relation to an established order, but independently from “the historic groups to
which [persons] belong[ed],” relying on ideologies that were susceptible of becoming “a
powerful vehicle of totalitarianism” (4). Talmon sees the most important change in the
18th century as one involving a “peculiar state of mind” that considered the human legacy
as unnatural and unworthy: “Men were gripped by the idea that the conditions, a product
of faith, time and custom, in which they and their forefathers had been living, were
unnatural and had all to be replaced by deliberately planned uniform patterns, which

165

JPSE (2018)
would be natural and rational” (3). According to Talmon, this new secular religion that
usurped the rights of the Church promoted “social morality,” since it was now incumbent
upon the State to supply or replace the religious ethics that used to exist. Liberty was
hence to be achieved “only in the pursuit of a collective purpose” (4) that was rooted in
social utility rather than in tradition, and that above all was guided by reason (3). These
new thinkers, armed with the conviction that there was no other truth than an “exclusive
truth in politics” (1),
refused to envisage the conflict between liberty and virtue as inevitable.
On the contrary, the inevitable equation of liberty with virtue and reason
was the most cherished article of their faith. When the 18th century
secular religion came face to face with this conflict, the result was the
great schism. Liberal democracy flinched from the spectre of force, and
fell back upon the trial-and-error philosophy. Totalitarian Messianism
hardened into an exclusive doctrine presented by a vanguard of the
enlightened who justified themselves in the use of coercion against those
who refused to be free and virtuous. (5)
Having defined the partisans of “the totalitarian school” as a bunch of doctrinarians who
cherished what they perceived as an exclusive truth in politics because their ideology
postulated “a preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme of things, to which men
[were] irresistibly driven and at which they [we]re bound to arrive” (2), and in addition
having defined these thinkers as despotic re-enforcers of a dubious new secular ethic that
served as justification of the right to coerce in the name of freedom and virtue, Talmon
points to what he interprets as the shifting of the original credo from a mainly ethical
stance into “a social and economic doctrine” that nevertheless still is “based on ethical
premises,” and that is thereby added to the overall picture of a makeshift, opportunistic
movement rather than to a grounded, sensible and humanitarian one:
[B]efore the eighteenth century had come to an end, the inner logic of
political Messianism, precipitated by the Revolutionary upheaval, its
hopes, its lessons and its disappointments, converted the secular religion
of the eighteenth century from a mainly ethical into a social and economic
doctrine, based on ethical premises. The postulate of salvation, implied in
the idea of the natural order, came to signify to the masses stirred by the
Revolution a message of social salvation before all. And so the objective
ideal of social harmony gave place to the yearnings and strivings of a
class; the principle of virtuous liberty to the passion for security. The
possessing classes, surprised and frightened by the social dynamism of the
idea of the natural order, hastened to shake off the philosophy which they
had earlier so eagerly embraced as a weapon in their struggle against
feudal privilege. The Fourth Estate seized it from their hands, and filled it
with new meaning. And so the ideology of the rising bourgeoisie was
transformed into that of the proletariat. (5-6)

166

JPSE: Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education III (2018)
If, in this formulation of the ideals perpetuated in the eighteenth century, one can
recognize themes that are prevalent in Rousseau’s philosophy, such as notions of nature,
freedom, and virtue, it is difficult nonetheless for a careful and sensible reader to point to
them as the essential ingredients that brought into being a type of democracy that
becomes a perfect model for totalitarianism. Yet Talmon ends his introduction by
pointing out that “Modern totalitarian democracy is a dictatorship resting on popular
enthusiasm ... [i]n so far as it is the outcome ... of the synthesis between the eighteenthcentury idea of the natural order and the Rousseauist idea of popular fulfillment and self
expression” (6). Talmon then continues by denouncing the misuse of reason as well as
the notion of the general will as it is presented in Rousseau’s ideology, saying that “By
means of this synthesis rationalism was made into a passionate faith. Rousseau’s
‘general will’, an ambiguous concept, sometimes conceived as valid a priori, sometimes
as immanent in the will of man, exclusive and implying unanimity, became the driving
force of totalitarian democracy, and the source of all its contradictions and antinomies”
(6).
Any nuanced reader of Rousseau will have to question the accuracy of Talmon’s
understanding of Rousseau’s general will, even if that reader might also agree that in
Rousseau’s philosophy, the general will can seem like a shifting and ambiguous concept.
Perhaps what may help the reader see the problem with Talmon’s perspective is
Talmon’s own eagerness to split Rousseau’s concepts into oppositional categories,
resulting in situations where the adoption of a principle automatically excludes the
foundations on which it may have been established. When, for example, in his chapter on
totalitarian democracy and Rousseau, Talmon writes about the implications involved in
embracing the general will, he sees this embracing as connected to a dangerous tendency
to persuade the individual that he or she is not being coerced into following the demands
of an external standard that is being reinforced by an external authority that supposedly is
answering to “man’s inner voice,” thus encouraging the person to submit and comply to a
state of freedom that can only be achieved through discipline. Says Talmon, “even if
constrained to obey the external standard, man cannot complain of being coerced, for in
fact he is merely made to obey his own true self. He is thus free; indeed freer than
before. For freedom is the triumph of the spirit over natural, elemental instinct. It is the
acceptance of moral obligation and the disciplining of irrational and selfish urges by
reason and duty” (40). In this interpretation “the whole aim of political life is to educate
and prepare men to will the general will without any sense of constraint” (42), and the
goal of the Legislator is “the re-education of the ... nation to will the general will” (49).
In this reading, for Talmon, the general will is something that Rousseau “conjures up” by
“fiat” (19). But conversely to what Talmon seems to suggest by this characterization, the
general will is not an opportunistically fuzzy concept, but rather becomes a fluid and
clear expression of the best of humanity, both in its natural and in its socialized
expressions. The general will in fact allows the community and the individual to
question the purity of any and all intentions and of any disinterestedness in light of an
attempt to achieve inner and outer harmony. The external standards it establishes are not
arbitrary, but in fact reflect internal standards associated with the compulsions of
conscience. Far from involving moralistic prescription, then, the general will is the
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expression of the collective conscience at work. Also, far from acting as a Machiavellian
stratagem devised to impose and perpetuate socialized moral constructs, the general will,
through its flexibility, accommodates accurate uses of intuition and sensible knowledge
that serve both the individual and the community. Thus freedom is not achieved through
a split between instinct and spirit; it is achieved through the creation of an inner harmony
that becomes the general will or the collective conscience.
According to Rousseau, selfish urges do not need to be disciplined by reason and duty if
one undergoes an educational process similar to Emile’s, including an embracing of
negative education and a cultivation of faculties that enable one to function properly.
Instinct and intuition will be combined in a well-directed flow of energy, thus letting
passions flow adequately in a way that does not go against one’s own well-being. In no
way is the individual citizen/subject forced into obligation and acceptance, having his or
her personality molded according to external political norms that have been designed to
make it fit in and initiate the person into an artificial freedom. The general will is not
based on notions of conformity, nor is it an external, egotistic force in relation to the
individual. It enables the individual and the community to perform acts of conscience
because it never goes against anyone’s compassionate natural or social make up, but
instead reflects the workings of the uncorrupted individual’s amour de soi.7
Talmon tells us that the general will “has an objective existence of its own, whether
perceived or not ... [and that it] has nevertheless to be discovered by the human mind”
(41). What seems to lead Talmon to compartmentalize Rousseau’s ideas here is a
profound misinterpretation of Rousseau’s understanding of reason. For Talmon, reason
is a solely mental construct. But Rousseau, continuing in the tradition of Descartes, for
whom reason stems from a capacity for common sense that is based in the expression of
instinct, sees reason and reasoning not only as the articulation of a complex faculty that
demands the use of a well-trained mind, but also as the manifestation of a basic faculty
that starts its work before any other mental faculty develops. Before reaching maturity,
the child relies mostly on what Rousseau calls « la raison sensitive », a basic faculty
linked to the need for survival. The somewhat elusive concept of the general will is not
connected for Rousseau to some externalized social abstraction like the one Talmon
suggests; it exists within us as a manifestation of a potential derived from basic
instinctual reasonableness. Above all, it does not have an existence of its own, outside of
human reality, because it is a metaphorical concept that acknowledges a natural form of
conscience that does not issue from the application of social morals, but from individuals
themselves, before any exposure to ethics. It certainly does not exist solely as a mental
construct; rather, it resides in the physical, anatomical, and spiritual weave of the natural
man, as well as in the social man who is harmoniously tuned to nature.
Thus conversely to Talmon’s idea that the human mind needs to be acquainted to the
general will, the human mind of “the natural man made to inhabit the city,” such as Emile
is, is fully engaged with the dynamic interplay of the instinctual and the mental, since
from an early age this mind has been integrated with human reasoning processes via the
universal language of the body that resides at all levels of any being, from bodily
microcellular reactions to the tuning of a discerning mind via the intelligence of the heart.
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To see this process at work, one need only recall the early, non-verbal teaching of the
infant via the stimulation of feelings, the use of simple images, and the introduction of
simple thoughts (and later, as the child grows, more complex thoughts) that enable the
individual, thanks to a sound and grounded intellect, to function in harmony with both
himself and his surroundings. Rousseau’s philosophy does not rely on changing the core
of human nature, but on directing the passions in such way that the integrity of the
individual’s natural energy is protected and does not deviate. If the mind has learned to
use its faculties properly, it is in tune with its own intuition and instinct. Thus, when
Talmon asserts that an implication of Rousseau’s Social Contract is that “[i]ndividualism
will have to give place to collectivism, egoism to virtue, which is the conformity of the
personal to the general will” (42), one cannot help but note that this interpretation
confuses the notion of individualism, “an ideology that privileges and celebrates
individuals over the group,” with that of individuality, or “the recognition that individuals
are different from one another” (Loo).8 To be sure, Rousseau’s philosophy does ask that
one not act selfishly, but this request has nothing to do with the imposition of rules, or
with discipline, or with the obliteration of the individual’s existence. Rather, it involves
the reiteration of the recognition of natural compassion and pity that is born out of amour
de soi.
The understanding that Talmon has of Rousseau’s individual relies exclusively on a
definition of man that is associated with amour-propre and not with amour de soi.
Above all, Talmon seems to mix up the concepts of the national will and the political will
with the general will, turning the latter into a means for finding an efficient way to move
masses. Yet Rousseau’s establishment of a social compact is not geared toward finding
hypocritical ways to manipulate the mass so it will concur with the agenda of the state,
but rather toward preserving the integrity of the individual through an agreement that
respects each individual’s wholeness while enabling the wholeness of the newly
established community and state to exist in accordance with primordial principles of
human compassion. Far from being a coercive mechanism that forces unanimity, it
ensures the development of a process for generating and remembering wholeness and
cohesion. In addition, the general will is not designed to reinforce a political agenda and
a system that imposes preordained rules that apply in society without ever being
questioned. Rather than considering the political plane as the only plane of existence, it
brings together the natural, the instinctual, the intuitive, the individual, and the social as
well as the universal planes.
By not seeing in Rousseau’s definition of reason the crucial role played by instinct and
common sense, Talmon falls into the same error as Babbitt did when he chooses to
describe Rousseau’s philosophy as based exclusively on instinct and sentiment, rather
than seeing it as a philosophy that comprehensively co-ordinates the senses and the
intelligence of the mind as well as the intelligence of the heart — in short, as a
philosophy that combines the multidimensional aspects of the person that contribute to
the intelligent use of faculties when body, mind, and heart are united. When Talmon
contrasts the “liberal type of democracy” with the “totalitarian democratic school” by
pointing out that totalitarian democracy “is based upon the assumption of the sole and
exclusive truth in politics,” while “the liberal approach assumes politics to be a matter of
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trial and error” (1), one must wonder how he can present Rousseau as the precursor of
such political ideologies. For one may ask if a structure with checks and balances like
those found in the model of the citizen/subject in the Social Contract, reflecting as they
do the active involvement of all that are included in the compact as well as offering a
common, comprehensive, and universal understanding of what pertains to the “moral”
core of humanness and humanity, precludes spontaneity and encourages doctrinal
ideologies.
Looking at Lester G. Crocker’s analysis of Rousseau, written in the late 1960s and early
1970s, one encounters again a similar type of distortion in the interpretation of
Rousseau’s system. Once more, Rousseau’s terminology comes under attack, as do his
motivations in writing books such as Emile and The Social Contract — books that are
meant to offer solutions to mankind. Instead of trying to read Rousseau contextually,
which would imply attention to the autobiographical, historical, philosophical, and
spiritual forces impacting his work, Crocker’s approach involves a desire to explain
Rousseau’s philosophy as reflecting a hidden agenda, or better yet as exemplifying the
work of a hypocrite who changes his views whenever it suits his argument. Hence, for
instance, when he is reporting on Rousseau’s demonstrations in the passage known as the
Profession de foi from Emile, Crocker accuses Rousseau of conveniently, under the guise
of his semi-fictional character the Vicaire Savoyard, leaving reason aside in favor of the
inner light when wanting to know what is true. In Crocker’s interpretation, Rousseau
tries to mask the inconsistencies in his thoughts as well as his deceptive ideas by simply
shifting perspectives and conveniently when need be denigrating reason, even when
doing so apparently contradicts his previous acknowledgements of reason’s importance
and supremacy. In this way Crocker sums up the second conclusion drawn by the Abbé
during his spiritual quest as being aimed at consulting the inner light instead of at
“philosophers [who] in their pride lead us only into the kingdom of confusion” (2:146).
According to Crocker, Rousseau replaces Descartes’ reason with the word “heart,” the
heart here representing the sensible means of reaching clarity in one’s convictions.
Denouncing what he calls Rousseau’s dubious method, Crocker underlines what he sees
as Rousseau’s lack of integrity and honesty
So much for the method. Only it is not really his method. In reality,
Rousseau is a reasoner and a rationalist. He will reason as hard as he can.
He is also a dogmatist. Knowing in advance what he wants to prove, he
will abandon reason, mock and vilify it when it abandons him, and turn in
triumph to the “inner light.” The “inner light” is infallible because it is an
immediate intuition, preverbal in form, unfiltered by reason. He sees no
contradiction in his attitude: reason, “properly” used, within its “proper”
sphere, is man’s attribute. But he also decries reason, because he is hostile
to its effects as men have used it in civilization. (2:146)
Crocker’s perception of Rousseau’s opportunistic use of reason here must seem
completely inaccurate to anyone who has read Rousseau closely, and above all to anyone
who has followed Rousseau’s multiple explanations of what the act of reasoning entails.
As Rousseau points out, reason is an extremely complex faculty. To operate efficiently

170

JPSE: Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education III (2018)
and appropriately, reason requires the use not only of numerous mental faculties, but also
of other physical and instinctive faculties. According to Rousseau, then, reason is not
solely a mental faculty. In addition, it is not what exclusively constitutes human
understanding. Seen in this light, it is certainly not the faculty of reasoning or reason in
itself that Rousseau abandons, nor reason that has negative effects; rather, it is what
results when men do not know how to use reason properly and comprehensively. Thus,
Rousseau’s statements are not brought up randomly whenever convenient; rather, they
point out, as far as the use of reason is concerned, the limits of this faculty when it does
not rely on other judicious faculties and detached motivations, since reasoning itself
cannot merely be a simple mental exercise designed to justify our ends, especially when
only superficial interests are involved. In fact, the unity of Rousseau’s system and the
role played by reason within it can only be understood if one recognizes the part played
by conscience at the individual, instinctual, mental, spiritual, and social levels. Only then
do such concepts as reason, or what Rousseau means when he deals with the notions of
freedom and obedience, make sense. A more modern way of explaining where Rousseau
is coming from would involve equating the notion of amour-propre to the ego and amour
de soi to the self as detached entity. One wonders if Rousseau tends to be consistently
misunderstood by critics such as Talmon and Babbitt because of the confusion that words
such as ‘reason’, ‘instinct’, ‘sentiment’, ‘feeling’, ‘opinion’, ‘individuality’, and
‘freedom’ generate, or because of the meanings that these and other words convey to
them. In addition, one might wonder if such critics do not project their own thoughts
regarding morality onto Rousseau, due in part to their inability to understand what
Rousseau really means by conscience and how it can manifest itself in a political body.
As mentioned previously, Rousseau’s system, as it is presented in his writings, is not
meant to be seen as a series of isolated fragments that enable the critic randomly to
extract statements out of context so as to project one-dimensional interpretations that are
more reflective of the critic’s agenda than of Rousseau’s actual intentions. The nowclichéd sentence that if man does not want to be free he will be forced to be free is
certainly one of the most typically misunderstood passages in the Social Contract, as is
what Rousseau meant by the general will, which is often interpreted as representing
something similar to Orwell’s Big Brother.
Looking at the critics this paper has presented so far, it is incumbent to try to explain
why, from the late 19th century to the contemporary period, so many Anglo-American
readers of Rousseau have misunderstood his philosophy and made blatant, irrational
accusations regarding his writings, especially in light of the compassionate message
Rousseau was trying to put across. One might also try to explain what role historical
events such as the Russian Revolution, World War Two, and the Cold War played in
developing these unfounded views of Rousseau’s system, as for instance in the claims
concerning the totalitarian intentions that are associated with it. After all, as Dame points
out, in the early history of the United States, readings of Rousseau largely remained in
tune with Rousseau’s intentions, including a “[call] for a return to natural action founded
on reason of mind and heart” with “[i]nstinct, feeling, subjectiveness, and imagination
[being] of paramount importance [and] employed to lead enlightened men from the state
of nature to the social state, which is the appropriate state” (54). Perhaps Shklar’s and
Masters’ readings of Rousseau can help explain what in Rousseau’s writings triggers
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fanaticism on behalf of conservative American critics, a fanaticism that can be traced to
Babbitt’s writings of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Neither Shklar nor Masters are
invested in pointing the finger at Rousseau’s system. They seem instead to want to
explain or even dismiss assertions about Rousseau’s importance with regard to any actual
political or other manifestations from World War One to today. At question is whether
Rousseau is actually a political philosopher, not to mention a politician. In fact, for
Masters, Rousseau’s first Discours is the only work that bears political relevance to
modern life: “an objective consideration of our own era confirms Rousseau’s claim [in
the Discours] that the pursuit of luxury and wealth based on scientific and technical
progress coincided with grave social and moral problems” (441).
On the other hand, Shklar’s perspective can be seen as hinting at why hostile 20th and 21st
century critics offer such compulsive misunderstandings of Rousseau; their
interpretations derive from Rousseau’s efforts to reconcile his longing for a society that
provides opportunities for personal fulfillment with the need for self-abnegation he found
in classical social models. In light of this effort Rousseau’s prescriptive statements about
society should not be taken literally. The concepts readers project onto his works stem
from a profound misunderstanding of Rousseau’s intentions, which Shklar describes as
combining an endeavor to find a model that fulfills a most universal aspiration, i. e.,
happiness, with metaphoric personifications (the sovereign people and the general will)
that aim at fostering a public model of this happiness. Reminding us that “Rousseau is
not ‘rousseauisme’” (216), and that the “the Social Contract was less a utopia than a book
of warnings” (211), Shklar claims that Rousseau “was neither a traditionalist nor a
revolutionary of any sort” and that his “deep ... hatred of inequality is a perpetual
challenge to any known society” (30).
Riley’s interpretation of Rousseau supports Masters’ and Shklar’s claims that Rousseau’s
models could represent a viable political system only with extreme difficulty. The
conflict lies in Rousseau’s wish to combine ancient cohesiveness and modern
voluntarism. As Riley puts it, “The problem Rousseau faced in the concept of the general
will ... was to reconcile modern individualist and even commercialized models of society
with the greater cohesiveness he perceived in ancient societies” (86). Rousseau uses the
term ‘general will’ to encapsulate these two notions, bringing together past and present,
the community and individual, and so forth in an abstraction.
When Shklar, Masters and Riley look at Rousseau, they attempt to understand the
tensions in the text that may lead to misunderstanding. They recognize the quality of
Rousseau’s gesture and do not try to read him literally, but rather to see what he tried to
achieve. Things change when we read Rousseau from the perspectives of Babbitt,
Strauss, Talmon, and Crocker. The problem these critics face is that they offer
interpretations that generate ideological perspectives. Starting with Babbitt, we see an
understanding of a type of Romanticism that is based on the abstract, the imaginative, the
emotional, and the metaphysical, as well as on the sentimental and egocentric. Babbitt
believes that this type of Romanticism aims to get rid of classical values — an interesting
perspective, given Rousseau’s own tendency to support his political and educational
visions with direct reference to classical society, though as Riley points out, Rousseau
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leans more toward Sparta than toward Athens. Babbitt’s misunderstanding lies in his
belief that Rousseau discredits the analytical intellect. Talmon falls into a similar error
when he describes Rousseau’s philosophy as based on instinct and sentiment, without the
multidimensional aspect that contributes to the intelligent use of human faculties when
body, mind, and heart unite. For Talmon the 18th century rebels replaced traditional
values with ‘natural’ and rational ones, making secular religion the promoter of social
morality and placing virtue and freedom in the hands of the state, not the church.
Rousseau’s philosophy, in Talmon’s view, contributed to this movement by interjecting
ideas of popular fulfillment and self expression based on instinct and sentiment, as
opposed to components such as the mind and heart that can contribute to the intelligent
use of faculties.
Reason itself becomes a major theme for Crocker. Strauss and Crocker both present
Rousseau as a Sophist, but Crocker is more judgmental in his reading of Rousseau than
Strauss is. Both Crocker and Strauss read Rousseau narrowly, in a positivistic manner
(i.e., by trying to understand the text through the life of the man and by analyzing the
character of the man through the perceptions reflected by the work). This approach leads
them both to suggest that Rousseau is a hypocrite and to find his arguments involving
manipulation and lies designed to serve his own ends. One result is that their collective
analyses become almost personal. Above all, Crocker shows how completely oblivious
he is of Rousseau’s intentions, which involve trying to convey in his often metaphoric
writing his visionary experience at Vincennes and his desire to foster ways to achieve the
unity of man (see Rousseau, “To M. de Malesherbes”). None of Rousseau’s writings are
meant to be dogmatic, despite what Crocker so adamantly suggests, perhaps forgetting
that Rousseau was self-taught and so expressed himself in uncharacteristic ways.
Actually, Rousseau’s writings attempt to capture a moment and transpose the revelation it
involved into social, political, educational, and fictional visions. The great flaw of these
conservative interpreters — Babbitt, Talmon, and Crocker — is that they read Rousseau
out of context, either deliberately or unconsciously, seeing him as a manipulative,
hypocritical sophist who will not hesitate to contradict himself in the name of being right.
To the contrary, if Rousseau uses paradox, it is more with the intention of clarifying his
vision, which he himself suggests was overwhelming, and which he acknowledges has
been imperfectly relayed. As a result of their approach in reading Rousseau, then, critics
such as Crocker and Strauss miss much. They do not understand Rousseau’s gesture and
read him literally, without nuance. This tendency reaches its extreme in the vituperation
Crocker shows toward Rousseau when the former characterizes “the natural man made to
inhabit the city,” Emile:
Perhaps we get a more accurate view of what Emile really is, in his
independence from “opinion,” when we learn that he will not accept an
insult or a slap, with its stain of dishonor; but neither will he, in such a
situation, endanger his life to remedy what the civil law is unable to
avenge. Law being insufficient, he recovers his natural independence. He
will simply murder the offender in some way, perhaps by shooting him in
the back. (2:144)
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The extremity of the characterization here suggests that Rousseau might function for
some as what Carl Jung would call a constellating factor. Though Strauss, Talmon, and
Crocker lived through the Second World War and under the shadow of the Cold War, we
can still see this tendency toward constellation emerging in recent presentations of
Rousseauist thought, just as one can say that the “constellated” concept of the Reaganist
“evil empire” has re-emerged in symbolic post-Soviet manifestations such as
Islamophobia, or in the reversal of this perception in the countervailing, euphoric postSoviet vision of the “New World Order” proclaimed by the first President Bush in the
early 1990s, or in the echo of evil that streams through the plague of invective that now
polarizes American politics. The ghost of history remains in the American critical
psyche, and plays its role in shaping sociopolitical perspectives and the readings fueled
by them much as it did in the century before. In this light we see the negative Cold War
readings of Strauss, Talmon and Crocker continued in the work of two contemporary
commentators, Jonathan Israel and Michael Coffman.
Jonathan Israel’s overall project is to champion what he calls the “Radical
Enlightenment,” a “system of ideas that [has] shaped the Western World’s most basic
social and cultural values in the post-Christian age” (Revolution xi). He asserts that
“Radical Enlightenment argues for overthrow of current systems, the basis of morality in
reason, international consensus on progress, and equality.” This intellectual movement,
spawned in the 17th and 18th centuries, supports belief in fundamental human equality,
stresses the importance of democracy, upholds rights of individual liberty, and argues for
freedom of speech and thought. Radical Enlightenment differs from the “mainstream
thinking” (Revolution xii) of the past, and is challenged by postmodernism, which has
“deemed all traditions and sets of values more or less equally valid” (Revolution xiii) and
so dismissed “universal … higher values self-evident in reason and equity” (Revolution
xiii). Israel distinguishes the Radical and Moderate Enlightenment from such “AntiEnlightenment” figures as Rousseau.
In his systematic polarizing of perspectives, Israel connects Rousseau to authoritarianism
in a way that ignores Rousseau’s support of equality. Rousseau is excluded from the
Radical Enlightenment for several reasons, many of which demonstrate Israel’s ignorance
of Rousseau’s positions on freedom, morality, and reason, and show how inaccurate,
limited, and decontextualized his understanding of Rousseau is. Following are some of
the reasons for Rousseau’s exclusion:
1. The Radical Enlightenment saw its political agenda as potentially international,
arguing for “universal revolution driven by the active agent of la philosophie”
(Revolution 57), and argued that human rights and equality are the same for
everyone, so the revolution should be exported, while Rousseau argued against
internationalism and felt that different societies would require different
governmental institutions.
2. The Radical Enlightenment found the basis for morality in human reason, while
Rousseau argued for its foundation in the “voice of nature.”
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3. The Radical Enlightenment argued for freedom of thought and expression, while
Rousseau favored censorship (“forcing people to be free”) (Revolution 63).
4. The Radical Enlightenment insisted on the social nature of its enterprise, while
Rousseau leant increasingly towards isolation and introversion. (D’Holbach felt
that the misorganization of society, which Radical Enlightenment meant to fix,
was responsible for Rousseau’s contention that “life in society is ‘contrary to the
nature of man’” [Revolution 57] and should be renounced.)
5. “Radical Enlightenment … is partly defined by an emphatic, anti-Rousseauist
preference for representative democracy” (Revolution 64).
Regarding these, we can agree that Rousseau certainly did not believe in “universal
revolution,” which could be equated with the “New World Order” proclaimed by the first
President Bush around the time of the first Gulf War. A glance at the differences
between Rousseau’s recommendations for the governments of Poland and Corsica
demonstrates Rousseau’s belief that different societies require different forms of
government, as opposed to a “one size fits all” type of model that may underlie some of
the difficulties involved in the West’s attempts to export the values (and exploitations) of
capitalist society. Regarding reason, Israel’s clichéd reference to the “voice of nature”
demonstrates a total lack of understanding that is perhaps even more severe than the
oversimplifications of Babbitt and others. Similar problems appear with concerns about
censorship. While one can detect passages suggestive of censorship in the work of
Rousseau, it is only addressed directly in chapters 6-7, Book IV, of the Social Contract.
For Rousseau, censorship is a worst-case scenario because it can only be present when it
is already too late. That is to say, censorship exists only when the essential morality of
the human being has been compromised by opinion, and thus when the role of negative
education, as it is described in Emile, has failed. With regard to isolation, though
Rousseau did move away from his peers, this more reflects on personality than on
philosophy. And finally, as concerns representative government, see again Rousseau’s
beliefs about different types of government for different societies. In short, Israel's
reading of Rousseau is filled with clichés and oversimplifications, perhaps because Israel
reads Rousseau through other critics, perpetuating prejudices and distortions that lead
him to miss the systematic unity in Rousseau’s thought. As an example, he concludes
Radical Enlightenment with comments on Rousseau's “Janus-headed mixing of elements
from both the radical and mainstream Enlightenment,” proclaiming that Rousseau put
“stress on the existence of a Creator and First Mover, on two substances [vs. the
monadology of Israel's champion, Spinoza], on the immortality of the soul, and the
absolute quality of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in ethics” (Radical 720). While some of these
assertions might be supported by statements Rousseau made, the claim that Rousseau
believes in an “absolute quality of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in ethics” is blatantly false — Emile,
for example, is amoral until he learns morality. Rousseau’s system is not based on a
prescriptive ethics founded on absolute good and evil but rather on a natural and
individual predisposition that if well channeled will inevitably construct a sensible
morality, as happens for example in the case of Emile.
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Israel's massive output has been met with an impressive range of skepticism. As Johnson
Kent Wright puts it, Israel's writings have engendered “a series of in-depth critiques,
from leading practitioners of every stripe,” who reach a “strikingly unanimous verdict”
that the work is an “academic juggernaut, careening destructively through the discipline,
in the service of a false idol ... and an unsustainable principle — the idea of an umbilical
connection between metaphysical monism and political radicalism.” But if Israel’s
perspective is problematic, and his reading of Rousseau an amalgam of clichés, it is
nothing compared with the crude ignorance displayed in the approach Michael Coffman
offers in his manifesto Rescuing a Broken America. Coffman divides American social
values into two categories that he identifies with the philosophies of John Locke and of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau respectively. The Lockean model, Coffman claims, upholds the
individual as the basis for any founding principle of rights and values, and so represents
all “good” values of freedom and justice that underlie “true” American values as
represented in the United States Constitution. The Rousseauist model, on the other hand,
upholds the group or the state as determining rights and values, and so represents a
movement toward evil, fascistic, and communistic values that Coffman identifies with the
policies of Barack Obama. In Coffman’s lexicon, “Rousseau” becomes an adjective that
replaces words such as evil, lazy, dictatorial, bureaucratic, and so on, as is shown in such
phrases as “Rousseau progressive liberals have a very warped view of human nature; they
refuse to accept responsibility” (30) or the chapter title “The High Cost of Rousseau
Socialism” (57). As regards education, Coffman argues that as a result of the “shifting
[of] the form of government from that based on the John Locke model to one based in the
writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau” (95), public education in America “has been totally
corrupted” into “a system of mind control based on the psycho manipulation principles of
Burrhus Frederic Skinner, Benjamin Bloom, and Alfred C. Kinsey” (96). The result of
such an alteration is spelled out bleakly at the end of Coffman’s discussion of education:
Once a revisionist curriculum indoctrinates a full generation, its
propaganda becomes truth. The general population will believe that
socialism and world citizenship is the only truth, and will resist all efforts
to expose how they have been dumbed down. It is happening before our
eyes. (104)
Anti-freedom, communistic, fascistic, evil — such are the words, images, and ideas that
one finds associated with Rousseau. One might ask if these projections onto the ideas
Rousseau presents are signs of isolationism and compartmentalization, Manichean
perceptions of evil and duplicity, blatant representations of hypocrisy and deceit that
actually only express some of the undercurrents of American society, and are
unfortunately passed on in the American educational system. Such are the interpretations
of Rousseau’s philosophy. One can ask why Rousseau has become such a polarizing
figure in Anglo-American circles, why his philosophy — or rather, attacks on his
philosophy — became important in the New Humanism or underscored the orchestration
of the New World Order proposed in the image of Radical Enlightenment, or even echo
today across the Radical Right. An answer might lie in the tradition of Anglo-American
philosophical education, which can be characterized by its lack of study of philosophy,
bolstered by undercurrents of utilitarianism, empiricism, and pragmatism that cannot
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encompass the philosophical background of someone like Rousseau, and the avowedly
self-taught traditions of classical philosophy and Cartesian rationalism that he brings to
his work. It might also be pertinent to consider the dismissive attitude toward foreign
languages and the meanings and cultures they represent in light of this tendency to
diminish the philosophical.
However we approach the phenomenon of Rousseau’s denigration, what is clear is that
Rousseau is a polarizing figure, an expression of contradiction and of complexity that
allows critics of all stripes to see in him both what he means to say and all too often what
they project. If Rousseau is a constellating figure in the Jungian sense, perhaps what the
critics see in Rousseau is only a representation of themselves, or of the ideological
perspectives they represent. If ideology is revealed by the contradictions it avoids, and if
projection in psychological terms is the mechanism by which the analysand avoids seeing
the neurotic forces driving these projections, what can we say about the characterizations
of Rousseau’s philosophy that underlay the long ascension of America onto the world
stage from the late 19th to the 21st centuries — the period when industrialization,
destruction of nature, increasingly totalitarian states, both dictatorial and democratic, and
crushing social organization have come to the fore — when the statement that “man is
born free, but everywhere he is in chains” has in some ways become truer than ever?
Perhaps the effort is to kill the messenger, rather than hear the actual message, in which
the disunities of individual and social freedoms might be addressed, or in which the
possibilities of a new freedom lie buried in an unrealizable novel on the education of a
child in which the child gets taught in such a way that his mind remains unclouded by
ideology, operates mostly on common sense, and enjoys a harmonious use of mental
faculties, allowing him to be able to think outside the box in an open fashion at all times.
Either way, what you see is what you get — or what you are. These readings or
misreadings of Rousseau may then tell us as much about our own society as they do
about the citizen of Geneva.
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Notes
1

For an assessment of Rousseau’s impact more particularly on American life in the 18th
century, see Spurlin.

2

For a perhaps oversimplified view of Rousseau’s impact on American education,
particularly at the primary levels and regarding the shift away from Puritanical
educational practices toward the introduction of Kindergarten, see Cunningham.

3

Frank Thakur Das maintains that “the period roughly speaking between 1889 and
1930 ... found the critics, mostly academics, pre-occupied in examining the elusive,
metaphysical, concept of the General Will,” but that “in the background of [the] rise and
fall of Fascism in Europe [the] main concern was to probe into the overall political
disposition of Rousseau’s thought in terms of two rather loosely defined categories
Liberal or Totalitarian, either variant of this critical pre-occupation which held the
attention of Rousseauite scholarship for more than a decade was like-wise in terms of two,
somewhat vague, yet suggestive categories, i. e. Individualism and Collectivism” (552553).
It should also be noted here that readings of Rousseau often approach the texts in
isolation, or emphasize certain features at the expense of others. It is important to
remember that Rousseau generated most of his works within a decade, and that the works
are supposed to complement each other. Ideally they are not to be read exclusively, but
judged in light of his whole œuvre. Nor are they to be seen as evidence of a preRomantic, Enlightenment, or other tendency, but must be read from multiple perspectives
at once. Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse, for instance, is well known for its exploration of
political and social views, and so goes well beyond being a simple love story. Rousseau
himself explains his entire œuvre in relation to a moment of enlightenment he
experienced when traveling to Vincennes, and locates the central tenets of his philosophy
in his two Discours and in Emile.

4

Other critics who support Babbitt’s views on education in contrast to perspectives
traced to Rousseau include Robert C. Koons, for whom Rousseau’s “admitted ...
inveterate laziness” translates (via Harvard’s Charles William Eliot) into the “elective
system” of the modern university, “in which the student is ‘compelled to be free’ by
being denied the opportunity to undertake a coherent and well-ordered course of study”
(Koons 203), and Glenn A. Davis, who suggests that Babbitt saw Rousseau’s
“understanding of the imagination” as underlying “the deepest roots of educational decay,”
since in the Rousseauist model, “Education ... did not mean training for ethical character
or virtue, but rather it meant ‘letting go’ of all externally imposed standards” while also
“limiting instruction to the utilitarian needs of its constituents” (Davis 53-54).

5

Lester G. Crocker illustrates this tendency when he tells us, “[a] major fallacy [Babbitt
commits] is to regard Rousseau as an anarchist, whereas, quite to the contrary, [Rousseau]
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is an authoritarian and puts the highest price on discipline and order” (“Professor Babbitt”
272). This interpretation equally reveals Crocker’s and Babbitt’s misreading of Rousseau.
6

According to Arie Dubnov, Talmon describes “the French Enlightenment thinkers,
headed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as radicals who not only provided the philosophical
justification for Jacobin terror but were in fact also forerunners of Bolshevism and
Stalinism. Talmon considered Rousseau, more than anyone else, an anti-liberal democrat
who made totalitarian democracy possible. Opposite to liberals, argued Talmon,
Rousseau did not consider politics ‘to be a matter of trial and error’. Rousseauian vision
of politics, based on the idea that ‘La volonté générale est toujours droite [the general
will is always upright]’, offered a new ideal that became essential for totalitarian
democracy — that there is a ‘sole and exclusive truth in politics’. Hence, Rousseau’s
‘lawgiver’ (legislateur) was interpreted by Talmon all too similar to George Orwell’s
‘Big Brother’ and Stalin’s ‘engineers of the human soul’. It was the idea of volonté
générale in particular, Talmon believed, that became ‘the driving force of totalitarian
democracy’” (131). See also Das, who maintains that “Talmon traced the roots of
modern totalitarianism to Rousseau” (555), and Seitschek, who writes that „Rousseau
nimmt eine zentrale Rolle in Talmons Denken ein, da ihn Talmon — sehr eigenwillig —
als direkten Vorläufer des Totalitiarianismus interpretiert“ (57).

7

This position can be thought of in relation to Jonathan Marks’ consideration of the role
of “disharmony” in attempted resolutions of human consciousness. Marks points out that
people are born without the “sentiment of existence,” since at birth we lack “selfconsciousness,” which depends for its existence on memory. He suggests that
Rousseau’s savage differs from the “sociable man” because the sociable man exists
“always outside himself,” while the savage “lives in himself.” These tensions within the
individual lead Marks to claim that “Rousseau views the human good not as a unity but
as a set of disharmonious attributes or tendencies that must somehow be arranged in a life
so as not to tear the human being apart” (86-87). Projected onto the political sphere,
Marks suggests that “Rousseau was willing to preserve tension in order to give the
plurality of human goods their due” and “made the savage nation, a nation characterized
by struggle, a pattern for his visions of the good life” (88). Marks specifically contrasts
this perspective with the one Talmon presents, in which (he claims) Rousseau’s
“totalitarian” tendencies are linked directly to Rousseau’s (perceived) neurotic character.
As Marks puts it, “to call someone who [like Rousseau] favored civic education and civil
religion a totalitarian is to empty that term of its moral seriousness” (87).

8

These definitions come from a 2 December 2013 blogpost by Dennis Loo, author of
Globalization and the Demolition of Society, on a site dedicated to discussion of this
book. Similar insights into the distinction of individuality from individualism can be
found at the Emerson Post blogsite, dedicated to discussion of the works of Ralph Waldo
Emerson, where on 9 December 2009 “Mr. Morris” commented, “Individuality as I see it
is about the expression of self; an expression of mind and spirit; an expression of your
thoughts and those things that make you a unique being worthy of notoriety.
Individualism is the spirit that sees the world and life (to use an economic term) as a zero
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sum game. The idea that one person’s win is another person’s lost [sic] or that one’s
happiness may require another’s grief. The idea that someone necessarily has to get the
short end of the stick in the ‘game’ of life....” See finally John Horvat’s comments in
Return to Order, a book dedicated to the establishment of an organic Christian
community, in which Horvat states, “We make a distinction between individuality and
individualism. Man manifests his individuality when he fully develops his personality
and talents by which he is different from others. At the same time, individuality
encourages man to develop his intensely social character by participating in life together
in community, acknowledging a moral law, and promoting the common good. The more
specific, richer, and stronger this personal life, the more intense the social life. Thus,
individuality results in stronger community.” Meanwhile, for Horvat, “Individualism is a
deformation of individuality by which man makes himself the center of an enclosed
world of personal self-interest that tends to disregard the social character of man and his
role in community” (74). One might ask if these tendencies to establish an opposition
between individuality and individualism are supplanting the earlier emphasis on the
opposition between individualism and conformism that prevailed during the Cold War
period.
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Teaching Magical Thinking: Notes towards a Burroughsian
Pedagogy
Allan Johnston
It might seem odd that one would write about the pedagogical practices or educational
philosophy of William S. Burroughs, the Beat novelist who is best known as the author of
Naked Lunch and pioneer of the cut-up method. After all, Burroughs was a writer rather
than a teacher, and his experiences as a teacher, not to mention his comments on those
experiences, are limited. Of his two stints in the classroom described in Literary Outlaw,
Ted Morgan’s biography of Burroughs, one, his tenure at a school in Switzerland,
appears to have been part of a scam, while the other gave him only a short experience of
teaching. He lectured at the Naropa Institute, but lecturing is not necessarily teaching.
Also, he apparently found that teaching drained his creative energy to such an extent that
after teaching one creative writing class he asked, “am I being punished by the Muses for
impiety and gross indiscretion in revealing the secrets [of writing] to a totally unreceptive
audience — like you start giving away hundred-dollar bills and nobody wants them”
(Adding Machine 28)?
But behind the drug-crazed, homoerotic violence of Burroughs’ experimental novels,
recordings, and films lies a peculiar metaphysics and a system of thought that
underscores a vision of the world which we can view from an educative angle. In fact,
Burroughs does describe pedagogical practices he used in writing classes, and these
exemplify some of the ideas, often unusual but coherent in their own strange way, that
underlie his vision of the world, and particularly of the word, and stress how the forces of
thought, perception, education, and existence shape our approach to daily life. These
pedagogical approaches toward teaching writing perhaps parallel or supplement what
Joseph Vecchio calls the “pedagogical ... sense” (vii) underlying much of Burroughs’
experimentation with film and prose (the “cut-up” technique), through which, Vecchio
claims, Burroughs often “is purposefully putting himself in the role of teacher whose
curriculum is the destruction of control mechanisms” and whose purpose is “to
demonstrate ways in which one could free oneself from control” (4). From the few
examples of strategies he describes having developed to teach writing students, we can
reach some conclusions about his intentions and techniques, including some that
Burroughs himself presents. We will examine these after reviewing some of the
predominant ideas Burroughs develops through his writings, interviews, and other works,
showing how his persistent effort is to invoke means of countering social control.
At the core of Burroughs’ approach is an attack on rationality and ego-centeredness as
bulwarks of social order. This rational order is upheld by dominating addictions to
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power, which Burroughs sees as more addictive than the heroin to which he was hooked
for much of his life. He identifies this addiction early on in his famous calculation of the
“algebra of need,” which for him demonstrates among other things that selling is more
addictive than buying. Closely related to this concept is Burroughs’ “focus on the antisocial, anti-life forces which [are] a fundamental expression of the parasitic nature of
living [and which] construct his world of parasitism and symbiosis” (Johnston,
“Burroughs Biopathy” 108). He expresses the formula of need in Naked Lunch through a
simple set of rules that he sees as providing the model of monopoly:
1—Never give anything away for nothing
2—Never give more than you have to give (always catch the buyer hungry
and make him wait).
3—Always take everything back if you possibly can. (Naked Lunch 200)
We see one of the central characters in Naked Lunch, Dr. Benway, exploring a corollary
to these values when he states, “The subject must not realize that his mistreatment is a
deliberate attack of an anti-human enemy on his personal identity. He must be made to
feel that he deserves any treatment he receives because there is something (never
specified) horribly wrong with him. The naked need of the control addicts must be
decently covered by an arbitrary and intricate bureaucracy so that the subject cannot
contact his enemy direct” (Naked Lunch 19). Bureaucracy operates on the “principle of
inventing needs to justify its existence” (Naked Lunch 112), Benway states later.
Jennie Skerl argues that Burroughs’ algebra of need replaces the “economic theories of
capitalism’s apologists” and also opposes the positions of “Marxist critics” (William S.
Burroughs 38), in that in this model “[s]elling [becomes] more of a habit than using”
(Burroughs, Naked Lunch 287). What this means, then, is that the Burroughsian “world
of manipulated needs … serves mainly to keep those who satisfy [these needs] in power,”
but it also means that “this power elite’s control is far from absolute, for its members are
driven by their own need to control” (Dolan 535). The algebra of need thus offers “a
cycle of diminishing returns [and] a degenerate capitalist economy headed for
bankruptcy” (Lydenberg 146).
Later works by Burroughs suggest a movement toward a “next step” in which the human
may leave the body altogether (Whitmer and VanWyngarden 106), though Burroughs
elsewhere states, “I do not think of myself as a materialist but I do insist that anything
that affects the human nervous system must have a point of reference that is a definite
location in the human nervous system” (Adding Machine 90). David Ayers associates
Burroughs’ move away from the body with Gnosticism (225), while Jones Irwin,
following the lead of Daniel Belgrad, would probably associate this tendency more with a
“Third Worldism ... understood from a spiritual rather than an economic perspective”
(272). It could also be that “Burroughs … aims to destroy society through fantasy”
(Johnston, “Burroughs Biopathy” 119), and as a corollary to this destruction, tends to
move away from the dominating presence of the body, its entrapment in the senses, and
its material expression through language by transcending it through telekinesis, extrasensory perception, and other means. In this light the anarchic homosexual gangs
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described in such novels as The Wild Boys and Red Cities of the Night represent an
idealized form of anti-society based on decentralized, cooperative social structures that
seem focused intently on homoerotic violence and sometimes ritualized death. These
imagined communities attempt to supersede bourgeois social order by exiting from
language, which Burroughs at some points suggests can itself be disembodied, even to
the extent that voices in the air or voices in silence can be detected given the right
circumstances (Adding Machine 53). Which brings us to the concept of the word virus.
Having posited addictions to power and to selling as primary forces in contemporary
societies, Burroughs connects this supposition to an identification of language with
endemic features that are expressed through the trope of the word virus. Burroughs
apparently considers the word virus as literally extant, though one may question the
extent to which Burroughs’ vision of the world is flatly materialistic. Put another way, a
spiritualistic component appears in Burroughs’ presentations of the word and the
societies that the word virus infects, but we cannot say that this is a religious view.
Rather, it is “magic” in a sense that implies indirect and non-rationally knowable
connections in a way that we will come back to later. But the word, in its endemic
spread, its self-replication, its disembodied capabilities, and its ability to control thought
through standardization of meanings via cliché, repetition, and other devices, achieves, in
Burroughs’ cosmology, a viral quality that removes it from the usual arguments regarding
the conveyance of meaning, the processes of ideation and naming, and other features we
associate with language. Skerl describes the word virus as consisting of “linguistic-social
constructs linked to particular economic and political structures” (William S. Burroughs
63), and if we accept this model, escape from this virus involves “an escape from
entrapping modes of consciousness” (Johnston, “Consumption” 110). In his more avantgarde writings Burroughs works toward this escape through experimentation with cut-ups
(in which two texts are cut apart, and the pieces are aligned to create a new text), fold-ins
(in which a text folded over on top of itself generates altered content), and other forms of
textual manipulation deliberately designed to subvert meaning as it is determined by the
ordering process of words constructed into sentences.
Burroughs himself states, “My general theory since 1971 has been that the Word is
literally a virus, and that it has not been recognized as such because it has achieved a state
of relatively stable symbiosis with its human host” (Adding Machine 48). He uses as
evidence for this claim the following argument: “The Word clearly bears the single
identifying feature of virus: it is an organism with no internal function other than to
replicate itself” (48). From this angle we can see that the word virus, even if we do not
accept it as a literal virus as Burroughs apparently does, is capable of obtaining an
independent and perhaps even quasi-mystical force, often operating beyond the usual
levels of human control, but nevertheless manipulated by some in ways that allow words
to subdue individuals and control social organization. One way to think of this is via the
model of sentence structure that posits an entity (the subject, usually a noun) that acts
upon another entity (the object, manipulated through a verbal limb that controls the
relation between these two ideations). Gunther Kress, in a context totally unrelated to
Burroughs’ description of the word virus, illustrates this relation well when comparing
the linguistic presentation of rain in the sentence “It is raining” to the visual, auditory, or
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other modes in which rain is presented as a feeling of wetness, the sounds of water
splashing, and so on. The sentence structure in the lingual mode posits an “it” that is
somehow making raining occur, suggesting a subject-based manipulation of perception
that relies on an external or perceptually distinct entity or quality that makes raining
operate (“it”). Whether for Burroughs such powers as those that these features of
language permit are controlled by forces beyond earth, as some of the novels suggest, or
whether such meanings are deliberately subverted by experimental textual techniques
such as the cut up or the fold in, which try to undermine the domination of the word and
the representational presentation of reality that it often manifests, much of the effort in
Burroughs’ work is to describe control structures and to show how these structures can be
attacked and subverted through violation of the social and linguistic forces that shape or
determine appropriate social behaviors.
In the novels these attacks often take the form of overt social violence, and are
accompanied by descriptions of obsessively obscene, vicious erotic practices such as
asphyxiation by hanging, almost invariably in a homoerotic context. Yet importantly
these practices are not accompanied by any sense of standardized abiding moral
evaluation. The style of writing, involving what Burroughs calls the “routine,” removes
us from moralistic or “bourgeois” consideration (particularly after Burroughs develops
the mature style that starts with Naked Lunch), and becomes reportorial, deadpan,
fantastical, generally macabre, and comic in a “black” or “arabesque” way. This effect,
and the general style of the routine as an anecdotal strategy, is exemplified well by the
famous routine describing the talking asshole in Naked Lunch, a passage that also
illustrates in graphic manner how language takes over and degenerates individual
existence:
Did I ever tell you about the man who taught his asshole to talk? His
whole abdomen would move up and down you dig farting out the words.
It was unlike anything I ever heard.
This ass talk had a sort of gut frequency. It hit you right down there like
you gotta go. You know when the old colon gives you the elbow and it
feels sorta cold inside, and you know all you have to do is turn loose?
Well this talking hit you right down there, a bubbly, thick stagnant sound,
a sound you could smell.
This man worked for a carnival you dig, and to start with it was like a
novelty ventriloquist act. Real funny, too, at first. He had a number he
called “The Better ‘Ole” that was a scream, I tell you. I forget most of it
but it was clever. Like, “Oh I say, are you still down there, old thing?”
“Nah! I had to go relieve myself.”
After a while the ass started talking on its own. He would go in without
anything prepared and his ass would ad-lib and toss the gags back at him
every time.
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Then it developed sort of teeth-like little raspy in-curving hooks and
started eating. He thought this was cute at first and built an act around it,
but the asshole would eat its way through his pants and start talking on the
street, shouting out it wanted equal rights. It would get drunk, too, and
have crying jags nobody loved it and it wanted to be kissed same as any
other mouth. Finally it talked all the time day and night, you could hear
him for blocks screaming at it to shut up, and beating it with his fist, and
sticking candles up it, but nothing did any good and the asshole said to
him: “It’s you who will shut up in the end. Not me. Because we don’t
need you around here any more. I can talk and eat and shit.”
After that he began waking up in the morning with a transparent jelly like
a tadpole’s tail all over his mouth. This jelly was what the scientists call
un-D.T., Undifferentiated Tissue, which can grow into any kind of flesh
on the human body. He would tear it off his mouth and the pieces would
stick to his hands like burning gasoline jelly and grow there, grow
anywhere on him a glob of it fell. So finally his mouth sealed over, and
the whole head would have amputated spontaneous — (did you know
there is a condition occurs in parts of Africa and only among Negroes
where the little toe amputates spontaneously?) — except for the eyes, you
dig. That’s one thing the asshole couldn’t do was see. It needed the eyes.
But nerve connections were blocked and infiltrated and atrophied so the
brain couldn’t give orders any more. It was trapped in the skull, sealed
off. For a while you could see the silent, helpless suffering of the brain
behind the eyes, then finally the brain must have died, because the eyes
went out, and there was no more feeling in them than a crab’s eye on the
end of a stalk. (Naked Lunch 110-112)
What happens in this passage is a literal takeover of ego-centered humanity as expressed
through language by a malevolent oppositional force in what Skerl calls a “downward
metamorphosis” (William S. Burroughs 39). This process occurs through a gradual
assertion of voice over the person via political and emotive manipulation (the demand for
equal rights and the crying jags). In the anecdote this voice reduces the body through a
non-human (or perhaps, à la Nietzsche, too human) shutting down of the brain through
cliché, emotion, and demand. Base human functions overtake capacities of language and
all possible normal oral expression, and in this instance the effect is the devolution of the
person into undifferentiated tissue, a form of stem cell material, though here achieving
the opposite possibilities of plenipotentiary cells in that this material becomes almost a
type of napalm disfiguring the body and devolving it toward the level of the crustacean or
even further.
If for Burroughs much language usage incorporates a “definite technology for the
negative use of words to cause confusion,” this is “the opposite of what a writer does”
(Adding Machine 34). “An essential feature of the Western control machine,” Burroughs
states, “is to make language as non-pictorial as possible, to separate words as far as
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possible from objects or observable processes” (Burroughs and Odier, qtd. in Baldwin
63). The writer, on the other hand, trains himself or herself to use words to focus on the
particularities of existence, away from the exigencies of power and control, perhaps by
setting up a counterbalance to this control. One might compare this vision of the word
and how it works to evoke “charged” particularities, even if imagined or hallucinated,
with the idea of the image developed by Ezra Pound, one of the leading Modernist poets
whose work helped break the gridlock of traditional forms to usher in the free verse
movement. According to Michael Alexander, Pound’s Cantos follows a strategy in
which “honesty to perception involve[s] a shifting focus and the use of superimposed
images and dissolving forms” (138), in a way that foreshadows Burroughs’ adaptation of
the rapidly shifting routine. In a similar vein, “Imagism,” the pioneering focus on “direct
treatment of the thing” that Pound and others introduced in the years before World War
One, “attempted a new purchase on reality (‘direct treatment of the “thing”’) by a process
of limitation (‘the “thing”’) and exclusion of inessentials by a formal purism. The pursuit
of the essential, the illuminating moment caught in the significant detail, was Pound’s
habitual aim, an empirical mysticism involved in the origin of descriptive poetry” (90).
This “direct treatment of the thing” can be compared with Burroughs’ explanation of the
title of Naked Lunch as referring to “a frozen moment when everyone sees what is on the
end of every fork” (Burroughs, Naked Lunch 199).
Pound’s imagism thus bears relation to the strategies Burroughs employs. We must of
course recall that the “image,” as it is presented in poetry, literature, and writing
generally, directly implicates itself in the “word,” from which it is formed. For Pound,
and in poetry generally, images are the creation of words that are used to stimulate or
recall mental processes initiated by sensory perception. In this way the word, if not a
virus, is a manifestation of energy, or at least becomes a funnel (like Pound’s vortex) that
can direct energy through its establishment of relations between energy fields. Thus
Hugh Kenner can say of Pound’s strategy that “Patterns made visible ... occupied
[Pound]”; “‘Emotion [evoked through language became] an organizer of form’” (146);
“‘Energy creates patterns’” (147). The “funneling” that words achieve is presented by
Kenner as operating through indirection established by relation: “For Pound Imagism is
energy, is effort. It does not appear itself by reproducing what is seen, but by setting
some other seen thing into relation.... The action passing through any Imagist poem is a
mind’s invisible action discovering what will come next that may sustain the presentation
... to the end that the poem shall be ‘lord over fact’...” (186). Again, this “image” is a
creation of the word or of words that have been arranged to provide “psychic charge”
through “direct treatment of the thing.” It could be argued then that Burroughs achieves
intensely “imagistic” effects through his presentation and disbursement of (often erotic)
scenes that appear, evoke, and “fade out” in rapid order, rendering and in fact deliberately
imitating a style that is often associated with the filmic or cinematographic.
The core concepts regarding the word and the power structures surrounding us lead us to
Burroughs’ suggestions regarding human interaction with the world in a way that can
point toward the pedagogical approaches he mentions in some of his writings. Burroughs
identifies his approach to the world as “magical thinking,” and he contrasts it with other
perspectives such as ego-dominated rationalistic thinking. Irwin associates Burroughs’
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position with “animistic values” and “a literary and mystical move which attacks the
basis of Western modernity and indeed the very self-justification of the West itself”
(278). Burroughs does this, Irwin continues, through the introduction of “demonology
and ... thematic possession” (278) in a way that posits these forces without reduction,
recalling (Irwin states) the position Paulo Freire takes toward animistic societies in
Cultural Action for Freedom: “As Freire has shown, reductionist readings of animism
and magic in non-Western societies apply an externalist logic which fails to understand
the inner coherence of the magic system” (Irwin 278). A primary aspect of Burroughs’
magical thinking is a belief that the individual is at the center of his or her own perceptual
universe and in some ways makes things happen in that universe, be it intentionally or
unintentionally. That is to say, the perceptual universe of the individual is specifically
that person’s universe, created and manipulated by that person, though often without that
person’s knowing or conscious intention. In fact the question of intentionality versus
non-intentionality, insofar as it is centered in ego consciousness and rational decision, is
misleading in that Burroughs sees “the ego” as a “liability,” at least insofar as artistic
creation goes. As he puts it, “The best writing and painting is only accomplished when
the ego is superseded or refuted. An artist is in fact transcribing from the unconscious”
(Adding Machine 88).
The power to make things happen surpasses conscious manipulation through egocentered domination in that Burroughs suggests that Freudian Id and Superego merge
with ego, and that most action occurs outside conscious thought, though the links
between consciousness and unconsciousness can often be traced. Burroughs believes in
fact that the Freudian model offers an “outmoded” (Adding Machine 88) description of
the spheres of human consciousness and the subconscious. To the end of usurping the
domination of perceptions by the ego and increasing awareness of the connections
between consciousness and the subconscious, he describes exercises he uses in writing
classes that involve observation and a pursuit of the thought patterns that lead to
particular events or perceptions. These exercises, which resemble some of the techniques
used in Scientology and aim at results similar to those underlying spiritual beliefs and
practices associated with eastern religions and disciplines, alert the student to perceptual
processes and help the student understand or trace subliminal links that underlie
“accidents” (which, for Burroughs, who is operating in a magical universe, are never
accidental) and other actions and interactions in which the student is involved. In a way
we could call these practices instances of spiritual pedagogy, in that behind them lies an
effort to increase awareness and perhaps mindfulness. These efforts thus become central
to developing a sense in which the student learns to shape or construct his or her own
world, which Burroughs essentially sees as the activity the artist or writer engages in —
making reality.
Burroughs points toward this understanding of magical thinking in his collection of
essays The Adding Machine, where he declares his acceptance of magical truth. As he
puts it, “Magic is the assertion of will, the assumption that nothing happens in this
universe (that is to say the minute fraction of the universe that we are able to contact)
unless some entity wills it to happen. A magical act is always the triumph or failure of
the will” (99-100). He continues:
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Among so-called primitive peoples, if a man is killed in a fall from a cliff,
the friends and relatives of the victim start to look for a killer…. The
magical push or pull, which potent magic men achieve by a projection of
their malignant will, reaches its purest form in defenestration…. You can
observe [the mechanisms of magic] operating in your own experience. If
you start the day by missing a train, this could be a day of missed trains
and missed appointments. You need not just say ‘Mektoub, it is written.”
The first incident is a warning…. Writers operate in the magical universe
and you will find the magical law that like attracts like often provides a
key note.... In the beginning was the word and the word was God. And
what does that make us? Ventriloquist dummies. Time to leave the
Word-God behind. (100-103)
Many of the exercises Burroughs recommends for writers involve acts of perception
designed to increase awareness of the immediate environment. As an example, he
presents the following recommended practice: “when walking down any street, try to see
everyone on the street before he sees you. You will find that if you see others first they
will not see you, and that gives you time to observe” (Adding Machine 33). Whether we
can say that the results of this practice are true – whether, that is, by seeing others first
you prevent them from seeing you – is obviously debatable, and would need to be tested
through data collection or controlled experimentation, though such an approach would
inevitably sabotage the results of the testing of the “magic” by its imposition of controls.
Variations on this exercise mentioned by Burroughs involve successive observations of
objects of specific colors as one walks, so that for instance one focuses on the red objects,
then on the blue, green, yellow, etc., taking note of each. Burroughs’ name for this
exercise is “walking on colors,” and he describes it this way: “Pick out all the reds on a
street, focusing only on red objects…. Switch to green, blue, orange, yellow” (Adding
Machine 50). The point of such exercises is that perceptually, the writing student who
practices externalized focus of attention develops observational skills that increase
awareness through centering on external realities rather than a potential interiorized
monologue of random thought, or in literary terms a “stream of consciousness.”
Additionally, these exercises turn perception into montage, recalling Douglas Baldwin’s
assertion that for Burroughs, “montage in film and literature more closely matches human
perception (especially urban perception) than ideologically inspired linear narrative with
its satisfying closure” (Baldwin 71).
I have suggested that such techniques resemble some of the strategies that Scientology
employs. In Scientology, one simple exercise can be interpreted as involving an effort to
consciously observe objects via a process of direct questioning that emphasizes objective
existence. An example would be to choose an object, say a tree, and consciously follow
the steps suggested by the words “See that tree? Look at that tree. Thank you. See that
sign?” and so on. An interlocutor might start you on this process, but eventually it gets
internalized, so that the perceiver him- or herself follows the steps of itemization,
observation, and disengagement via acknowledgement. The person practicing the
exercise is of course expected to actively connect through the steps by really looking at
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the tree (or whatever), even to the point of acknowledging its individuality and the
particularities of its existence, appearance, and qualities through the act of thanking,
paying respect to the tree, which perhaps merges with the self-congratulation implied in
the acknowledgement of one’s participation in the exercise. The effect might be said to
involve separation of the perceiver from the visible world, and objects in the visible
world from each other, so as to emphasize the individual’s existence as a detached being
(in Scientological terms, an operating Thetan) that is not actually part of the physical
world as such. In fact one of the physical effects of such exercises is increased depth
perception and awareness of existential dimensionality, accompanied by a “quieting of
the mind” through externalized concentration on perception that makes the exercise
useful as a technique of increasing mindfulness and awareness.
The connection between Burroughs’ approach and strategies employed in Scientology
may not be accidental. Burroughs himself practiced Scientology and apparently reached
the state of “Clear” (Kostantinou), which refers to a level of consciousness in which past
memories (called engrams) no longer generate uncontrolled reactive response.
Burroughs has written regarding Scientology,
Some of the techniques [of Scientology] are highly valuable and warrant
further study and experimentation…. On the other hand I am in flat
disagreement with [its] organizational policy. No body of knowledge
needs an organizational policy. Organizational policy can only impede the
advancement of knowledge. There is a basic incompatibility between any
organization and freedom of thought. Suppose Newton had founded a
Church of Newtonian Physics and refused to show his formula to anyone
who doubted the tenets of Newtonian Physics? All organizations create
organizational necessities. It is precisely organizational necessities that
have prevented Scientology from obtaining the serious consideration
merited by the importance of Mr. [L. Ron] Hubbard’s discoveries.
Scientologists are not prepared to accept intelligent and sometimes critical
evaluation. They demand unquestioning acceptance. (“William S.
Burroughs on Scientology”)
We see Burroughs acknowledging the possibilities Scientology offers, but attacking it
because of its adherence to bourgeois order, and in fact its slippage into the “control”
mode that underlies “organizational necessities.” Scientology becomes just another
control structure attempting to dominate thought and existence. The freedom implicit in
the exercise, in that it distinguishes and provides individuality to each entity perceived, is
negated by the mechanisms of control that the Church of Scientology imposes upon its
members, not to mention its control over the techniques this organization has developed
to increase individual awareness.
One goal in Scientology is the “clearing” of reaction to external stimuli that “trigger” the
individual. A strategy employed to this end involves sitting in a chair facing another
person. The goal is to remain in a still, “meditative” state while the person opposite you
says or does any number of things to provoke you or to “push buttons.” The exercise is
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meant to eliminate charge from what Scientologists call “the reactive mind.” Similarly,
the e-meter, a device that resembles a lie detector, is used to measure reactions with the
aim of reducing the emotional “charge” associated with memories, just as by repetition
one might imagine a subject reducing the charge measured by a lie detector. The
intention is to “clear” the subject of emotional reactions generated by latent memory in
order to prepare the subject for direct reception of the Scientological “truth” of human
existence as “operating Thetans” (which is beyond the scope of this paper; as the
Scientologists would put it, “understanding is agreement”). Hence the idea of “going
clear” or of being “clear” refers to achieving or being in a state where the emotional
charge of past events has been lessened or erased. Writing to Allen Ginsberg, Burroughs
described this method of clearing as involving “directed recall”: “[the Scientologists]
simply run the tape back and forth until the trauma is wiped off. It works” (qtd. in
Kostantinou).
Similar goals of deprogramming operate in the “pedagogical sets” (if one can use such
words to describe them) of disciplines or religions such as yoga and Buddhism, both of
which employ or encourage exercises to limit, counter, or reduce the “charge” of reaction
generated by experience — sometimes in past lives — and its (often unconscious)
internalization. Thus in these traditions the aim is to “empty” the mind through
restraining and ultimately “clearing” mental content, as is made evident in the description
of yoga that opens Patañjali’s Yoga Sutra, which specifies the aims of yogic practice:
Yoga is the cessation of the turnings of thought.
When thought ceases, the spirit stands in its true identity as observer to the
world.
Otherwise, the observer identifies with the turnings of thought.
(Stoler Miller 29)
The “turnings of thought, whether corrupted or immune to the forces of corruption” (31),
are identified as “valid judgment, error, conceptualization, sleep, and memory.” These in
turn are defined as follows:
The valid means of judgment are direct perception, inference, and verbal
testimony.
Error is false knowledge with no objective basis.
Conceptualization comes from words devoid of substance.
Sleep is the turning of thought abstracted from existence.
Memory is the recollection of objects one has experienced.
(Stoler Miller 31)
The role of language in perpetrating such “turnings of thought” should be obvious.
Language arguably underlies all acts of inference and verbal testimony, as well as all
“false knowledge” and “conceptualization,” even if these relations are not always
immediately obvious. Arguably the “image” structure of the brain involves visualization
existing under a layer of verbalization that shapes and disguises visualization. The
Poundian “imagism” discussed above in fact achieves its “psychic charge” through the
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word’s power to evoke the (deeper) visual or sensual image and/or perhaps to link images
in a way that generates energetic responses. In many ways, then, “thought” can be
understood as a manifestation of language, and often this manifestation occurs as what
Patañjali calls “verbal delusion.” Yogic practices included among the eight limbs of
yoga, such as asana (yoga poses) and pratyahara (withdrawal of the senses), are
designed to move one progressively toward “the cessation of the turnings of thought,”
which includes the cessation of (internalized) language.
Buddhism similarly encourages practices such as meditation that are meant to lead to
states involving the stilling of thought. A primary aim here is to move the subject away
from the separation of self and other and imprisonment in the past (i.e., karma) towards a
recognition of the illusory nature of reality, or the “void.” Burroughs in fact describes a
conversation he had with Allen Ginsberg in relation to his theory of the word, as follows:
I asked some of my Buddhist friends, including Allen Ginsberg, this
simple question: who are you actually talking to when you are ‘talking to
yourself’? Without presuming a complete understanding of the nature of
the Word, I suggested that such an understanding would make it possible
to shut off the internal dialogue, to rub out the Word. Allen replied that
the Buddhists have developed techniques over the centuries to do just that;
it may be so. Not having experimented with their techniques, I can’t say.
But I wanted some answers, and it seems to me that in the three thousand
years the Buddhists have had to toss this around, they have not come up
with any. I offered this challenge then and I repeat it now: give me ten
years and a billion dollars for research, and I’ll get some answers for the
question of the Word. (Adding Machine 48)
The suggestion Burroughs here makes in fact echoes one sometimes associated with
Scientology, in that (so the argument goes) the Scientological employment of the e-meter
and other technologies or practices eliminates the trial-and-error or “marathon” approach
of the ancient disciplines, substituting technological solutions for ardor and money for
time. It should also be noted that Burroughs’ focus is much narrower than those of these
ancient disciplines, in that 1) Burroughs concentrates exclusively on the effect of the
word on human consciousness, and links it with the effect of social control mechanisms
on human consciousness in a way that if addressed at all in the ancient systems, is only
approached indirectly; 2) Burroughs lays aside the direct focus on morality as
traditionally understood, not evoking concepts such as faith or consideration of
observances (the yogic concern with yama or moral principles, the Buddhist emphasis on
“right speech” and “right action” as part of the eight-fold path). In fact Burroughs hints
in Naked Lunch that the state of peace and full awareness sought in samadhi (which he
calls Soma) is in some ways just another form of addiction: “I have heard that there was
once a beneficent non-habit-forming junk in India. It was called soma and is pictured as
a beautiful blue tide. If soma ever existed the Pusher was there to bottle it and
monopolize it and sell it and it turned into plain old time JUNK” (Naked Lunch 201). It
must also of course be remembered that Burroughs here is writing a novel rather than
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exploring a philosophy, so we are allowed to “suspect” the representation of the “truth”
as it appears in the text, or in the perspective of the characters presented in the text.
If we wanted to link Burroughs’ perspective to a more familiar or western pedagogical
stance, we could point to Paulo Freire’s description of the human relation to the world as
presented in Cultural Action for Freedom, where he suggests the effect language has on
human interaction with the world:
Engagement and objective distance, understanding reality as object,
understanding the significance of men’s action upon objective reality,
creative communication about the object by means of language, plurality
of responses to a single challenge — these varied dimensions testify to
men’s relationship with the world. Consciousness is constituted by the
dialectic of man’s objectification and action upon the world. (40-41. My
emphasis)
In Pedagogy of the Oppressed Freire posits the “banking school of education” as the
tradition in which students become depositories of information later to be regurgitated at
will or at the bequest of the educational system. He argues for a critical pedagogy of
“problem posing” that should allow the oppressed to regain their humanity and overcome
their condition of oppression, a position that tallies in part with the Burroughsian
approach in which the pupil becomes central to (and hence presumably gains some power
over) interpretation of the world. Freire, however, does not suggest that the individual
“makes” his or her own reality, but rather confronts and (hopefully) overcomes the
problems posed by an extant reality, be they environmental, physical, or social.
Burroughs goes beyond oppression at the social level by exploring the mechanisms of
thought through which such information can be posited. The word virus, for example,
becomes a controlling motif pointing toward the mechanisms of control that need to be
confronted to go beyond the mechanism. In this way, through the quasi-spiritual or
magical, the Burroughsian approach sidesteps the Freirian position in that Burroughs
calls the very mechanisms of organization of the ‘real’ into question. For instance, in
discussion with Daniel Odier, Burroughs points out that “If we realize that everything is
illusion, then any illusion is permitted. As soon as we say that something is true, real,
then immediately things are not permitted” (qtd. in Baldwin 70). An example of this
approach to reality can be seen in the perception of something as seemingly basic to the
human experience as time. Vecchio, in discussing the impact of Burroughs’ theories on
industrial music, points out that “The linear nature of time is usually not thought of as a
‘deliberate attack’ from an enemy, but time is an imposition that is never agreed upon a
priori” (25). While it is difficult to imagine how one might escape from temporal
linearity, it is not totally inaccurate to state that the perception of time as linear (in
opposition, for example, to a cyclical understanding of time) is generated by social,
cultural, and perhaps mechanical forces. It might in fact describe the difference between
a mythical and a rationalistic approach to existence, in that it replaces eternal recurrence
with temporal linearity. In his writing, Burroughs often undermines the perception of
linear time through paramnesiac manipulations of words meant to generate senses of
déjà-vu or jamais-vu. Bonome relates this practice to “ritornello,” “a term describing a
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section of a musical composition, which is repeated at some point during its
performance,” and discusses this practice in relation to “paramnesia”:
“paramnesia” typically defines a condition where the subject is not able to
remember the proper meaning of words. Two other forms of paramnesia
are worth mentioning; one occurs when someone thinks she has seen a
scene before or lived a situation when in reality it is the first time such
scene or situation is encountered, and is associated with “déjà-vu.” The
other type of paramnesia, where the familiar is thought to be experienced
for the first time, is called “jamais vu.”
These effects, manipulated in textual presentation, perhaps call into question, or reflect,
or sabotage similar factors of control that are seemingly embedded in our perceptions, so
that (Baldwin states), according to Burroughs, “both visual and verbal narratives
traditionally fail to mimic real processes of perception; they instead redefine how people
‘see’.... [T]his ‘redefining’ becomes a trope for how perception — individuals’ ‘narrative
self-fashioning’, as it were — is controlled by outside forces” (65). Thus we reach
Burroughs’ contention that “‘Reality’ is simply a more or less constant scanning pattern
— The scanning pattern we accept as ‘reality’ has been imposed by the controlling power
on this planet, a power primarily oriented towards total control” (qtd. in Baldwin 69).
Other exercises Burroughs suggests for writers go beyond the direct focusing on
externalities described above, and may suggest ways in which “magical” approaches can
begin to undermine such established notions as temporality. These approaches involve
an effort to provide inroads into the subtle psycho-spiritual or magic interactions that
emerge from the interplays of self, unconscious, environment, and perhaps the unnamable
or unspeakable. Thus Burroughs recommends an exercise that mingles subject, object,
and other potential entities or agents, perhaps as a way of beginning to penetrate the
dichotomies such naming suggests. Here is the exercise, along with some results and
suggested effects:
Take a walk around the block. Come back and write down precisely what
happened with particular attention to what you were thinking when you
noticed a street sign, a passing car or stranger or whatever caught your
attention. You will observe that what you were thinking just before you
saw the sign relates to the sign. The sign may even complete a sentence in
your mind. You are getting messages. Everything is talking to you. You
start seeing the same person over and over…. At this point some students
become paranoid. I tell them that of course they are getting messages.
Your surroundings are your surroundings. They relate to you. (Adding
Machine 101-102)
“Writers operate in the magical universe and you will find the magical law that like
attracts like often provides a key note” (Adding Machine 101), Burroughs explains. In
the exercise one of the most notable features is the subject’s subtle perception of escape
from linear time and rationalized organization of events. The sign completes a sentence
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in a way that might suggest pre-perception or Jungian synchronicity (which Burroughs
mentions, though he does not associate the phenomenon with Jung), or it points to the
interference of environment with thought so that the sign becomes the logical or
necessary end by somehow imposing its message on the subject’s consciousness prior to
direct awareness. Again, rational or any scientific testing of this approach and its effects
would require some form of double-blind testing that given the subjective nature of the
experience would be almost impossible, since it would require an affirmation of
subjectivity through objective means — employment of the sort of organizational
structure that Burroughs wishes to subvert, and a process posited upon the terms and
meanings the exercise in some ways seeks to question. The question becomes, to what
extent do we live unconsciously outside rational order in a world where voices float in
the air, a sign completes a seemingly unrelated meaning, synchronous occurrences
immerse us in repetitions of the same, invisibility is achieved through perception, etc.?
These are both features of and questions posed by the magical world Burroughs claims he
exists in and defends, and they return us to the realm of the shaman, spirit traveler, and
other beings who exist in a world we in contemporary society claim to have left behind, a
world of “primitive” “magical” existence in which all events are controlled not by
assigning them meaning, but by attributing causal components that are often identifiable
as unnamable forces. Burroughs’ deliberate Rimbaudian deregulation of the senses, not
to mention his experiences living in Mexico and Morocco, and his deliberate immersion
in hallucinogenic experimentation during his journeys in the Amazon as depicted in The
Yage Letters, suggests the extent to which he has tried to replicate, in modern terms,
qualities of the primal, magical world order that seems ubiquitous in primordial societies.
As he puts it, “I [give] my writing students various exercises designed to show how one
incident produces a similar incident or encounter. You can call this process synchronicity
and you can observe it in action” (Adding Machine 101).
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Burroughs lived as a writer rather than a
teacher, so his comments on teaching are limited. From the few examples of strategies he
developed to teach writing students, however, we can reach some conclusions, including
those Burroughs himself presents. The intention of his teaching is to increase student
awareness of the immense subtleties of the present moment as it passes, and to suggest
the degree to which slippage of past and present, and interference of subliminal
components, constitutes what we perceive as present reality, which so often includes
what we don’t perceive even though too often this component becomes the dominating
agent in events that shape lives. It is the effort to capture the complexity of this reality, or
to make this moment as fully alive as possible, that motivates the artist, Burroughs might
suggest. The “word technology” the writer uses as a tool of trade is a “technology of
magic,” he would maintain, though “in the case of newspapers and magazines, [it is]
mostly black magic. They stick pins in someone’s image and then show that image to
millions of people” (Adding Machine 49). Burroughs aims to sharpen perception “to help
[students] make their own enquiries into the nature of word and image as they manifest
themselves along association lines” (Adding Machine 50). The approach of “taking a
walk with the continuity and perceptions you encounter” (Adding Machine 50) is useful
to writers because “Writers operate in the magical universe” (Adding Machine 101), and
the “variations of the walk exercise [are] all designed to show the student how incidents
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are created and how he himself can create incidents. Artists and creative thinkers will
lead the way into space” — a goal Burroughs foresees as pivotal in the next stages of
human evolution — “because they are already writing, painting and filming space”
(Adding Machine 102). We can give the last word to Burroughs, who describes “writing
as [a] magical operation” and “[t]he written word [as] an image” “originally ceremonial
or magical” (Adding Machine 48-49) in nature, perhaps because of its very capacities to
generate, collect, and direct energy in all its forms. The continuity of the magical
capacities of language is central to Burroughs’ attempt to “destroy society through
fantasy” in an effort to assert the viability of the individual’s power of invention and
imaginary force as basic to the center of perceptual control — as creating a reality
remade through magic.
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